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This book has a history of over 25 years. When Swiss Democracy was first 
published in 1994, articles on Switzerland in political science journals 
were rare, and Swiss Democracy was one of very few monographs on the 
Swiss political system written in English. Meanwhile, things have changed. 
This edition can draw on extensive political science research on this ‘devi-
ant case of democracy’, and several new or revised monographs on the 
history and politics of Switzerland are on the market.1
In certain respects, Swiss Democracy has remained unique. Up to date 
with the state of scholarly research, it offers the basics of the political sys-
tem and is intended not only for an academic readership. The book strives 
to combine an accessible writing style with theoretical considerations and 
concrete political narratives. Past editions have found many readers out-
side of university classrooms. Particularly the Swiss Department of Foreign 
Affairs makes use of the message of Swiss Democracy in its diplomatic mis-
sions and public initiatives, notably with the 1500 copies ordered of the 
Arab version. The book has also been translated into Polish, Nepali, and, 
1 For example, Clive H.  Church, The Politics and Government of Switzerland (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004) and Political Change in Switzerland (Routledge, 2016), Jonathan 
Steinberg, Why Switzerland? (Cambridge University Press, 3rd edition from 2015), Pascal 
Sciarini, Manuel Fischer and Denise Traber, Political Decision-Making in Switzerland 
(Palgrave, 2015), Hanspeter Kriesi and Alexander Trechsel, The Politics of Switzerland 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), Jan-Erik Lane (ed.), The Swiss Labyrinth (Palgrave, 
2001), Michael Butler et al., The Making of Modern Switzerland (Palgrave, 2000), and, as a 
collection of political science articles, Ulrich Klöti et al., Handbook of Swiss Politics (NZZ 
Publishing, 2007).
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forthcoming, Azerbaijani. Partial translations of the text exist in Russian, 
Romanian and Serbo-Croatian.
As a kind of a reference work for a critical account of Switzerland’s 
democracy, the text needed continuous updating for two reasons. One, 
Swiss political science research has flourished over the last two decades. 
Many of its findings are relevant for this book and give readers further 
insight and hints, corresponding to the latest state of the art. Two, beneath 
Switzerland’s apparent political stability one finds steady political change. 
This relates to the Swiss Constitution which—because of its openness to 
popular initiatives—is subject to amendments almost every year. Change 
also concerns politics, where the party system has undergone fundamental 
transformations since the early 1990s. Finally, Swiss policies, under the 
disruptive effects of globalisation and Europeanisation, have been under 
pressure from abroad. In the words of British scholar Clive Church, this 
has led ‘from stability to uncertainty’.
While the second (1999) and third (2010) editions of Swiss Democracy 
were characterised by ‘soft’ renovations, this fourth edition underwent 
more extensive revisions. As a result, the former Introduction now appears 
as a separate chapter (Chap. 1) from the historic review of building a mul-
ticultural society (Chap. 2). Besides providing comprehensively updated 
statistical data, this chapter particularly describes two recent develop-
ments: the question of immigration and asylum policy, as well as the trans-
formation of the party system and its implications for the Swiss government. 
In the chapter on federalism (Chap. 3), readers will learn about the latest 
developments in the Jura conflict, the exit from nuclear power and its 
consequences for Swiss energy policy, the changing role of the Council of 
States and how the institutions of federalism are under stress from the 
outside.
The practice of direct democracy (Chap. 4) has also led to political 
turbulences. They first emerged when the people and cantons approved 
constitutional amendments conflicting with international treaties. And 
while digitalisation appears as a new chance, it also bears considerable risks 
for direct democracy. The rise of populism and growing polarisation have 
further jeopardised the politics of ‘consensus democracy’ (Chap. 5). As in 
the past, the international comparisons (Chap. 6) are focused on one 
essential question: how do the institutional features of federalism, power- 
sharing and direct democracy function in other countries? And can they 
help to solve multicultural conflict? A new chapter (Chap. 7) analyses the 
ix PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION 
policy of ‘bilateral’ relations between Switzerland and the EU, as well as 
their uncertain future. That chapter and thus the book conclude with the 
question on whether and how others could take the Swiss experience as a 
basis for their own institutional development—what I call the ‘dia-
logue model’.
Online databases play an ever-important role also in teaching and 
research. For students interested in Swiss politics, I mention just two of 
them: https://anneepolitique.swiss, a yearly chronicle about all important 
events in Swiss politics, and https://swissvotes.ch, a list of all federal pop-
ular votes since 1848, with comprehensive statistical data and the narrative 
of every single votation.
The most pleasing change of the book, however, is that I could gain 
Sean Mueller as co-author. Holding since February 2020 a Swiss National 
Science Foundation professorship at the University of Lausanne, Sean is 
one of the most promising political science scholars of his generation in 
Switzerland. He inspired me and Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun from 
Palgrave Macmillan to undertake this fourth edition. Based on the experi-
ence of a similar and rewarding cooperation for a new edition of the 
German textbook Schweizerische Demokratie,2 Sean and I took great plea-
sure in reviewing, discussing and rewriting what is now the latest edition 
of Swiss Democracy. It was realised in the spirit of maintaining the qualities 
of all past editions: a simple structure, a focus on the essentials, up to date 
on scientific research and real developments, and written in a style acces-
sible also to non-specialists.
My thanks go to the many persons who helped me in the making of 
Swiss Democracy in the past 25 years. It was the late George W. Jones of 
the Government Department of the London School of Economics who in 
1990 encouraged me to write a monograph on Swiss governance and rec-
ommended me to a British publisher. I still remember the hospitality of 
Jürg Steiner (University of North Carolina) and his wife Ruth at Chapel 
Hill, where I wrote drafts of the first edition during my sabbatical in 1992. 
Clive Church from the University of Kent at Canterbury was an important 
mentor. As a specialist in contemporary Swiss history, Clive made particu-
larly well-informed suggestions on how to explain Swiss political institu-
tions to an English-speaking public. In many respects, the questions 
2 Wolf Linder and Sean Mueller, Schweizerische Demokratie  – Institutionen, Prozesse, 
Perspektiven (Haupt, 2017).
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discussed in this book go beyond the perspective of political science. I am 
particularly grateful, therefore, to a number of colleagues from other 
disciplines: Jean-François Aubert from the University of Neuchâtel, the 
late Peter Saladin and Walter Kälin from the University of Bern, all of 
them specialists in constitutional or international law, as well as peace 
researcher Johan Galtung, at the time when he was a guest professor at our 
Institute. They were all critical readers of the manuscript for the first edi-
tion and provided invaluable advice as well as incitation.
Finally, my acknowledgements go to the many collaborators of the 
Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern who, before my 
retirement, assisted in the preparation of earlier editions. I mention Hans 
Hirter, Lorenz Kummer, Martin Senti, Adrian Vatter, Daniel Hug, 
Martina Delgrande, Thomas Holzer, Reto Wiesli, Andrea Iff, Michael 
Sutter, Franziska Ehrler, visiting scholar Peter Stettler and my long-time 
secretary Monika Spinatsch. As to this fourth edition, special thanks are 
due to the anonymous reviewer and to Palgrave’s Anne-Kathrin Birchley- 
Brun for her publishing services. Last but not least, we thank the Swiss 
National Science Foundation for enabling the Open Access publication of 
this fourth edition.
Bern, Switzerland Wolf Linder 
May 2020
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Switzerland is a bottom-up creation. Unlike other countries that were 
founded more in a top-down manner, through territorial conquest or 
dynastic intermarriage, the basic values and mechanisms of Swiss democ-
racy are cooperation, small-scale government and participatory democ-
racy. That is also why for many observers, Swiss politics has something 
archaic, outdated, medieval. Indeed, two of the most important institu-
tions, federalism and direct democracy, can draw on an almost uninter-
rupted legacy spanning centuries. The legendary foedus or pact sworn on 
the Rütli meadow in Central Switzerland epitomises pre-modern libera-
tion struggles from imperial rule, while some of the equally medieval citi-
zen assemblies have functioned to this day.
Yet albeit somewhat old-fashioned and simple in design, Switzerland is 
also profoundly postmodern and complex. It has largely achieved the 
peaceful living-together of different cultures as postulated by Kymlicka 
(1995). Its civic nationalism resembles ideas of Jürgen Habermas’ (1992) 
Verfassungspatriotismus. The Swiss polity emphasises democracy as a pro-
cess of deliberation among co-equal citizens (Barber 1984), and its con-
sensus democracy in many ways approximates the theoretical ideal-type 
(Lijphart 2012). Complexity, in turn, arrives in the form of dynamic inter-
actions between different institutional elements. Federalism, direct 
democracy and power-sharing reinforce each other in multiple ways. For 
instance, citizens can directly vote on policies and elect their representative 
at the local, regional and national levels. But there are also tensions, such 
2
as when the territorial and popular majorities collide or when certain 
regions, parties and groups feel excluded from and neglected by the gov-
ernment for too long.
In some ways, this book thus describes a ‘deviant case’ of democracy: 
one where citizens participate not only in the election of their parliament 
and government, but also vote on and ratify parliamentary decisions of 
major importance. Since this type of direct democracy has remained 
unique, it runs the risk of a double misunderstanding: rejected by some 
and glorified by others. The main goal of this book, therefore, is to criti-
cally discuss Swiss democracy and avoid both fallacies. Our hope is also 
that some aspects of Swiss democracy can stimulate creative thinking 
elsewhere.
However, it is important to keep in mind that probably nobody in her 
right mind would today invent something like Switzerland. To divide a 
small country with only 8.5 million inhabitants into 26 cantons and over 
2000 municipalities? Even Germany, with over 80 million inhabitants, 
only has 16 Länder. Moreover, not only does this mean that, on average, 
a mere 330,000 people inhabit a canton. But every canton also has its own 
constitution, government, parliament, courts, flag and anthem. In reality, 
cantons differ widely in size, from Appenzell Inner-Rhodes with just 
16,000 to Zurich with over 1.5 million inhabitants. The number of 
municipalities varies enormously, too, from Glarus and Basel with three 
each to Bern with 346 (Fig. 1.1). On top of all that, the country also rec-
ognises four different national languages—and not just any, but those of 
its big neighbouring countries, Italy, France and Germany. If at least lin-
guistic and cantonal diversity overlapped, it would all make sense. But no, 
not really: 17 cantons are officially German- and four French-speaking, 
three are bilingual (two with French, one with German as the majority 
language), one is Italian-speaking and one trilingual (German, Italian and 
Romansh). Logic was definitely not part of decision-making when this was 
all called to life.
Or, rather: logic was very well present, just not in the form of a single, 
grand design imposed by somebody from above or the outside. The great 
fortune of the Swiss has been that with only one or two exceptions, they 
were always masters of their own destiny. At the same time, it was under-
stood early on that with freedom also comes responsibility, with rights also 
duties. So rather than Cartesian, it was through trial and error, mutual 
learning and an almost instinctive scepticism towards anything new that 
today’s institutions slowly took shape. Like a child that needs to fall over 
























to learn the laws of gravity, the Swiss have had their painful military defeats 
and civil wars, too.
The purpose of this book is not to heap but praise on the Swiss way of 
doing politics and try to ‘sell’ its democracy. No system is perfect, even if 
some do seem a little less imperfect. For despite the many advantages and 
mechanisms that make Switzerland appear as a success story, there remains 
room for improvement. For the progressive left, campaign and party fund-
ing should be made more transparent. For the conservative right, integra-
tion into European-wide affairs, notably by subscribing to the free 
movement of persons, has gone too far and needs to be rolled back. Yet 
for all their cultural and political differences, Swiss citizens want the exact 
same things as those of other countries: good jobs, healthy lives, sustain-
able economies and a solidary society. Switzerland, in that sense, is noth-
ing special. All that is different is the political structure in which these 
same goals are pursued. If ever there was one general lesson to be drawn 
from the Swiss case, it is probably that finding the right institutional struc-
ture takes time and will never be finished once and for all.
Chapter 2 explains how, indeed, it was not abstract logic but pure 
necessity and pragmatics that dictated the terms of Swiss state-building. 
What is more, nation-building occurred in parallel to state-building—nei-
ther was fully present when modern Switzerland was founded in 1848, 
after a brief civil war. This circumstance, coupled with the observed cul-
tural diversity, gives Swiss nationhood its distinct political, that is, ‘civic’ 
flavour. This is very different from mono-cultural, ‘ethnic’ nations. Swiss 
history can thus be read as gradually achieving the participation of the 
most important minority groups and the different social classes through 
proportional representation. Proportionality is the first and most impor-
tant element of power-sharing, the common notion comparative political 
scientists use to describe the characteristics of democracies that renounce 
majority and ‘winner takes all’ rules (e.g. Lijphart 2012).
In Chap. 3, we focus on Swiss federalism. Federalism allows the division 
of power between one central and many regional governments and is 
therefore a widely used institutional arrangement in multicultural societ-
ies. But rather than just focusing on autonomy and differences, Swiss fed-
eralism also allows for participation and coming-together for the purpose 
of joint problem-solving. As Denis de Rougemont (2012 [1947], 88) 
explained using the very Swiss case:
As it happens, the words federalism and federation are understood in two 
very different ways in [the German- and French-speaking parts of] 
 W. LINDER AND S. MUELLER
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Switzerland. In German, Confederation means Bund, which means union, 
evoking especially the idea of centralisation. In Swiss Romande, on the con-
trary, those who profess federalism are actually the jealous defenders of can-
tonal autonomy against centralisation. For some, therefore, to federate 
simply means to unite. For others, to be federalist simply means to protect 
freedom at home. Both are wrong, because each is only half right. True 
federalism consists neither only in the union of the cantons, nor only in their 
complete autonomy. It consists in the continuously adjusted balance 
between the autonomy of the regions and their union. It consists in the 
perpetual combination of these two opposing yet mutually reinforc-
ing forces.
If federalism thus understood and practised has helped bridge the gap 
between different cultural communities, direct democracy contributed to 
avoiding one developing between the political elite and ordinary citizens. 
Chapter 4 discusses the emergence and operation of Swiss direct democ-
racy and assesses its effects on power-sharing. Contrary to what many 
theorists have claimed, it is not too demanding for people in a highly 
developed industrial society. Just as with other elements of Swiss democ-
racy, abundance is not an obstacle but key to success: the fact that citizens 
get to have a direct say up to four times a year at federal level, in addition 
to frequent referendums at cantonal and local levels, makes voting almost 
a routine exercise. It also allows today’s losers to become tomorrow’s win-
ners—and vice versa, thus fostering mutual respect and cooperation. But 
contrary also to what some revolutionaries had hoped for, it has not led to 
radical change either. Instead, direct democracy has above all led to politi-
cal conservatism, be that regarding welfare policies, defence or European 
integration. Most importantly, the Swiss Constitution and with it the 
entire development of the modern state is the direct result of dozens of 
popular votes.
Chapter 5 takes yet another step into the Swiss ‘labyrinth’ (Lane 2001) 
by unpacking the notion of power-sharing. Many other countries use a 
variety of institutional forms of plebiscite, referenda and popular initiatives 
to influence or complement parliamentary and governmental policies. 
Switzerland, however, is the only country where direct democracy has 
become an important—perhaps also the most constraining—element of 
power-sharing. In fact, the referendum has enabled different minorities to 
successfully challenge parliamentary proposals that did not take into 
account their group interests. Consequently, law-making in Switzerland 
has become impossible without the participation of various interest groups 
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at early stages of drafting already. The referendum has profoundly changed 
the Swiss governmental system, which initially intended to follow the 
winner- takes-all pattern of Anglo-American democracy. Instead, it has 
developed into broad-based political pluralism. In its structures of conso-
ciational democracy, all important political parties and interest groups are 
permanently represented in the political institutions, and legislating has 
become a process of negotiation and mutual adjustment involving differ-
ent political forces.
In Chap. 6, we develop three comparative perspectives that look beyond 
the Swiss case. Beginning with direct democracy, we discuss how it is not 
a definitive concept, but one which changes with the passage of time. 
Thus, enhancing the direct participation of people as in Switzerland—con-
sidered revolutionary in the nineteenth century—may still be regarded a 
progressive form of democracy. But can the principle of the maximum 
participation of the greatest possible number of people be applied to the 
whole spectrum of political issues and decision-making? And are increased 
political rights, offering the people not only a voice in electing their repre-
sentatives but also a chance to decide major decisions directly, really an 
efficient way to improve democracy?
The second perspective deals with federalism. Traditionally, it has been 
understood as a means for the vertical division of power within states. But 
can it also play a role for the supranational division of power and the par-
ticipation of minorities? Despite the fact that federalism is a venerable and 
well-known institutional recipe, it seems that still not all of its possibilities 
are fully exploited today. The last section of Chap. 6 places political power- 
sharing in a context of conflict resolution, especially concerning multicul-
tural societies. We end by stressing that power-sharing is not just an 
institutional arrangement, but that it also has to be based on the specific 
culture of a society that intends to practice it.
The book concludes, in Chap. 7, with a look at Switzerland in Europe 
and the world. Why are the Swiss, while profiting from globalisation, not 
a member of the EU? And how come that Switzerland, by means of a 
series of bilateral treaties with Brussels, adopts a good part of the eco-
nomic regulations enacted by that same EU? We analyse the reasons and 
political consequences of this selective participation without membership 
and try to answer the question whether or not ‘bilateralism’ is a sustain-
able strategy for the Swiss preference: utmost economic integration and 
least political loss of national autonomy.
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What about Switzerland in the world? Contrary to the hopes of Francis 
Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ thesis, we do not live in an age of 
worldwide democracy. Instead, democracy is barely consolidated in many 
countries and even at risk of disappearing (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). No 
wonder that we observe a growing interest in the institutions of Swiss 
democracy from abroad, be it in questions of decentralisation, direct 
democracy or political power-sharing. Can Swiss democracy be exported? 
We do not regard such ‘export’ ideas as appropriate. Instead, we propose 
an alternative: the ‘dialogue model’ which, as a discourse between equals, 
seems to be a more promising way. In this approach, others can draw from 
the ‘Swiss experience’ as a base for autochthonal developments of their 
institutions. And the Swiss can be inspired in turn.
Let us conclude this introductory note with an emphasis on one of the 
main Swiss paradoxes: its democracy both maximises stability and institu-
tionalises openness. How is that possible? Stability happens by letting all 
important groups participate in collective decisions, either through politi-
cal parties and governmental or parliamentary representation; interest 
groups voicing their concerns in the pre-parliamentary phase; social move-
ments building up pressure from the street or cantonal and local govern-
ments running their own show. At the same time, the system is incredibly 
open: a good idea, a determined organisation, some resources and maybe 
fortunate circumstances allow almost anyone to change the Constitution 
or bring the entire political and economic elite to its knees.
The country is small, elite members know each other and important 
issues and projects are regularly discussed in the media, at work, in associa-
tions and of course online. But despite all that, surprises still happen and 
political change occurs. Suffice it to look at the October 2019 federal elec-
tions, which produced massive gains for the Greens and Green-Liberals at 
the expense of all four government parties. Of course, one should not read 
too much into just one election. But 2019 was also the year that saw the 
biggest ever ‘Women’s Strike’ (Frauenstreik) take place, on 14 June, with 
hundreds of thousands of women (and some men) demanding full equal-
ity. And as if to top that—as some say—biggest political demonstration in 
100  years, three weeks before the parliamentary elections a further 
100,000 people took to the streets in Bern to call for a sustainable cli-
mate policy.
Welcome to Switzerland, a country that spent decades creating a system 
possibly devoid of one grand design but replete with specific answers to 
specific problems of all sorts of groups. A place where you can not only 
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vote for people and parties but also decide all important policies directly, 
at three meaningful levels of government—and still feel ignored, neglected 
and as losing out from globalisation. At the heart of Europe, the masters 
of federalism, home to a civic community of willing members—yet not in 
the EU, the other grand project of uniting different communities to the 
benefit of all.
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CHAPTER 2
Building a Multicultural Society by Political 
Integration
2.1  IntroductIon
Switzerland seems to be one of the most privileged countries in the world. 
Whereas its direct neighbours were engaged in the destructive conflicts of 
World Wars I and II, Switzerland survived as a successfully neutral and 
independent small nation in the heart of war-torn Europe. Today, its 
inhabitants enjoy one of the highest living standards among industrialised 
countries. The country lacks natural resources, but Swiss industries pro-
duce high-quality goods of global renown: from precision machines and 
watches through chocolate and cheese to pharmaceutical and chemical 
products. Its services such as banking, insurance and tourism are equally 
appreciated all over the world. With high import and export rates, 
Switzerland is strongly dependent on the European and world markets yet 
has maintained its ability to compete in many fields. Although Switzerland’s 
population is small and the country landlocked, it can compete with the 
largest developed nations. In exported goods, Switzerland ranks 17th in 
the world and among foreign investors 8th (CIA World Factbook 2019). 
What was once a poor region of mountain farmers, mercenaries and emi-
grants has become the third-largest holder of foreign exchange and gold 
reserves. No wonder it is seen as a model case of successfully finding a 
profitable niche in world markets (Box 2.1 and Fig. 2.1).
Swiss residents pay relatively low taxes for the many benefits they receive 
from their government. There are high-quality, reliable public transport 
systems which not only link cities but also extend up to small mountain 
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Box 2.1 Characteristics of Switzerland
 A. Geography
Switzerland is a landlocked country at the heart of Western 
Europe. Its total surface spans 42,000 km2, divided into three main 
areas: the Jura mountain region in the North-West, the Alps in the 
South/South-East and the Mittelland plains spread out between the 
two. Less than 10% of its soil are residential/industrial, 36% are agri-
cultural, 32% forests, and the remaining 25% unproductive. 
Switzerland borders five countries: Italy in the South, France in the 
West, Germany in the North and Liechtenstein and Austria in the 
East. Various lakes and rivers flowing in different directions (Rhine, 
Aare, Rhone, Ticino and Inn) complete the picture.
 B. Population
By the end of 2019, some 8.6 million people had permanent 
residence in Switzerland. One in five inhabitants lives in one of the 
ten largest cities, but the average population size of the roughly 
2000 municipalities is still only 3800. The largest city is Zurich 
with 430,000 inhabitants. Twenty-five per cent of the Swiss popu-
lation, that is, some 2.1 million persons, do not possess the Swiss 
nationality—although 19% of those (i.e. some 410,000) were 
born in Switzerland. In turn, some 750,000 Swiss live abroad. 
German, French, Italian and Romansh are all national languages, 
spoken by 63, 23, 8 and 0.5% of inhabitants, respectively. Five per 
cent have English as their main language, 19% another language.1 
In terms of religion, 36% of residents are Catholics, 24% 
Protestants, 6% practise another Christian faith, 5% are Muslims, 
0.3% Jewish, 3% belong to another or an unknown religion and 
26% have none. While language proportions have remained stable 
over centuries, Protestants have lost their majority (1910: 56%) 
due to secularisation and immigration from Catholic countries 
such as Italy, Spain and Portugal.
(continued)
1 Respondents could indicate more than one main language, which is why the total 
exceeds 100%.
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villages. The infrastructure for roads, energy supply and telecommunica-
tions is comprehensive and well maintained. Public education is of a high 
standard, especially in vocational training. In some research domains, the 






































































non-Swiss inhabitants employed in services
Fig. 2.1 Service economy and immigration, 1960–2018: two indicators of 
socio-economic change [%]. (Sources: CIA World Factbook (2019); BFS (2019))
 C. Economy
In 2017, Switzerland’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 523 
billion US Dollars. This corresponds to some 62,000 US Dollars per 
inhabitant, placing the country 16th worldwide, behind the various 
oil and fiscal paradises. Seventy-four per cent of GDP derive from 
services, 26% from industry and 0.7% from agriculture. Ninety per 
cent of companies have less than nine employees, but 32% of employ-
ees work in companies with 250 or more staff. Exports mainly go to 
Germany (15%), the US (12%) and China (8%), imports mainly 
come from Germany (21%), the US (8%) and Italy (7%). 
Unemployment rate is a low 3%. Nevertheless, some 8% of the popu-
lation live below the poverty line and a further 15% are at risk of 
poverty. Figure 2.1 shows how the share of non-Swiss residents and 
the expansion of the services-sector have both grown enormously 
since 1960.
Box 2.1 (continued)
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leaders. Health and social services are available to everybody, even if the 
costs of both have steadily increased over the past decades.
Finally—and here we come to the heart of the matter—the political sta-
bility of Switzerland is outstanding. With only a short interruption, the 
seven-member Swiss government has been composed of the same four par-
ties since 60 years. Together, they have represented between 70% and 90% 
of the Swiss electorate (BFS 2019). Despite the fact that every year the 
people vote on some six proposals to change the Constitution (average for 
1999–2019; Swissvotes 2019), Switzerland is not a country of political rev-
olution. Maintaining a constrictive interpretation of the principle of neutral-
ity, Switzerland has played a lesser role on the stage of international politics 
than other neutral countries such as Sweden or Austria. In doing so, it has 
avoided many of the conflicts and complications in international affairs that 
could have been dangerous, perhaps even catastrophic, for a small nation.
Outsiders thus wonder not only about Swiss conservatism, but also about 
a seeming absence of serious social, economic or cultural conflict. But even if 
they are right to suspect a connection between political stability and eco-
nomic success, the question is how such stability arose in the first place.
In the context of Swiss history, this outcome is all the more puzzling 
since initial conditions seemed anything but favourable. It would also be 
fundamentally wrong to think of Switzerland as a country without histori-
cal conflicts. Modern Switzerland was not created by one homogeneous 
ethnic people, but by different groups speaking different languages and 
adhering to different religions. Nation-building was a slowly evolving, 
bottom-up process. Moreover, nation-building and the processes of 
urbanisation, industrialisation and modernisation were accompanied by 
societal conflicts just as in other countries. The latter are in many ways 
comparable to processes in developing countries today.
In 1848, the Swiss federation emerged out of a civil war between 
Conservative Catholics and progressive Protestants. Thereafter, despite its 
political neutrality, in World War I Switzerland almost fell apart because 
political elites opted for different sides in the conflict between its neigh-
bours: the majority of German-speaking Swiss identified with Germany, 
while the French-speaking population sympathised with France (Jost 
1986). Industrialisation was accompanied of rising economic inequality 
and a class struggle between workers and entrepreneurs. This culminated 
in a nationwide strike and the intervention of the armed forces in 1918. 
The workers, whose claims were all denied by the bourgeois government, 
radicalised their opposition politics in the following decade.
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An even bigger ‘minority’, namely women of Swiss nationality, had to 
wait until 1971 to be given the right to vote on national affairs. A first 
attempt had failed in 1959. Finally, after World War II an important ethnic 
conflict broke out in the canton of Bern, where a large part of the French- 
speaking population in the Jura region felt ill at ease with the German- 
speaking majority. After a long political struggle, by 1979 they succeeded 
in creating a canton of their own, but the fate of one city, Moutier, remains 
undecided even in early 2020.
Today, the Swiss people are deeply divided on the question of European 
integration. Despite its geographical location in the heart of Europe, 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, and in a 1992 referendum a 
majority even refused to join the European Economic Area (EEA). 
Switzerland thus faces the challenges of globalisation and Europeanisation 
on its own. Being a small state, it runs the risk that many of its traditional 
comparative economic advantages turn into disadvantages. Thus, the 
question of European integration remains controversial: ‘Traditionalists’ 
see Switzerland’s best future in continuing its long-standing policy of neu-
trality and utmost sovereignty, while ‘modernists’ want Switzerland to 
become a member of the European Union or at least maintain close ties 
(e.g. Church 2016, ch. 11; Mazzoleni and Dardanelli 2019).
So how has the Swiss nation-state, once a Utopian idea, become a real-
ity? How was Switzerland able to keep its independence as a political nation 
and deal with its many religious, economic, linguistic and class conflicts? 
And, finally: how was Switzerland able to transform itself into a modern, 
industrialised nation and develop a form of democracy that already in the 
nineteenth century went further than all other European countries?
In saying that Switzerland represents a ‘paradigmatic case of political 
integration’, we echo the view of Karl Deutsch (1976), a scholar looking 
at Switzerland from the outside. Indeed, the Swiss have become a nation 
with its own, distinct identity only through and because of its political insti-
tutions. Their role was fundamental in uniting territorial communities of 
four different languages, two different religions and many more different 
regional histories. What is more, political institutions were able to turn the 
disadvantages of cultural diversity such as fragmentation and conflict into 
advantages such as experimentation and solidarity. Key to this process was 
political integration and a particular way of dealing with conflicts and 
problems in a peaceful, democratic manner. In this chapter as well as in 
many other parts of the book, specific examples illustrate what integration 
meant and how it has worked to date.
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2.2  the orIgIns of Modern swItzerland
After the Vienna Congress in 1815, when much of the European pre- 
revolutionary, old order was restored, nobody could have foreseen that 
Switzerland would shortly become one of the first modern democracies 
and a small nation-state.
The origins of Swiss integration can be traced back to three tiny alpine 
regions, which declared themselves independent from the Habsburg 
Empire in the thirteenth century. Other regions and cities then followed 
suit and by the time of the French Revolution, 13 regional polities (Orte, 
later named ‘cantons’) formed a loose confederation. However, what had 
once been a product of peasant resistance against outside jurisdiction and 
taxation had mutated into a feudalist regime of privileges, in which a for-
tunate few exploited the resources and people of newly acquired subject 
territories. This moribund ancien régime broke down when troops of the 
French Revolution, promising to bring liberty, equality and democracy, 
invaded Switzerland as they had other European countries.
While France was successful in breaking the privileges of the old can-
tons, it failed, not surprisingly, to merge the cantons into a united Helvetic 
Republic in 1798. Five years later, on the order of Napoleon Bonaparte 
himself, a part of the autonomy of the cantons was restored in the so- 
called Mediation Act, but in 1815—with Napoleon defeated—the Swiss 
chose to return to the old system. A loose confederation of now 25 inde-
pendent cantons, which considered themselves sovereign states, was re- 
established. The ‘eternal’ treaty guaranteed collective security by mutual 
assistance. A conference of canton delegates was empowered to imple-
ment common decisions. But delegates were bound by the instructions of 
their cantonal governments. Agreements and decisions were thus difficult 
to reach. The Swiss confederation of 1815 did not have a real parliament, 
let alone an executive body. In other words, Switzerland was not yet a true 
nation-state (e.g. Kästli 1998, 17–44; Vatter 2018b, 14ff.).2
In the decades after 1815, the Swiss Confederation lived through a 
period of internal polarisation between two forces, the Conservatives and 
the Radicals. The Conservatives were Catholics from mainly rural regions in 
Central Switzerland, Fribourg and Valais. Being a minority, they insisted 
2 There is often confusion about the meaning of the term confederation. Here it is used to 
describe a treaty-based system of independent states, whereas the term ‘federation’ desig-
nates a state wherein power is shared between one central government and a number of 
non-centralised governments having the status of constituent or member states. Thus, 
Switzerland will be called a confederation for the period 1815–1848, and thereafter a 
federation.
 W. LINDER AND S. MUELLER
15
that decisions taken at the Conference of Delegates (Tagsatzung) should be 
unanimous. They were sceptical about the idea of strengthening the author-
ity of the central government—just as the anti-federalist forces in the US 
had been a few decades before. In a time of early democratisation in the 
cantons, the Conservatives also wanted to preserve the traditional cultural 
and political role of the Catholic Church, especially regarding education. 
The Radicals, on the other hand, were rooted in mainly Protestant, indus-
trialising cantons such as Zurich, Berne, Basel and Geneva. The Radicals 
strove foremost for democracy under the slogan of popular sovereignty, 
with the aim of public control of all authorities. The democratic revolutions 
in many cantons sought not only political rights for all people, the division 
of power, and publicity for the debates of the elected parliament, but also 
the separation of state and church. Radicals denied the Catholic minority 
the old social privileges of their church. From the sixteenth to the eigh-
teenth century, the old confederation had suffered four internal religious 
wars—but it had also achieved agreements between Catholics and Protestants 
that led to periods of peaceful coexistence (Box 2.2). With the arrival of 
democracy, religious differences again led to conflict.
Box 2.2 Religious Conflicts Between Protestant and Catholic 
Cantons, Sixteenth–Eighteenth Centuries
1529:  A military conflict between Protestant Zurich and the five 
Catholic cantons was prevented by the first Kappeler 
Landfriede which contained the promise of confessional 
tolerance.
1531:  Battles between Catholic and Protestant troops from Zurich 
and Bern were won by the Catholics. The second Kappeler 
Landfriede was therefore in favour of the Catholics: 
Protestant confession was acknowledged but Catholics con-
served some prerogatives. This second Kappeler Landfriede 
regulated the balance until 1656.
1656:  Zurich and Bern tried to improve their position vis- à- vis the 
Catholic cantons but lost the first battle of Villmergen, 
which confirmed Catholic dominance.
1712:  The second battle of Villmergen was won by the Protestants. 
The victory eliminated Catholic hegemony in the Old 
Confederation and gave Protestant Zurich and Bern politi-
cal influence appropriate to their growing economic power.
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Religion was not the only conflict between Radicals and Conservatives, 
but it became the focus for many other conflicts within and between the 
cantons. It led to rebellions and repression by military force, as when armed 
volunteers (Freikorps) of Radicals from other cantons wanted to ‘liberate’ 
Lucerne from its Catholic government. In 1845, the Catholic cantons 
signed a separate treaty (Sonderbund) to defend their common interests. 
They also demanded a revision of the confederal compact and tried to 
obtain diplomatic help (and more) from Austria, France and Sardinia. In 
1847, the Catholic cantons left the Tagsatzung. This was interpreted by the 
Protestant cantons as secession. The differences over religion, culture and 
the political structure then escalated into a short civil war, which ended—
after 26 days and with only about 100 casualties—with the defeat of the 
secessionists (Ernst et al. 1998; Remak 1993; Roca 2012).
The way was then free for the creation of a nation-state fundamentally 
different from that established by the confederative treaty of 1815. The 
victorious Radicals were the leading force in drafting a constitutional 
framework that involved:
• The bottom-up transition from a loose confederation to a federa-
tion: The 25 cantons (today 26) were willing to establish a national 
government and, upon becoming member states of the federation, 
to renounce on some of their sovereign powers;
• The creation of a multicultural state: According to the Constitution 
of 1848, the Federation consisted ‘of the peoples (Völkerschaften) of 
the cantons’. In contrast to the unification of Germany or Italy, 
which happened in the same period, the concept of the state was thus 
not based on the same culture, religion or language of its people, but 
on the same citizenship of the different peoples of the cantons. 
Switzerland therefore represents a political or civic, not a cultural or 
ethnic nation;
• The transition to a constitutional democracy with an independent 
executive authority and its own parliament. Moreover, the Federal 
Constitution set minimum democratic standards for the institutions 
of the member states, including guarantees of certain political and 
civic rights, the separation of power, free elections to parliament and 
defining the cantonal electorate as the supreme authority for chang-
ing cantonal constitutions.
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The draft was submitted to a popular vote in 1848. The votation did 
not conform to the same standard in all cantons because there was no 
common procedure. In Fribourg and Grisons, the cantonal parliament 
decided ‘in the name of the people’, whereas the Radical government of 
Lucerne interpreted the vote as a veto and thus added the 30% non-voters 
to the yes-side. Despite these irregularities, two thirds of the cantons 
accepted the project, and on 12 September 1848 the Tagsatzung declared 
that Switzerland’s first ever Federal Constitution had been accepted by a 
large majority of people and cantons (Kölz 1992, 608ff.; Ruffieux 1983, 
10f.; Ernst et al. 1998; Kley 2011).
Fully revised in 1874 and 1999, the Constitution of 1848 nevertheless 
contained most of the organisational framework of today’s polity (Boxes 
2.3 and 2.4). Table 2.1 shows that the Swiss federal system consists of 
legislative, executive and judicial organs at each level. Note, however, that 
the Swiss system conforms less to the classical concept of separation of 
powers than to an idea of mutual cooperation and control that is partly 
comparable with the checks and balances of the US Constitution. Finally, 
Box 2.5 provides an overview of the Swiss party system.
Box 2.3 Main Authorities of the Federation
Federal Assembly: Bicameral parliamentary body representing the 
people (National Council) and the cantons (Council of States). Both 
chambers have equal powers. The Federal Assembly exercises the 
supreme authority of the federation, having the legislative power to 
make all federal laws, and appointing the members of the Federal 
Council and the Federal Court, the Commander-in-Chief or general 
(in times of war) and other major federal bodies. It supervises all 
authorities of the Swiss federal government and approves the annual 
budget proposed by the Federal Council.
Federal Council: Supreme executive and governing authority of 
the Swiss federation. Its composition mirrors power-sharing 
between different parties and cultures: the seven members of the 
Federal Council are representatives of four different political par-
ties (in basically the same composition since 1959: three bour-
geois centre-right and one left-wing party). An unwritten law 
(continued)
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requires that at least two members come from French- or Italian-
speaking regions. The Council acts as a collegiate body. There is 
no role of prime minister with prerogatives over the other mem-
bers of cabinet; thus, most decisions come from and are under-
written by the Council as a whole. One of the seven serves as 
president of the federation. By custom, this function is carried out 
by a different member each year. The president has no special 
political privileges, only formal duties. Each federal councillor 
heads one of the seven ministries (called departments): Foreign 
Affairs; Home Affairs; Justice and Police; Defence Civil Protection 
and Sports; Finance; Economic Affairs; Education and Research; 
and Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications. The 
federal administration, located mostly in Bern, has a staff of about 
38,000 civil servants and employees—the army, national rail and 
postal services excluded.
Federal Tribunal: The Federal Supreme Court acts as the final 
court of appeal in cases coming from cantonal courts and involv-
ing federal law. Thus, the Court acts in all areas of Swiss law but 
in very different functions, depending on the specificity of the 
case. The Court also decides on conflicts between the federation 
and the cantons and on conflicts among the latter. It is empow-
ered to review all legislative and executive acts of the cantons and 
guarantees the constitutional rights of the citizens. However, the 
Court does not have the power, either directly or by implication, 
to rule on the constitutionality of federal laws. The Supreme 
Court is located in Lausanne, with specialist chambers in Lucerne, 
St. Gall and Bellinzona. The Federal Assembly elects all judges 
for a term of office of six years. The composition of the Supreme 
Court complies with both cultural and partisan proportionality: 
all three state languages as well as the most important political 
parties are adequately represented.
Box 2.3 (continued)
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Box 2.4 Direct Democracy
Besides electing their parliament, the Swiss voters are provided with 
three important instruments of direct democracy: the popular initia-
tive, the mandatory referendum and the facultative referendum.
The popular initiative is a formal proposition which demands a con-
stitutional amendment. It must be submitted to the vote of the people 
and cantons if the proposition is signed by at least 100,000 citizens 
within 18 months. Before the vote, the Federal Council and the Federal 
Assembly give non-binding advice on whether the proposal should be 
accepted or rejected and occasionally formulate a counterproposal.
The mandatory referendum obliges parliament to submit every 
amendment of the Federal Constitution and important international 
treaties to the approval of a majority of cantons and the people.
The facultative referendum provides 50,000 citizens or eight can-
tons with the option to challenge any Act of Parliament within 
100 days of its publication. If that quorum is reached, the Act is 
submitted to a binding vote, with a simple popular majority deciding 
on approval or rejection.
3 For general and  comparative accounts of  Swiss nationhood, see Eugster and  Strijbis 
(2011) as well as Dardanelli and Stojanovic ́ (2011) and Zimmer (2003).
2.3  turnIng Poor odds Into good ones: factors 
that Made swIss natIon-BuIldIng a success3
As the short historical account of the previous section suggests, the transi-
tion from confederation to federation was not an easy one. First, the 
Conservatives’ desire to maintain key elements of the old order made 
them fiercely opposed to giving away the sovereign rights of their cantons, 
preferring instead to maintain the status quo. The innovating forces, on 
the other hand, were firmly opposed to this. Second, there was the prob-
lem of cultural differences. Besides religion, there was the question of 
language. German was, and still is, spoken by some 70% of the population. 
Those in the French- and Italian-speaking regions feared that, as minori-
ties, they would be made worse off by yielding their political power to a 
central government. Third, economic structures differed from canton to 
canton, as did preferences for trade regulations protecting the interests of 
farmers, craftsmen and traders.
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Box 2.5 Political Parties
The social cleavages and antagonistic political interests in the second 
half of the nineteenth century led to three main tendencies in Swiss 
political life: liberalism, conservatism and socialism. Coupled with the 
urban-rural and religious divide, these tendencies crystallised into the 
four governmental parties: Radicals (liberal, urban and largely 
Protestant), Christian-Democrats (conservative, rural and largely 
Catholic), Social-Democrats (socialist, urban and working class) and 
the Swiss People’s Party (conservative, rural and historically 
Protestant). Federalism and proportional representation, however, 
have led to a highly fragmented multi-party system. Since there are no 
quotas, usually over ten different parties are represented in parliament.
A further distinction can be made between governmental and 
non-governmental parties. The development of political power- 
sharing in the twentieth century has led to a multi-party govern-
ment. From 1959 to 2003, there was an informally fixed distribution 
of the seven executive seats among the four biggest parties (the 
‘magic formula’) according to their electoral strength: two seats each 
for the Radicals, Christian-Democrats and Social Democrats, one for 
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). The rest of the parties occupied less 
than 20% of the electorate and did not form a coherent opposition. 
The SVP gained one seat in 2003 at the expense of the Christian- 
Democrats, was out of government in 2008, but returned to occupy 
one and then two seats in 2009 and 2016, respectively. So the new 
formula is two seats each for the Radicals, SVP and Social-Democrats, 
one for the Christian-Democrats (see also Chap. 5).
The federal elections of 2019 led to substantial changes in the 
party system: All four governmental parties lost part of their sup-
porters, whereas Greens and Green-Liberals almost doubled their 
electorate. The worldwide campaign against climate change thus did 
not fail to have a great impact on Swiss voters. The majority of the 
Federal Assembly, however, refused to allocate the Greens a seat in 
the Federal Council. Without the Greens and with two clearly over-
represented parties (Radicals and Social-Democrats), the arithmetic 
rule of proportional representation is violated. If the Greens can 
repeat their electoral success in 2023, adjustments of the ‘magic 
formula’ will have to be sought.
(continued)
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The profiles of current governmental and non-governmental 
parties and their performance at the 2019 federal elections (National 
Council) are as follows:
• Governmental parties
 – Radical-(Liberal) Democrats (15.1% of the vote, 35% female 
MPs): regards itself the heir to nineteenth century liberal 
ideas; enjoys close relations with business and industry and is 
highly influential in economic matters. Represents indepen-
dent professionals, entrepreneurs and the upper-middle class.
 – Christian-Democrats (11.4%; 28%): successor to the Catholic 
Conservative Movement. Still the preferred party of Catholics. 
With a bourgeois and a trade-union wing, it tries to integrate 
the opposing interests of entrepreneurs and employees.
 – Social-Democrats (16.8%; 64%): in former times periodically 
a Radical left movement. Today a moderate party standing 
for social, ecological and economic reforms. Enjoys close 
relations with trade unions. Most of its supporters live in 
urban, industrialised regions, but it draws on all social groups.
 – Swiss People’s Party (25.6%; 25%): once a conservative party 
appealing mainly to farmers, craftsmen and independent pro-
fessionals, it has more than doubled its electoral force over the 
last 30 years and become the biggest political party. Defending 
Swiss sovereignty and neutrality, it is today situated at the 
national-conservative right. The success of the People’s Party 
was the result of several factors: absorbing smaller right-wing 
parties, strong mobilisation of anti- European and anti-immi-
gration parts of the electorate, populist strategies, stronger 
professional organisation, charismatic and authoritative party 
leadership and substantial financial resources.
• Non-governmental parties
 – Greens (13.2; 61%): party of the ecology movement; has 
drawn from left parties as well as from new social movements.
 – Green-Liberals (7.8; 50%): split from the Green Party in 
2007 to address centre-oriented ecologists, that is, voters 
Box 2.5 (continued)
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Fourth, nationalism, at the beginning, was a kind of abstract Utopia. 
What is called nationalism today in East-European countries, for instance, 
is an appeal to a common cultural heritage or ethnic group. In Switzerland, 
the reverse applied: the people of the cantons represented different lan-
guages, ethnic groups and religions and had to be convinced that they 
should form a common nation, which to them was artificial in every 
respect. Certainly the people of the cantons were known as ‘the Swiss’, but 
they really felt themselves to be from Zurich, Uri, Geneva or Ticino, with 
little in common with people of other cantons. Last but not least, some 
cantons had serious internal conflicts. In Basel, for instance, the city was 
unwilling to give up its political control over the surrounding regions. 
When a compromise failed to be reached, the city and countryside sepa-
rated to form two independent half-cantons.4
willing to better protect the environment but without too 
much government regulation.
 – Bourgeois-Democratic Party (2.4%; 0%): split from the Swiss 
People’s Party in 2008, moderate right-wing party.
 – Protestant Party (2.1%; 67%): counterpart to the Christian- 
Democrats, but without their electoral success.
 – Alternative left (1%; 50%): successor of former Radical left 
parties (mainly the Communist Party and progressive organ-
isations) that have almost disappeared. Non-dogmatic, 
socialist, feminist and ecological.
 – Federal Democratic Union (1%; 0%): Radical-right, defends 
Christian values, Eurosceptic.
 – Lega dei Ticinesi (0.8%; 0%): regionalist-populist party in 
Canton Ticino, anti-immigration like the SVP but some-
times also left-oriented in welfare questions.
Box 2.5 (continued)
4 In 1830, the rural population around the city of Basel demanded proportional represen-
tation in the cantonal parliament, that is, a number of seats according to their demographic 
weight. After the city refused, a civil war broke out in which numerous people were wounded 
and killed. In 1833, the Swiss confederation approved the separation of Basel into two half-
cantons, bringing the conflict to an end (e.g. Andrey 1983, 247ff.).
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Thus, it was not easy to push the idea of a nation-state when political 
perspectives and horizons were shrinking rather than widening in many 
cantons. Instead of ‘coming together’ (Stepan 1999) to form a single 
nation-state, the cantons could have been stuck with their internal quar-
rels and vanish from the map of Europe.
So what did bring Switzerland together?
2.3.1  Economy
By the middle of the nineteenth century, early industrialisation had reached 
many cantons. New elites, whose status was based on industrial wealth and 
capital rather lineage and privilege, entered the public arena. The harness-
ing of power from rivers led to a pattern of decentralised industry, reaching 
far up into the Alpine valleys. The first railroad between Baden and Zurich 
opened in 1847, and from then on it became evident that the boundaries 
of cantonal markets were obstacles to growing industrial activities. The 
Federal Constitution of 1848 promised not only to remove these obstacles, 
but also to create a new, common economic market. It banned cantonal 
toll barriers and empowered the federal government to issue a Swiss cur-
rency as well as to introduce a federal postal service. Moreover, the 
Constitution aimed to promote ‘common wealth’ (gemeinsame Wohlfahrt), 
and it promised equal rights as well as freedom of residence in any canton 
to all those who became Swiss citizens. One historian went so far as to say 
that the economic necessity of creating a common market was more impor-
tant than the political ideas of Swiss nationalism (Rappard 1912).
2.3.2  Pressure from the Outside
When the great powers, at the Vienna Congress of 1815, restored the pat-
terns of Old Europe, Metternich and the delegates of the other countries 
were not unhappy about a neutral zone between Austria, Sardinia- 
Piedmont and France. The Swiss confederation thus gained further recog-
nition of its political neutrality (Box 2.6), which the cantons had begun to 
observe as early as 1648. Between 1815 and 1848, however, the cantons 
learned that they were somewhat dependent on the good—or bad—will 
of their powerful neighbours. While the latter were far from thinking of 
annexing the cantons, this did not make them refrain from diplomatic 
intervention into Swiss affairs. This situation was exacerbated by some 
cantons seeking diplomatic help from outside, as did the members of the 
Sonderbund (see above).
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5 Riklin (1991) adduces three additional functions: (a) the free trade function, (b) the 
function of maintaining a political equilibrium in Europe and (c) the function of offering 
‘good offices’ in international relations. See also Kreis et al. (1992) and Goetschel (2007).
Box 2.6 Neutrality: A Necessary Aid in Building up the 
Swiss Nation
Political neutrality has long been a traditional cornerstone of Swiss 
foreign policy. After a disastrous defeat in the battle at Marignano 
(near Milano) in 1515, the Swiss cantons slowly grew aware of the 
advantages of neutrality. In fact, this turned out to be the only way 
to maintain the integrity and independence of a confederation con-
sisting of small cantons surrounded by larger and belligerent powers. 
Subsequently, the Swiss avoided becoming involved in conflicts 
between neighbouring states, especially during the 30 years of reli-
gious war in Europe which ended in 1648. It took a long time, 
however, for the unilateral declaration of neutrality to be recognised 
abroad. It thus did not prevent the Swiss cantons from being occu-
pied by the French during the years 1798–1802. Things changed 
only after the Vienna Congress of 1815, when the European powers 
at last recognised the neutrality of the confederation, realising that it 
was in their own interest to use it to preserve the desired political 
equilibrium. After the creation of the federation in 1848, Switzerland 
became able to more efficiently defend its neutrality with its own 
armed forces. This was particularly important in the twentieth cen-
tury, when Switzerland was one of the very few European nations 
not to be involved in either World War I or World War II (Riklin 2006).
Neutrality, historically, has had two main functions: internal inte-
gration and external independence. Integration through neutrality 
prevented the cantons of the old confederation from becoming 
divided by the conflicts of their neighbours and from being broken 
up into antagonistic religious and cultural camps. Later on, armed 
neutrality helped to preserve the independence of the Swiss 
federation.5
Today, the Swiss idea of neutrality is firmly based on the law of 
nations as formulated in the ‘Hague treaty on the rights and duties 
of neutral powers and persons’ of 1907. ‘Neutrality in the sense of 
(continued)
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In the middle of the nineteenth century, the cantons witnessed impor-
tant experiments in nation-building as when the small neighbouring king-
doms of Sardinia-Piedmont, Lombardy-Venetia, Baden, Wurttemberg 
and Bavaria became parts of Italy and Germany, respectively. What would 
be the future of the small cantons when their neighbours developed as 
members of larger and more powerful nation-states—each of them speak-
ing one of the Swiss languages? In fact, the process of Swiss unification 
developed a strong momentum by assuring a better collective security for 
all the cantons, and precisely the lack of linguistic unity forced the elite to 
seek other means of imaginary togetherness (Zimmer 2003). Thus, the 
Swiss Constitution of 1848 speaks of federal responsibilities to guarantee 
the independence of the Swiss nation in ‘unity, force and honour’, as well 
as to uphold internal security and order.
2.3.3  Democracy and Social Values
Enthusiastic nineteenth century writers praised the Swiss for their ‘innate 
taste for democracy’. The Swiss were certainly not the inventors of 
the law of nations’ means nothing more than the neutral nation’s 
non-participation in a war involving other nations. In fulfilling this, 
first, Swiss neutrality is permanent and defended by an army. Second, 
Switzerland pursues a policy of doing everything to ensure neutrality 
in a future war. But Switzerland’s policy goes far beyond this. After 
World War II, its extensive interpretation of ‘neutrality’ even meant 
non-participation in the European Community, the United Nations 
and other multilateral organisations. The reason given for this was 
the wish not to participate in economic sanctions or peace-enforcing 
measures, considered a threat to Switzerland’s neutrality.
After the end of the Cold War, the government’s policy has 
changed. In the 1990s, it participated in peace-keeping missions of 
the EU, the OSCE and the UN in the Balkans. In 2002, Switzerland 
decided by a popular vote to become a member of the UN. Neutrality 
is no longer an obstacle for participation in economic sanctions or 
peace- keeping operations, if decided by a universal organisation such 
as the UN (Kux 1994; Gabriel 1995; Gabriel and Fischer 2003).
Box 2.6 (continued)
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democracy—such ideas were brought to Switzerland through the French 
Revolution—and while finding their modern form of democratic govern-
ment, Swiss and US constitutionalists were mutually influenced.6 However, 
Switzerland did possess a cultural heritage which had prepared its people 
both to learn about democracy and to live with it: the Landsgemeinden 
(Meuwly 2018, 43). Also, the Swiss cantons had long been independent 
of both imperial and monarchical rule. While their old regimes were highly 
elitist, they were at least autochthonous (and, in French, ‘plus paternalistes 
qu’autoritaires’; ibid., 24).
As small societies, the cantons were unable to develop complex regimes. 
Most lacked the resources to build up professional bureaucracies and to 
back the modern form of ‘rational power’ of the state. Especially in rural 
regions, public works—such as building roads or aqueducts in the Valais 
canton—were done on a community basis: every adult man was obliged to 
work for several days or weeks a year for the common good (Niederer 
1965). In addition, many economic activities—farming in rural regions 
and crafts in the cities—were bound up in organisations which required 
collective decision-making. This, and the mutual dependence of people in 
small societies, promoted communalism. That was also reflected in the 
slogans used in the democratic revolutions in the cantons during the nine-
teenth century, when calls for the ‘sovereignty of the people’ became 
louder and louder (e.g. Meuwly 2018, ch. 5).
It is difficult to say whether Swiss democratisation came primarily from 
‘above’ or ‘below’. Certainly the democratic revolutions, which began in 
1831 and swept through many cantons, involved more than just the elites. In 
the small canton of Thurgau, which then had less than 80,000 inhabitants, 
more than 100 petitions with 3000 propositions for a new democratic consti-
tution were collected and discussed in the communes (Soland 1980). Some 
scholars, however, affirm that democratisation did not eliminate the elites 
then in power, but simply redistributed the cards for a new game under the 
same rules. Democratic revolutions neither took away the inherited wealth 
from old patrician families, nor did they prevent the concentration of capital 
in the hands of a few (Masnata and Rubattel 1991).
6 According to James H. Huston (1991), there were several periods of mutual influence. 
Especially important were three periods: (a) in the debate between American federalists and 
anti-federalists, the latter took the model of the old Swiss confederation as their reference; 
(b) the Swiss, in 1848, had the American Constitution very much in their minds when com-
bining the principles of federalism and democracy; (c) towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, the institutions of Swiss direct democracy were taken as a point of reference.
2 BUILDING A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY BY POLITICAL INTEGRATION 
28
Moreover, the rules of nineteenth century Swiss democracy were—by 
the standards of today—less than perfect: women were denied political 
rights, while some cantons established electoral rules that excluded poor 
or unmarried men from voting. Citizens elected their parliament but were 
denied the right to elect their government. Yet at the same time, political 
rights were gradually extended to allow the people a say over actual deci-
sions of their parliament. This was the beginning of semi-direct democ-
racy, which will be described in Chap. 4.
After 1831, the concept of democracy—implying equal voting rights—
spread among all cantons and their different cultures. When it succeeded 
at cantonal level, the experience of democracy helped the process of unifi-
cation: the sovereignty of the people was one of the few things that almost 
all the different cantons had in common, and what they wanted and agreed 
upon (see Box 2.7).
Box 2.7 Developing a Collective Identity
Successful nation-building needs cultural cement: the development 
of collective identity. Unlike nations such as France, Germany or 
Italy, Switzerland could not rely on one common culture, language 
or ethnicity, which were the prevailing bases of European nation- 
building in the nineteenth century. Therefore, it may have been dif-
ficult to find a common thread to bind together people from different 
cantons and thus identify themselves as ‘Swiss’. However, the devel-
opment of patterns of collective identity relied on ‘civic’ elements 
such as national symbols, shared history, common myths and finally 
the new federal polity.
After 1848, one can observe a search for a shared identity, for a 
common denominator (Im Hof 1991). Historians offered an inte-
grating view of the past. The many local battles in the old peasant 
cantons to defend their independence against invasions by the 
‘Habsburg hordes’ became part of a glorious heritage that all Swiss 
could be proud of. Historians also told that the Swiss elites went 
back as far as 1291, when three local leaders swore an oath of politi-
cal independence and mutual help. This act of will was especially 
emphasised and declared to have been the birth of Switzerland.
On 1 August 1891, the oath of 1291 was for the first time cele-
brated on a national basis. History was personalised so as to improve 
(continued)
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the opportunity for identification. Legendary and symbolic figures 
such as William Tell (a hero killing a foreign tyrant) and Helvetia 
(the mother of the nation) were omnipresent on postal stamps, pop-
ular pictures and hundreds of pub and inn signs. Today, historians 
give a much more sober account of Swiss history when trying to 
distinguish between the facts and the myths. Some claim that William 
Tell never existed, and that the events in 1291 are fiction. Even if 
that were true, from the point of national identification, this misses 
the point: symbolic figures and myths gave life to the idea of a com-
mon Swiss culture, and probably more so than actual events because 
they were independent of a particular social structure and allowed 
people with different backgrounds to identify with them.
The Alps were another element of national identification. The pic-
ture of a nation consisting mainly of farmers and shepherds living in 
isolated mountain chalets or small villages was drawn to distinguish 
Switzerland from other countries, although large parts of Switzerland 
had already been industrialised by the nineteenth century.
From the very beginning, therefore, Swiss identity relied not only 
on what its people shared with each other, but also on very Swiss 
specificities (Ruckstuhl 1991, 136; Demont-Heinrich 2005)—
things that allowed the Swiss to feel different from their neighbours. 
Most important in this respect was the Swiss polity itself. Swiss direct 
democracy is different from other types of democracy, and it has also 
become the most precious element of its common culture. Moreover, 
the fact that all men are legally bound to serve in the army is not only 
a means of social integration. Until 1971, when voting was the privi-
lege of male citizens only, the duty of serving in the army was con-
sidered to be correlative with having political rights—and was used 
as an argument against women’s suffrage. The ideology of all male 
citizens defending their country, and identifying with this task, was 
said to be the ‘cement’ of Swiss society especially during World War II.
Today, many of these symbols, myths and glorifications of history 
have lost their persuasiveness. But politically Swiss citizens are still 
convinced that their direct democracy is unique, their federalism and 
the neutrality of the country useful. The Swiss are proud if their 
football team wins an important game and sway the national flag as 
do the citizens of all other countries.
Box 2.7 (continued)
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2.3.4  Combining Democracy with Federalism
Democracy is founded on the principle of ‘one person, one vote’ and on 
the rule of the majority, which together make collective decisions binding 
for all. But is it defensible that a sizeable minority with different opinions 
and interests should have to comply with the decisions of the majority? 
One of the answers to this controversial question of political theory is that 
no majority decision is final. The minority should always have the right to 
propose a reconsideration of the decision taken, and if its arguments are 
convincing a new majority will be found for a revised decision. But while 
this may hold good for different opinions on common interests, it would 
not satisfy minority groups with religious beliefs or cultural values inher-
ently different from those of the majority. French-speakers cannot become 
German-speakers and Catholics do not become Protestants because of 
democracy. If a society is deeply divided by such cultural or religious cleav-
ages, democracy alone cannot help the problem of ‘frozen’ or ‘eternal’ 
minority or majority positions: the minority, which under pure ‘one citi-
zen, one vote’ rules can never win, is likely to be frustrated and discrimi-
nated against. In turn, even for the eternal majority, who can afford not to 
learn, power can become pathological (Deutsch 1967, 214–43).
This was the exact problem when the Swiss cantons were ready to set 
up their central government. For good reasons, Catholic and non- German- 
speaking citizens and their cantons were fearful of being systematically 
overruled on questions of faith, language and culture more generally. 
Thus, if the popular desire for government by the people gave momentum 
to unification, democracy was at the same time disadvantageous to the 
prospects of the creation of a Swiss nation-state since it risked working 
only for some of them: the German-speaking Protestant majority.
Combining democracy with federalism provided the answer. Federalism 
allowed the sharing of power between one central government and the 
cantons. In all matters that were the responsibility of the cantons, different 
answers to the same question were possible—answers that corresponded 
to the preferences of different ethnic or religious groups, who although a 
minority nationally were majorities regionally. Thus, federalism permit-
ted—and still permits—cultural differences to coexist alongside each 
other, and it protects minorities without infringing too much on the 
majority. As we shall see when discussing federalism in Chap. 3, the initial 
division of power between the federation and the cantons was very much 
in favour of the latter, providing for the utmost autonomy of cantons and 
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their cultural, social and political particularities. In 1848, this division of 
power in favour of the cantons also meant a concession to the Catholic 
conservative minority, military losers of the civil war, which gave the state- 
building project a better chance of succeeding in the forthcoming referen-
dum on the new Constitution.
Next to regional autonomy or self-rule, federalism also allowed the can-
tons to become active participants in central government decision-making 
(shared rule). The Constitution provided for a system of parliamentary 
bicameralism similar to that of the US. Thus, the National Council repre-
sents the Swiss people but is complemented by the Council of States, 
where all cantons are equally represented regardless of their population 
size. Moreover, the cantons also matter when deciding on constitutional 
amendments, since the Swiss-wide popular majority in favour has to be 
accompanied by a majority of cantonal electorates (double majority). In 
both instances, therefore, the democratic principle of ‘one person, one 
vote’ is combined with, on equal terms, the federal principle of ‘one can-
ton, one vote’. As we shall see in Chap. 3, this requirement for a cantonal 
majority has become very important.
2.4  relIgIous and ethnIc MInorItIes: 
froM coexIstence to PluralIsM
The Constitution of 1848 provided an institutional framework able to 
give unity to a diverse nation. It promised to peacefully resolve conflicts 
between minorities and majorities. A constitution, however, is only a legal 
document at first. Later it becomes a framework for political life, even if 
not political life itself. In this section, we turn from the framework to the 
picture and ask: how did formal political unity spur political integration 
and further develop the identity of Swiss society? Instead of treating this 
subject in a general form, we concentrate on the two minorities which 
were most important at the time, and for whom the success or failure of 
integration was crucial: Catholics and linguistic minorities.
2.4.1  Political Catholicism: From Segmentation to Integration
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Catholic minority comprised 
about 40% of the Swiss population. The cantons more or less represented 
religiously uniform entities. In 1860, ten cantons had over 75% Protestants, 
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eleven rather smaller cantons had over 75% Catholics. Only four cantons 
(Geneva, Grisons, Aargau and St. Gall) had a more even distribution of 
religions. Despite the fact that Catholic-Conservatives eventually achieved 
a good constitutional compromise, history first led to the segregation of 
the Catholic minority rather than to their integration. Politically, they 
retired to the strongholds of ‘their’ cantons and let the Radical majority 
take the initiative in forging the national unity of the new federal state.
Catholic regions were mostly rural, cut off from the industrialisation 
that was the main concern of the political elites in their progressive 
Protestant counterparts. The First Vatican Council of the Catholic Church, 
held in Rome in 1871, was hostile to the modernisation of society and 
scientific progress, opposed the separation of religion and state, and tried 
to enforce the position of the Pope as the sole and binding authority in all 
aspects of life. Both factors led to isolation and segregation. Many Catholic 
cantons entrusted the Catholic Church with the task of public education 
or maintained segregated public primary and secondary schools. Even in a 
few mixed cantons, religious segregation in schools was continued well 
into the second half of the twentieth century. In Fribourg, a Catholic uni-
versity was founded in 1889. A tight web of social organisations kept 
Catholics together and close to the church—both in their home cantons 
and in the diaspora regions where Catholics constituted a minority.
Catholics not only had their own political party, they also had their own 
trade unions, newspapers and bookshops. In mixed regions, they remained 
loyal to the Catholic butcher, pub, plumber and carpenter—even when 
the quality of a Protestant competitor was said to be better (Altermatt 
1991, 147). This kind of segmentation also existed on the other side, but 
to a much lesser extent: Protestant Switzerland lacked both the political 
leadership of a confessional party and the moral pressure of a single church 
to integrate all social classes on a continuing basis.
No wonder that conflict over religious issues became acute, especially in 
the mixed cantons. Swiss history books speak of the ‘cultural struggle’ 
(Kulturkampf) because the issue went far beyond religion to embrace dif-
ferent views of the role and interplay of society and state. The first total 
revision of the Federal Constitution in 1873–1874 was influenced by this 
struggle, which reached its peak around 1870. The Constitution of 1874 
aimed at a fully secularised state and eliminated most public functions of 
the church. Several articles of the Constitution confirmed the anti-clerical 
character of the federation and the isolation of Catholics. Examples are:
 W. LINDER AND S. MUELLER
33
• The prohibition of Jesuit activities;
• The prohibition on founding and restoring monasteries;
• No creation of episcopates without the permission of the federation;
• Federal control of citizenship and protection of marriage by the state;
• Ban of clerical courts and jurisdictions;
• The obligations for the cantons to establish confessionally neutral 
schools under the direction of the state; and
• Full religious freedom without privileging any of the Christian 
confessions.
Insofar as these provisions were discriminating against Catholics, they 
have been eliminated from the Constitution in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Today, the regulation of the relationship between the 
church and the state is the sole responsibility of the cantons. These rela-
tions vary from canton to canton. Usually there is no complete separation 
of state and church: the Protestant, Roman-Catholic and the small Christ- 
Catholic Churches are acknowledged as public institutions, called 
Landeskirchen. Some cantons—for instance Zurich—have given a similar 
status to the Jewish communities, but not to the 20 times larger Muslim 
communities which have grown rapidly in the last few decades.
The historic cultural conflict between Catholics and Protestants has by 
now faded away. Many of the issues were settled by the establishment of a 
modern, liberal democracy, which reduced the direct influence of religious 
organisations on the state. However, the more than four generations during 
which federalism permitted ‘in-between’ solutions to these conflicts needs to 
be noted. Thus, cultural issues were less ‘settled’ than given time to cool down.
This cooling down and the decline of the confessional schism was 
helped by several factors. First, the separation of Catholic and Protestant 
societies was overcome by modernisation. Geographically, a strong and 
steady migration between Catholic and Protestant regions opened ‘ghetto- 
oriented minds’ to religious tolerance and cooperation. Migration led to 
desegregation, which in turn helped integration. The declining influence 
of religion on people’s lives opened the way to pragmatic solutions: smaller 
communities, instead of building two churches, constructed one that was 
used and maintained by both Catholics and Protestants. Marriage between 
Protestants and Catholics became common. Industrialisation and the 
modern economy did not distinguish between Catholic and Protestant 
money. Divisions disappeared as more and more Catholics gained equal 
access to those economic and social activities which had once been seen as 
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typically Protestant. Cultural and political Catholicism itself developed 
pluralist attitudes towards the state. At the beginning of the 1970s, the 
former Catholic Conservative Party accordingly renamed itself the 
Christian-Democratic Party. The new label suggested the promotion of 
more general values of Christian belief and culture and acceptance of the 
separation of state and religion. This was similar to the programmes of 
Christian-Democrats in Germany and Italy after the end of World War II.
This brings us to the second, more political factor. Federalism permit-
ted Catholics to maintain the particularities of their culture in their ‘own’ 
cantons during the first decades of the nation-state. Later the devices of 
direct democracy permitted the Catholic minority to participate, with 
considerable success, in federal decision-making. Notably after the intro-
duction of the facultative referendum in 1874, Catholic-Conservatives 
were able to successfully challenge proposals by the Radical-dominated 
parliament. Simple majority politics therefore became impossible—the 
Catholics had to be integrated through participation in the government. 
Moreover, in 1918 a coalition of Catholic-Conservatives and Social- 
Democrats succeeded in imposing proportionality rules for elections to 
the National Council. This meant the end of the absolute majority of the 
Radicals in the Swiss parliament, and for Catholics the beginning of power- 
sharing. Most astonishing: with class struggles growing in importance, the 
Catholic opponent of the nineteenth century even became the closest ally 
of the Radicals in the twentieth century!
Beyond participation in the Federal Council and key positions in the 
federal administration, power-sharing meant compromises on legislative 
issues between Radicals and Catholic-Conservatives. It thus brought 
political influence, recognition and success to the Catholic part of soci-
ety—and that success is enduring. Although religious cleavages have 
largely disappeared, Christian-Democrats still constitute one of the four 
governmental parties. Economically, they have become advocates of busi-
ness interests almost as much as their Radical partners in government, 
although they often defend social policies together with the left. Christian- 
Democrats, therefore, have become a pragmatic centrist party. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that some crucial questions of the cultural schism—
such as the prohibition of Jesuits, who in the nineteenth century were 
regarded by Protestants as advocates and conspiratorial actors of counter- 
reformation—were only resolved long after the practical relevance of the 
issue had disappeared. Questions regarding fundamental values and reli-
gious belief take time to be settled—or even a long period of voluntary 
non-decisions, thereby avoiding the re-awakening of old cultural conflicts.
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2.4.2  Multilingualism: Understandings 
and Misunderstandings
Multilingualism constitutes a second instance of the historical integration 
of cultural minorities into Swiss society (McRae 1964; Windisch 1992; Du 
Bois 1999). Today, about 73% of Swiss citizens speak German, 21% 
French, 4% Italian and 0.6% Romansh, a minor language largely descend-
ing from Latin and spoken in a few Alpine regions in south-eastern 
Switzerland.7 The issue of multilingualism, however, differs in two ways 
from the subject previously discussed. Multilingualism—with the impor-
tant exception of the Jura problem, discussed below—never became as 
crucial as the question of religious minorities. And, as we shall see, societal 
segmentation by language played, and still plays, a different role.
Let us first consider the institutional arrangements that protect linguis-
tic minorities. Federalism, first, permits Romansh-, Italian- and French- 
speaking minorities to live their own culture within the boundaries of 
‘their’ canton(s). Moreover, being a majority in their canton, they also 
have a political voice in the decision-making of the central government. 
The historical importance of this voice may be illustrated by the fact that 
until 1974, the members of the National Council were seated in linguistic 
blocs (BAR 2011, 2).
Second, there are statutory rights for linguistic minorities. Linguistic 
autonomy is guaranteed by the principle of ‘territoriality’: the cantons are 
not only authorised but even obliged to guarantee the traditional 
language(s) of their region. Hence, newcomers need to adjust to whatever 
language is spoken in a given territory, and no commune can be forced to 
change its official language. German, French, Italian and Romansh are all 
defined as national languages.8 Banknotes and the most important federal 
7 If the total population, including the 25% foreign nationals, is taken into consideration, 
the proportion of Italian-speakers increases, whereas the proportion of German-people 
decreases (see Box 2.1).
8 In 1938, Romansh was added as the fourth national language of Switzerland. This was 
the result of a 1935 request by the executive of Canton Grisons, at the height of Italian fas-
cism under Mussolini. The initiators understood the request ‘primarily as an aid to Romansh 
in its uphill struggle for survival against the inroads of modem communications and tourism’ 
(see McRae 1964, 9). With an amendment to the Constitution in 1996, Romansh also 
became official language for state authorities ‘when communicating with persons who speak 
Romansh’ (BV 1999, Art. 70.1).
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government documents are worded in all four languages. Romansh is the 
main language of less than 50,000 inhabitants (BFS 2019). So, for practi-
cal reasons most legal texts are translated only into German, French and 
Italian.
Third, we find a strongly enforced proportional rule that leads to politi-
cal quotas. An unwritten rule says that two of the seven members of the 
Federal Council should be of French- or Italian-speaking origin, and over 
time, this has been well observed (Giudici and Stojanovic 2016). In gov-
ernmental expert and parliamentary committees, too, linguistic propor-
tions are observed more than any other proportional rule. Complaints 
about ‘German predominance’—more common among French- than 
Italian-speakers—are not well founded when looking at federal personnel 
statistics: at all levels of government, proportionality is observed to a 
high degree.
However, in contrast to many other countries, Swiss quota are not 
defined as hard legal rules. While some of them are written as general 
regulations in law, most are informal, that is they are obeyed as a political 
custom. This allows for flexibility under concrete circumstances. As can be 
seen from Table  2.2, general regulations and informal quota can have 
astonishing results for the fair representation of different cultural groups. 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that also proportional influence 
is guaranteed. Take for example the Federal Council with seven members, 
Table 2.2 Proportional representation of linguistic groups
German French Italian Romansh
Swiss population (5.3 million) 72.1% 23.7% 6.2% 0.7%
Federal Council (7 members) 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% 0%
National Council (200 members) 73.0% 23.0% 4.0% 0.5%
Council of States (46 members) 73.9% 21.7% 4.3% 0%
Federal Supreme Court (38 members) 60.5% 31.6% 7.9% 0%
Expert committees (ca. 1900 members) 65.1% 25.5% 8.6% 0.8%
Federal Administration (ca. 38,000 employees/35,000 full time equivalents):
–All personnel 70.8% 22.1% 6.6% 0.4%
–Top management 70.3% 24.0% 5.7% 0%
Sources: Own calculations based on Bundesamt für Statistik (BFS) (2019), Bundesrat (BR) (2016), 
Delegate for Plurilinguism (2019)
Note: Population data only for Swiss citizens who are 15 years and older (2017); data for the Federal 
Council and Parliament from August 2019; data for expert committees from 2016, data for the federal 
administration for 2018
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of which currently two are French-speakers and one Italian-speaker. Here 
the proportional rule is well observed, even in favour of the minorities. 
However, the four German-speakers could easily overrule the others with-
out even talking or listening to the French- and Italian-speakers. Moreover, 
the latter might be forced to learn German in order to understand what 
discussions are all about. Of course, minority representatives have the for-
mal right to speak their language, but knowing that majority members 
might not understand them well it would probably be better to present a 
key argument in German. French- and Italian-speakers may also face a 
situation where the German-speaking majority, at the end of the formal 
session, begins to converse in their regional dialect(s): very different from 
standard or ‘high’ German and therefore barely understandable by French- 
and Italian-speakers. This worst case stands in sharp contrast to the best 
case, as when a polite German-speaking majority loves to speak French 
and makes French the official language of the discussions. Both of these 
cases happen in practice.
At the federal level, discussions in the National Council are simultane-
ously translated into all three (full) official languages. However, while the 
official record of Swiss laws and regulations is published in Italian, French 
and German, it happens that the documentation for parliamentarians is 
available only in one or two languages. The same is true of many govern-
ment reports. Canada, for instance, goes much further, requiring every 
official document to be published in both English and French—probably 
because Canada has a more serious problem with its linguistic minority.
The Swiss are very conscious of the need for multilingualism: in schools, 
children are instructed in at least two languages. It is a myth, however, 
that these efforts lead to widespread bi- or trilingualism (Werlen 2008, 
211f.). Most people rarely read newspapers or listen to news in a language 
other than their own, which means that they perceive politics by different 
media systems in the three linguistic regions. When face to face with a 
person speaking another language, it is normal, however, to try to com-
municate. Traditionally, German-speakers try to speak French to a 
Romand, even if their French is poor. Today young people, all of whom 
are taught English at school, are more and more using English as the lin-
gua franca among themselves.
Multilinguism seems to offer advantages in internationalised business, 
too. The Swiss are actually rather proud of the multilingual aspect of their 
society and would find the question of whether German-, Italian-, French- 
or Romansh-speakers are ‘better’ Swiss people rather silly (cf. also Schmid 
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2001). Multilingualism requires public expenditure and fiscal redistribution 
in favour of minorities, both of which the Swiss have been willing to bear. 
There are four complete public radio and television networks, one for each 
linguistic group. The networks of the linguistic minorities get a more-
than-proportional share of the national budget. For instance, in 2018 
Radio Télévision Suisse, generating 23% of revenues, got 33% (SRG 
2019, 41).
These notions about language can be extended to cultural life in gen-
eral. Cultural specificities exist also in lifestyle (Windisch 1992). There is a 
popular saying that German-speakers live to work, whereas French- and 
Italian-speakers work to live. These and other differences are an enriching 
element of Swiss life. They may sometimes create difficulties in communi-
cating, but they are accepted as part of normal life. Thus, cultural and 
linguistic segmentation has not disappeared, unlike differences of religion 
as we saw above. Linguistic diversity has been kept—or rather repro-
duced—within the protecting boundaries of the cantons and linguistic 
communities. Differences appear also in political behaviour, for instance 
with respect to federal votations. French-speakers favour a more open for-
eign policy, while on issues concerning the armed forces, they are more 
sceptical than German-speakers.
With one exception (the Jura case discussed below), cultural segmenta-
tion has not been a major political problem for Swiss society as a whole. 
The virtues of pluralism may lie partly in the fact that the different cultures 
are separated from each other by the political autonomy of their cantons. 
It may be true that globalisation makes many societal differences between 
the cantons diminish or even disappear, while those with some groups of 
foreigners become more salient. But still, federalism provides a kind of 
horizontal segmentation which allows the three main regions of German-, 
French- and Italian-speakers to live apart without bothering each other 
too much (Watts 1991; Schmid 2001; Windisch 1992).
2.4.3  Jura: The Exception to Integration
Compared to the many multicultural societies which struggle with their 
cleavages, one could ask why Swiss society has integrated so successfully. 
We have no reasons to believe that the Swiss are more peaceful by nature 
than other people, nor their elites brighter than elsewhere. However, 
comparative politics literature suggests that there are institutional factors 
which generally favour processes of multicultural integration, such as a 
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non-ethnic concept of the state, federalism, proportional representation 
and other mechanisms of political power-sharing. Pressure from the out-
side also helps fostering national unity provided it does not lead to armed 
intervention by a foreign power. All these factors were present in the Swiss 
case, and we shall come back to this in the conclusions to this chapter. 
Here, let us focus on one particular condition which can be decisive for 
the success or failure of political integration: cross-cuttingness.
Cleavages related to religion, language and the economy can be territo-
rially overlapping or cross-cutting. When cleavages overlap, it means that 
a linguistic minority is also a religious minority and belongs to the poorer 
social strata of a society. If cleavages are cross-cutting, minorities are split 
into different groups. For instance, one part of the linguistic minority 
belongs to the religious majority, while another belongs to the religious 
minority. From a theoretical point of view, it is evident that in this case 
integration has better chances: a linguistic minority feels less discriminated 
against and may even be rewarded by integration if it is part of the religious 
majority. In situations of overlapping cleavages, however, the same group 
may suffer from multiple discrimination, which creates a much higher 
potential for grievances and ultimately political conflict (see also 
Steiner 1990).
The Swiss case is generally characterised by cross-cutting cleavages. 
Among French-speakers, for example, there are both Catholic and 
Protestant cantons. Among economically poorer cantons, there are both 
German- and French-speaking cantons. Thus, religious, linguistic and 
socio-economic cleavages do not coincide with the geographical boundar-
ies of the cantons—instead, they cut across each other. The cumulation of 
different issues into one political conflict with just two sides—for instance, 
poor Catholic French-speakers versus rich Protestant German-speakers—
could never develop. In practice, political majorities differ and vary from 
issue to issue. Most Swiss cultural groups have experience with being part 
of both a minority and a majority. This has been very important for the 
development of a culture of tolerance and pluralism.
There is an important case in modern Swiss history, however, where 
integration has somewhat failed. It concerns the Jura region, once the 
northern part of Switzerland’s second largest canton, Bern. In a struggle 
of over 40 years which included riots and violence, the Jura minority, who 
felt discriminated against by Bern, fought for separation from the old can-
ton. The creation of the new canton in 1978 will be described in Chap. 3, 
but the case is worth mentioning here precisely because of the factors of 
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integration discussed above. First, the Jura region contained a double 
minority: French-speakers practising Catholicism in a Protestant canton 
dominated by German-speakers (Fig. 2.2).
Moreover, there were socio-economic differences. The Jura region, 
located on the periphery of the canton along the border with France, 
claimed to be economically neglected. In the Jura region, therefore, we 
find the rare case of overlapping socio-economic, language and religious 
differences. This overlap, however, was not equal throughout the region. 
The southern part of Jura was economically better off and had a Protestant 
majority. Thus, the population of Jura itself was divided into pro- and anti- 
separatist movements. After a series of popular votations at different levels 
(see Sect. 3.3.5), the new canton of Jura was eventually created. But the 
southern districts had voted to stay with Bern and therefore the Jurassian 
people, because of its internal fragmentation, were not integrated into a 
single political unit.
Whereas the creation of Jura canton was widely praised as the solution 
that corresponded most to the principle of self-determination by the peo-
ple concerned, some separatist groups claimed that the southern districts 
should be reunited with the Jura canton. In other words, the potential for 
ethnic conflict was not completely removed with the 1978 solution. 
Catholics and French-speakers in the southern districts still complain 
about being a minority, cut off from the political body to which they feel 
they belong. However, if the southern districts were to be integrated into 
Jura canton, there would be a new problem for the Protestant minority, 
which feels more akin to Bern. The lesson to be drawn is evident: the ideal 
of ethnic and political overlap, so common in many nationalist move-
ments, is a pipe dream. In most cases, while it does eliminate some minor-
ity problems, it cannot be realised without the creation of new problems.
2.5  the challenges of socIo-econoMIc InequalIty
2.5.1  A Working Class Without a Homeland
Compared to other European countries, the industrialisation of Switzerland 
took place early, but it was somewhat different. Instead of concentrating 
in urban areas, important industries such as watchmaking, textiles and 
embroidery thrived in rural areas. This decentralised industrialisation pre-
vented the sudden concentration of a mass proletariat in the cities. But, as 
in every capitalist country, industrialisation led to growing inequalities and 
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the impoverishment of a new social class of workers, whose jobs were inse-
cure and whose earnings low. As in other countries, democracy prevented 
neither economic exploitation of workers nor inhuman working condi-
tions (Gruner 1988). In the 1870s, the Radical politician Friedrich Bernet 
wrote: ‘The Swiss Constitution of 1848 has put much political and eco-
nomic power into the hands of a few. This has allowed the rich to grow 
richer, whereas other groups such as farmers, craftsmen and industrial 
workers are downgraded to an indistinguishable proletariat’ (cit. in 
Gruner 1964).
At that time, neither a Socialist party nor a strong trade union for work-
ers existed yet. Instead, it was a faction of the Radical Party which sought 
to defend the interests of the working class by a policy of ‘entrepreneur- 
socialism’. They were concerned about growing social inequalities, which 
in their eyes were unacceptable in a democracy worth that name. The fac-
tion was the driving force behind the first regulations to protect workers 
and ban the use of child labour. This policy was strongly opposed by the 
liberal wing which, in the fashion of ‘Manchester liberalism’, wanted to 
avoid any government intervention into the free market. This marks the 
emergence of two new economic questions slowly superseding the older 
cultural schisms in Swiss politics:
• To what extent should the government protect Swiss industries 
against international competition and intervene in the free market?
• What role should be given to the government in compensating 
growing social inequalities created by market competition?
Unlike in other countries, such as Austria and Norway, business itself 
was divided on the question of the free market. Whereas some export 
industries pushed for unconditional liberalisation, farmers wanted to be 
protected from international competitors through levying duties on for-
eign products. Small trades and crafts enterprises were organised into cor-
porations and also sought protectionist state regulations for things that 
were beyond their own capacity to deal with. The first vocational schools, 
for instance, were run by trades and crafts corporations, but the state pro-
vided subsidies and declared professional schools mandatory for appren-
tices. This eliminated the problem of free riders—enterprises that abstained 
from investing in professional training, but which would hire employees 
from other enterprises that had invested in them.
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Thus, from the very beginning Switzerland’s economy tended to 
develop organised relations with the state. In a kind of highly fragmented 
corporatism, a great number of professional and business organisations 
cooperated with the state. They sought particular advantages through 
state regulations or subsidies, which eliminated the risks of free competi-
tion. In return, they offered to help in the implementation of government 
activities. Farmers’ organisations, for instance, furnished the statistical data 
used in drafting agricultural policies, which helped to keep down the num-
ber of public administration staff. Despite their high praise of economic 
liberalism, and despite their tradition of anti-state ideology, organised pro-
fessions and businesses have developed strong and influential relations 
with the national government which persist until today (Farago 1987; 
Church 2004, 71–81; Mach 2007).
In the race for the organisational build-up of economic interests, the 
workers were latecomers and did not organise until the end of the nine-
teenth century. They sure had a common interest to defend: the better-
ment of their economic conditions, promised also by the ideas of Socialism 
emerging in other European countries at that time. But in Switzerland, 
this common interest proved difficult to organise. Workers were spread all 
over the country and to a large degree isolated in smaller towns and vil-
lages. Here, the ties of traditional society and patterns of paternalism may 
have dampened the effects of economic inequality, but at the same time 
they hampered collective identity and the political organisation of the new 
working class. When the Social-Democratic Party was eventually founded 
in 1888 (Vatter 2018a, 107), it achieved rapid electoral success. Social- 
Democrats and trade unions were also among the first to use the new 
instrument of the popular initiative at the federal level. In 1894, they 
demanded the right to work and a programme of public industrial pol-
icy—40 years before Keynes. But the hope that direct democracy would 
be the lever of social reform was dashed. In a popular vote that year, the 
proposed constitutional amendment was rejected by over 80% of voters 
and all cantons (BK 2019).
Later, cultural ties often proved stronger than economic cleavages. The 
Catholic Conservative party, its social organisations and unions success-
fully united Catholic workers. Thus, the working class was divided. While 
this did not prevent the Social-Democrats from becoming one of the larg-
est parties, they never managed to form a coalition of equal strength to the 
bourgeois forces. Neither did the trade unions succeed in influencing 
industrial politics as much as businesses. This minority position of labour 
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in politics and industrial relations has remained a Swiss characteristic 
(Farago 1987; Kriesi 1980). It differs from other small European coun-
tries, such as the Netherlands, Austria, Norway and Sweden, where more 
of an equilibrium between labour and capital, and between the political 
left and right, can be observed. Cultural segmentation and territorial 
decentralisation were key obstacles to the organisation of the left in 
Switzerland. Labour forces were never able to catch up with the organisa-
tional strength of businesses or even farmers.
2.5.2  From Class Struggle to Economic Partnership
In the first decades of the twentieth century, the conditions of the Swiss 
working class worsened. For the period before World War I, historians 
note the development of a conservative, nationalist, sometimes reaction-
ary and anti-democratic political right which resorted to a ‘class struggle 
from above’ (Gruner 1988; Jost 1992). Politically marginalised by the 
cooperation of bourgeois forces, Social-Democrats and trade unions could 
not prevent the working class from bearing most of the burden of eco-
nomic setbacks during and after World War I.
The worldwide economic crisis of the 1930s brought mass unemploy-
ment also to Switzerland. Several strikes by angry workers were suppressed 
by federal troops, more than once ending in bloodshed. The left was 
denied what Catholics (in 1891) and farmers (in 1929) had achieved: rec-
ognition, political influence and participation in the Federal Council. 
Principles of proportional rule and participation were used to integrate 
cultural minorities, but not to resolve the problems of a growing socio- 
economic cleavage.
On top of all that, the Socialist movement split. A communist faction 
claimed that bourgeois democracy was fake, an instrument of the capitalist 
class, and that the betterment of the working class could arrive only 
through political and economic revolution. In their view, only the politics 
of class struggle could overcome the market and profit systems and install 
the working class in power. Social-Democrats, on the other hand, insisted 
on proportional participation in all democratic institutions and trusted in 
limited reforms, even if the state remained in the hands of a bourgeois 
majority. They also aspired to a mixed economy, with a strong public sec-
tor and state intervention on behalf of social equality. This would not only 
improve the situation of workers, but also protect the Swiss economy from 
the deep, worldwide market crisis that then seemed inevitable.
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For almost four decades, until World War II, the workers’ movements, 
politically discriminated against and internally divided, hesitated between 
radicalising the class struggle and cooperating in the hope of achieving inte-
gration. In the end, outside events gave the latter strategy the upper hand. 
Faced with the threats of fascism from Hitler’s Nazi Germany, the Social-
Democrats gave up their opposition to militarise and supported the mod-
ernisation of the army. An important treaty between the employers’ 
organisations and trade unions in the mechanical-engineering industry was 
signed in 1937: the so-called Labour Peace Convention (Friedensabkommen) 
accepted unions as representative organisations of the workers, proposed to 
resolve all conflicts by negotiation, and promised to end strikes and lockouts.
Economic and social inequalities—the predominant political issues in 
the twentieth century—thus finally began to be addressed through coop-
eration and integration. The Social-Democrats accordingly obtained their 
first seat in the Federal Council during World War II and were given ade-
quate, that is, proportional, representation as of 1959.
The unifying experiences of the generation that defended Swiss inde-
pendence and neutrality between 1939 and 1945 also had an effect. 
Ideological differences between the political left and right shrank. A large 
consensus amongst all political forces allowed the building up of a social 
security scheme, health care and insurance services, and a higher educa-
tional system, which reduced many areas of social and economic inequal-
ity. Economic growth led employers’ and workers’ organisations further 
towards cooperation and away from confrontation. Collective contracts, 
similar to the 1937 Labour Peace Convention, became the rule. Despite 
the fact that the labour force was less unionised than in other European 
countries, Swiss workers and employees obtained a fair share in the growth 
of prosperity (Linder 1983).
By the early 1970s, the highest degree of integration of different social 
classes in Switzerland had thus been reached. Employers and workers had 
gotten used to partnership, the left was integrated into the once purely 
bourgeois state. Political parties and economic organisations were able to 
reach consensus by compromise, power-sharing was effective. However, 
since then the social integration of Swiss society has somewhat declined. 
When economic growth turned into recession in 1974, the left learnt that 
proportional participation did not mean proportional influence. In 1984, a 
minority of the Social-Democrats even wanted to quit the Federal Council 
because political power-sharing was not shifting influence from the haves to 
the have-nots. Unions, which were willing to share the burden of recession 
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by accepting pay cuts, were losing members and political influence. In the 
last decades, while achieving less from employers by way of contracts, 
unions have thus tried to promote social policy by way of legislation instead. 
This led to a shift from a liberal to a post-liberal welfare regime, in which 
social partnership plays a somewhat lesser role (Trampusch 2010).
In the last decades finally, globalisation and Europe-wide liberalisation 
have led to new conflicts between capital and labour, and between urban 
and rural areas as well. Despite polarisation between the right and the left, 
political power-sharing has persisted thus far, but the partnership between 
employers and unions has become more difficult to maintain, as we shall 
see in Chap. 5.
2.6  ProPortIonal rePresentatIon: the unIversal 
Key to Power-sharIng
In the preceding sections, we saw how linguistic and religious minorities 
became integrated, and then how conflicts arising from the social cleav-
ages of modern industrial society were resolved. Conflict resolution in 
Switzerland relies very much on power-sharing rather than winner-take-all 
approaches. This section takes a closer look at the proportionality rule. It 
is a universal key to power-sharing in a double sense: it opens many doors 
to political participation for existing actors, and it can be used by new 
groups arising from new cleavages.
Let us first discuss the ‘doors to power’. The proportional rule today is 
the key that unlocks the door to almost all political institutions. As can be 
seen from Table 2.3, the proportional rule is used for different criteria—or 
groups—in the same body. In the ‘magic formula’ of the seven-member 
Federal Council, for example, party affiliation is not the only criterion of 
proportionality. As already mentioned, the Federal Assembly follows the 
rule of linguistic proportionality, normally granting French- and Italian- 
speakers two or even three seats. Until 1999, a provision in the Constitution 
stated that there could not be more than one representative from the same 
canton. This criterion has been abandoned in favour of a new rule stipulat-
ing an appropriate representation of the various language regions. Gender 
balance has not (yet) become a formal rule, but in 2010 briefly led to a 
female majority in the Federal Council. Not only candidates for the Federal 
Council, but also high officials of the federal government must fulfil one 
or more criteria of proportionality to be eligible for a position. There is 
some criticism that this system means that the ‘real’ job requirements are 
all too often neglected (Box 2.8).
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Box 2.8 Proportionality in Practice
Proportionality does not mean quotas but is based on informal polit-
ical claims, as the following illustrates:
When a French-speaking three-star general retires, the search for his 
replacement is practically limited to French-speakers. But what about 
a German-speaker who may be more qualified than the top French- 
speaking candidate? The former is indeed discriminated against on the 
basis of his language affiliation. This is the price that the Swiss are 
willing to pay for their system of power-sharing. This price, however, 
should not be exaggerated. In the foregoing example, the highly 
qualified German-speaker simply has to wait until a three-star general 
of his own language retires. Sometimes, of course, bad luck may 
strike; no opening may occur when someone is the “ideal” age for a 
particular position. For example, a German-speaking Free Democrat 
of Catholic faith, regarded as a top candidate, may never make it to 
the Federal Council, because during his prime political years, his par-
ticular combination of attributes may never be demanded. (Steiner 
1990, 109)
Table 2.3 Use of the proportional rule: institutions and criteria
Institution Language Party Gender
Federal Council x x x
National Council (x) x (x)
Council of States x x (x)
Federal Supreme Court x x x
Parliamentary committees x x (x)
Expert committees x (x) x
Nomination of high government officials x (x) x
Note: x = criteria normally used, (x) = criteria sometimes important
There is flexibility in the system in that over- or under-representation is 
temporarily allowed but must be compensated over time. Moreover, we 
cannot speak of formal ‘group rights’ because in most cases these are mere 
political claims which cannot be enforced by law (but are respected in 
most cases, though). The great majority of Swiss are opposed to rigid legal 
quota but like the idea that all groups of society should be fairly 
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represented in public bodies. Proportionality, therefore, is a political rather 
than a legal practice.
Finally, this element of political culture applies even beyond politics and 
positions in government. It is practised in many cultural organisations and 
even in sport. This is true at least for the linguistic proportional rule. It 
would be unimaginable, for instance, that the executive committee of the 
Swiss Football Association would consist of German-speakers only.
2.7  the lIMIts of swIss PluralIsM: new challenges 
for IntegratIon
We may speak of true political pluralism if no societal group is discrimi-
nated against and if every group has a fair chance of exercising influence 
through political institutions. This requires a state that refrains from privi-
leging or discriminating specific groups and whose laws enforce values 
common to all: human rights, basic rights and democracy, with all its 
implications of equality. Switzerland’s multicultural society, thanks to the 
way it has been integrated, has achieved a remarkable standard of political 
pluralism. Peaceful conflict resolution through power-sharing is not only a 
pattern of political but also of social life.
There are limits, however, to peace and pluralism in Swiss society. In 
sharp contrast to the mutual respect among the larger groups, there has at 
times been heavy discrimination against smaller religious and ethnic 
groups. Children of gypsies, a group at odds with the rather rigid Swiss 
sense of order, have been taken away from their parents and raised in 
‘proper’ homes. During World War II, Jewish refugees were sent back 
over the German border in order to avoid additional difficulties with the 
Nazi regime. For a long time, the rights of patients in psychiatric clinics 
and of sentenced and remanded prisoners did not meet the standards of 
other European countries (Kaufmann 1965, 245–62). During the Cold 
War and after, the federal intelligence service not only spied on extreme 
left-wing militants, but also on approximately 100,000 citizens who had 
done nothing more than support unorthodox political opinions or actions.
Another problem is gender. For a long time, Swiss women had to live 
in a society which only reluctantly began to abandon traditional male- 
female roles. Until 1971, Switzerland was a comparatively incomplete 
democracy because it denied women the right to vote, let alone be given 
a political mandate. As we shall see in Chap. 3, federalism and direct 
democracy made introducing female suffrage a difficult task. When in 
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1981 a constitutional amendment introduced legal, social and economic 
equality for women, the Swiss became aware that despite political plural-
ism, much discrimination persisted. Since then, legal discrimination against 
women—in the areas of family law and social security for instance—has 
been eliminated from all legislation. Today, the representation of women 
in the parliaments of the cantons and the federation is on par with that of 
neighbouring countries. In the last decade the proportion of gainfully 
employed women has increased more than in most highly industrialised 
countries.
On the other hand, women in Switzerland still mostly work in less 
qualified, worse paid jobs, are sometimes far from getting equal pay and 
are underrepresented in the higher ranks of management or universities. 
Whereas highly industrialised countries such as the US and Sweden have 
practised policies of affirmative action or equal pay for decades, Switzerland 
had to catch up in many fields of equal opportunity for women (EKF 
1980–1999; Ballmer-Cao 2000; Ballmer-Cao and Trembley 2008; 
Senti 1995).
Finally, there is the question of foreign residents. Ever since the 1960s, 
the rapidly growing economy needed additional labour. Workers from 
Italy, Germany, France and Austria, and later from Spain, Portugal, former 
Yugoslavia and Turkey, found jobs in Switzerland. In 2015, the number of 
foreigners surpassed 2 million for the first time, and in 2019 stood at 2.1 
million. That is 25% of the total population. A great part of them work in 
jobs that the Swiss avoid if they can. They pay taxes and contribute to all 
social security systems, but they generally have no political rights.9 
Obtaining Swiss citizenship is difficult; a demand can only be placed after 
at least ten years of residence and the commune of residence decides, 
either through an expert committee or a citizen vote or both (e.g. 
Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller et al. 2019).
While Swiss enterprises actively seek foreign workers, Switzerland has 
become an attractor to refugees and migrants from Third World countries 
(Table 2.4, Fig. 2.3). The social integration of this growing and heteroge-
neous foreign population sometimes challenges the capacities of political 
9 The exception are the French speaking cantons of Jura, Vaud, Neuchatel and Fribourg—
as well as some municipalities in Appenzell Outer-Rhodes and Grisons—which grant full 
political rights to foreign residents in communal affairs. See https://www.ekm.admin.ch/
ekm/de/home/staatsbuergerschaft-citoyennete/Citoy/buergerrechte/panorama.html 
[1.10.2019].
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Table 2.4  Foreign 
permanent resident 
population by citizen-










United Kingdom 41 2%
Other European countries 206 10%
Asia 160 8%
Africa 107 5%
Latin America and Caribbean 54 3%
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Fig. 2.3 Asylum seekers in Switzerland, 2007–2019. (Source: SEM (2019))
authorities, schools and some parts of society. Severe political tensions 
have arisen. Xenophobic parties developed and brought pressure on the 
political authorities to restrict immigration and avoid the ‘over-alienation’ 
(Überfremdung) of Swiss society. Foreign workers, asylum seekers and 
immigration remain highly controversial issues.
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To integrate foreigners in the same way as the native minority groups in 
the past will be much more difficult for Swiss society. Contrary to the past, 
it will also mean the integration of non-European cultural patterns, values, 
religious beliefs and mentalities, which is a new challenge. With over 25%, 
Switzerland has the highest proportion of foreigners of all European 
countries except Luxembourg. In many jobs, Swiss workers are a minority, 
as are Swiss children in school classes where teachers have to handle up to 
ten languages spoken by immigrant pupils. For a long time, immigration 
policy followed the interest of industries which needed additional work-
force with low qualifications but systematically underestimated the cost of 
social integration of new immigrant groups. In addition, competition 
between domestic and foreign workforce creates social tensions when jobs 
are cut. No wonder that immigration policy has become one of the most 
controversial issues.
2.8  conclusIon
Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Switzerland was neither a uni-
fied society nor a state. It was composed of several small societies with 
differing traditions, languages and religions that had become too limited 
to survive independently. In a bottom-up process, the cantonal peoples 
founded a united nation-state. It was based on a common Constitution, 
but not on a common language or religion. It was artificial, a product of 
historical circumstances, and could easily have failed. It lacked a coherent 
society. Surrounded by much more powerful and unified neighbours, the 
Swiss nation-state could still have been too small to survive. It could have 
been divided up and thus have fallen apart.
Yet, thanks to its political institutions and several felicitous circum-
stances, Switzerland became a nation willing to survive and found its own 
identity as a modern society. The case of Switzerland is thus an example of 
the successful integration of different cultures and of dealing with social 
inequalities. In this long-time process of societal integration, at least four 
political institutions or ideas played a key role:
• A non-ethnic concept of the nation-state: The most important factor 
behind Switzerland’s success may be that it never had the choice of 
building a state based on one religion, one culture or one language. 
Forming a nation-state on that basis would not have resolved exist-
ing minority problems, or only at great social cost. Whether in 
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attaching smaller units to a larger one or dividing up a larger unit 
into smaller ones, eliminating one minority problem merely creates 
others. In having no choice other than for all minorities to live 
together, Switzerland avoided becoming a mono-cultural nation- 
state. Instead, the non-ethnic concept of the state allowed the differ-
ent peoples of the cantons to recognise each other as having equal 
rights, regardless of differences in religion, language or cultural heri-
tage. Switzerland is a political nation, held together by the political 
will to live under the same Constitution.
• Federalism: Regional self- and shared rule were essential for the bot-
tom- up process of nation-building. They allowed for a compromise 
between the opponents and the advocates of a strong central state. 
Up to these days, federalism provides utmost autonomy to the can-
tons and their different cultures whilst also securing national unity.
• Proportionality: Proportional representation was, step by step, intro-
duced in all institutions of the central state. It encompasses parlia-
ment and its committees, the government, the courts, and expert 
committee as well as the federal administration. Proportional repre-
sentation is applied not only for party affiliation but also for lan-
guage, and belatedly also for gender, thus giving different societal 
groups adequate recognition and voice.
• Political power-sharing: Swiss democracy developed differently from 
the majoritarian or Westminster model of parliamentary govern-
ment. Instead of competition between government and opposition, 
where ‘the winner takes all’ for at least four years, we find an over-
sized government coalition. Instead of majority or sometimes even 
plurality politics, decision-making in Swiss politics is characterised by 
negotiation, consensus-seeking and compromise. The development, 
characteristics and functioning of this ‘power-sharing democracy’ 
will be explained in-depth in Chap. 5. The essential point here is this: 
political power-sharing has facilitated peaceful conflict-resolution 
among culturally different groups. In contrast to competitive democ-
racy, power-sharing has avoided the alienation of minorities arising 
from a perpetually winning majority.
Looking at the process of national integration, we note that the effect 
of political institutions is neither immediate nor perfect. It took time to 
overcome the deep conflicts between Catholics and Protestants, or 
between capital and labour. And while the religious and linguistic 
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cleavages have cooled out, others like the economic cleavage might catch 
fire again if the market economy exacerbates risks and inequalities. 
Moreover, while integration was successful for the main linguistic and reli-
gious groups of civil society, some small minorities were discriminated 
against. Women also received their political rights much later than in other 
countries. And immigration is the new, big challenge for integration. 
Immigration has become a controversial and important political issue pre-
cisely because it has created problems of integration that cannot be solved 
by the political mechanisms described above.
Finally, there are external factors that helped create and maintain 
national unity. Pressure from the outside was one of the basic motivations 
for the creation of the federation in 1848: the Swiss cantons, surrounded 
by much bigger nation-states, wanted to keep their autonomy and inde-
pendence. Pressure from the outside has been relevant ever since, but 
never materialised in armed intervention. Armed neutrality has allowed 
Switzerland to stay out of the belligerent conflicts between Germany and 
France in 1871 and both World Wars. With the end of the Cold War in 
1989 and the Eastward expansion of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), armed neutrality lost much of its practical importance in foreign 
policy, yet it still is a commonly shared value of all Swiss. Most citizens feel 
that the government of a small state should not expose itself in interna-
tional conflicts.
Yet when it comes to current challenges, the Swiss seem less united. On 
the question of European integration, they are divided between (an albeit 
dwindling number of) protagonists of membership and those who prefer 
bilateral treaties with the EU. Globalisation has led to new social tensions 
between winners and losers, and heavy immigration is sometimes followed 
by problems of integration. In times of pressure from the outside, as dur-
ing the financial and economic crisis of 2008/2009 when the Swiss gov-
ernment was forced to renounce on the traditional ‘banking secrecy’ and 
to adapt OECD standards for cooperation in fiscal affairs, the Swiss are 
still undecided on their future identity.
This is different from the past, when pressure from the outside—for 
example Mussolini’s irredentism towards Ticino—was a constant factor 
that brought the Swiss together in the idea of protecting and maintaining 
their national unity and independence. In the end, however, this past is 
still present. To this day, the Swiss are constitutional patriots and feel as a 
‘nation of political will’, and as ‘being different from others’. While lack-
ing a common language or religion, and despite conflict, the Swiss are 
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proud of what they all share as citizens: their political architecture and the 
civic rights that come with it. The three most important elements of that 
architecture—federalism, direct democracy and power-sharing—will be 
described in the following chapters.
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3.1.1  The Swiss Interpretation of Federalism
Until the time of the French Revolution, Switzerland was not a nation, 
but an ensemble of cantons bound together by several treaties. In modern 
terms, we could define this as a system of small, independent states united 
by an international treaty. Since all the cantons claimed to be autonomous 
or sovereign states, common decisions in this loose confederation had to 
be unanimous. All the decisions proposed by the assembly of cantonal 
delegates, the Tagsatzung, had to be ratified by all the cantons. After the 
civil war of 1847, the question was how to create a single political unit out 
of this multi-state system in order to guarantee political autonomy whilst 
Switzerland’s neighbours were forming modern nation-states and to pro-
vide a common market for its growing industry.
An obvious answer could have been to fuse the cantons into a single, 
larger territorial state just like European monarchies—such as Italy and 
Germany—had in the mid-nineteenth century. This solution, however, 
was impossible for two reasons. First, the Swiss people had already experi-
enced a unitary state between 1798 and 1803, when all power was in the 
hands of a central government. This model, imposed by revolutionary 
France, was at odds with the tradition of the Swiss people who were—and 
mostly still are—rooted in their cantons. The idea of such a system was 
therefore not feasible—it was inconceivable that the Swiss people, who 
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had successfully re-decentralised in 1803, would (re)establish a unitary 
system 50 years later of their own free will.
The second reason why that solution would have been impossible to 
achieve is even more important. As described in Chap. 2, the creation of a 
common government for Switzerland was highly controversial. Fought 
out between Conservative Catholic and Radical Protestant cantons, the 
latter’s struggle for political unification succeeded only after the short civil 
war of 1847. A peaceful solution for successful nation-building, however, 
had to take into account the interests of the defeated Catholic minority 
(Bonjour 1948, Ch. 7; Kästli 1998, 23–176).
Thus, the creation of the Swiss state was destined to follow a middle 
path between the unsatisfactory status quo of a loose confederation and a 
unitary state desired by nobody. It was also an institutional compromise 
between Conservatives, who were hostile to centralisation, and Radicals, 
who favoured a federal government strong enough to take the necessary 
decisions in the common interest (Ernst et al. 1998). The Constitution of 
1848 proposed the creation of a central authority by the cantons, who 
were to renounce part of their sovereignty as individual states. Nowadays, 
we would probably not accept the logic of such a divided sovereignty—
logically there cannot be two supreme powers. Politically, however, it was 
the common understanding of the fathers of the Federal Constitution that 
the cantons had not lost their sovereignty, but merely part of their respon-
sibilities. Crucially, they retained a substantial degree of autonomy as well 
as a say over future divisions of power between the federation and the 
cantons. This solution rested on three factors:
 1. The Swiss people had already experienced a federal system, when in 
1803 the Mediation Act imposed by Napoleon restored cantonal 
powers to the former unitary Helvetic state.
 2. Between 1831 and 1848, some of the cantons had not only estab-
lished revolutionary forms of direct and representative democracy, 
but also developed and realised the idea of ‘constitutionalism’ (Kölz 
1992, 301–540). This meant the establishment of a basic political 
order voted by the people, granting limitations and separation of 
legislative, executive and judicial powers, personal rights and free-
doms, and procedures for amending the Constitution. Cantons also 
kept their own constitutions, which form the basis of their political 
autonomy and statehood.
 3. The American Constitution successfully combined federalism with 
democracy, a crucial issue at the time. Doing so required an ade-
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quate reconciliation of two different, even contradictory, principles 
of decision-making: democracy follows the idea of ‘one person, one 
vote’ whereas federalism seeks to grant equal influence to member 
states regardless of population size.
After the victory of the advocates of a Swiss federation in the civil war, 
the drafting of the Federal Constitution in 1848 and its ratification by a 
majority of people and cantons were achieved within a few months. Thus, 
Switzerland became not only the first continuously functioning democ-
racy, but also the first modern federation in Europe.
Since 1848, the Swiss federal system has consisted of three levels: fed-
eration, cantons and communes. Each of them has a certain degree of 
autonomy, legal powers and responsibilities, the right to levy their own 
taxes, and the cantons have their own constitutions. Under the terms of 
the Federal Constitution, communes, cantons and the federation cooper-
ate with each other. All are bound to guarantee the democratic election of 
their authorities and decision-making. Furthermore, they must respect the 
principle of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers. Until 
today, the Swiss are citizens of their commune, their canton and the fed-
eration—in this order. They elect authorities and vote on policies at all 
three levels, exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties based on fed-
eral, cantonal and communal law (Aubert 1967, 510–894; Aubert and 
Mahon 2003, 379–455; Vatter 2018, ch. 4).
3.1.2  The Division of Powers Between the Federation 
and the Cantons
The cultural diversity of the Swiss cantons, their political power and their 
claims for autonomy set narrow limits to central authority. In 1848, the 
powers of the federation were limited to a few essential areas (Dardanelli 
and Mueller 2019). Its most important tasks were to handle foreign rela-
tions and protect Swiss independence by maintaining an army and to 
ensure peaceful relations among the cantons. Moreover, the federation 
was authorised to mount a federal postal service, provide a common cur-
rency and abolish cantonal customs duties. Looking at the current distri-
bution of responsibilities between the federation, the cantons and the 
communes in Box 3.1, we find that the responsibilities of the central gov-
ernment have considerably increased with the passage of time. Nevertheless, 
Switzerland remains one of the most non-centralised states worldwide.
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Box 3.1 The Main Powers of the Federation, the Cantons and the 
Communes
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3.1.3  Non-centralisation—Not Decentralisation
Even at an abstract constitutional level, the distribution of powers between 
central government and cantons can never be defined once and for all. A 
federal state must provide rules on how to deal with changes in the distri-
bution of central and non-central power, and it must decide whom to 
entrust with new responsibilities that arise because of changes in the econ-
omy and society.
The question of what rules apply to the allocation of future responsi-
bilities between central government and member states is crucial for fed-
eral systems because it implies shifts in power. In Switzerland, as in other 
federal states, centralisation or decentralisation is a constant political issue 
that prompts ideological, social, cultural and economic conflict. 
Centralisation is often urged by protagonists of a strong state, economic 
intervention, modernisation and extensive social programmes. 
Decentralisation, on the other hand, is preferred by interests which fear 
big government, by protagonists of decentralised autonomy or a ‘minimal 
B. Responsibilities of the communes
• Construction and maintenance of local roads
• Local public transport systems
• Gas, electricity, water supply and waste services
• Local land-use planning, construction permits
• Choice and employment of primary school teachers, building 
of schools
• Culture, theatres, sports facilities
• Budget responsibility, imposition of taxes
• Naturalisation of foreign residents
• Old age homes and mobile care services
Note that local government powers are determined by cantonal 
law, with wide variations from West to East as to how much they can 





state’, and by some minorities. In the nineteenth century, the principle of 
the division of powers among the three political levels prevailed. Since 
then, relations between the different levels have become far more com-
plex. In most policy areas, we find some form of cooperation between the 
federation, the cantons and the communes.
The Swiss solution exhibits a marked preference for extensive cantonal 
and local autonomy, thus preventing any uncontrolled growth in the 
power of the federation. The Constitution in Article 3 says that all (future) 
powers belong to the cantons, unless the Swiss people and the cantons 
decide, by constitutional amendment, that they shall be attributed to the 
federation. Here we find similarities to the US Constitution, which says, in 
its 10th amendment, that all powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by the Constitution to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. Both federations, 
therefore, share the same idea: any major centralisation of power must take 
place via constitutional amendment, whereas in unitary systems, for exam-
ple those of France and Britain, a simple governmental decision can create 
or eliminate local powers and even authorities. Thus, the US and 
Switzerland share a common institutional arrangement: federalism as a 
system of non-centralisation rather than decentralisation.
Note, however, that the same institutional arrangement is interpreted 
in fundamentally different ways. In the US, the 10th amendment proved 
to be a difficult way to shift powers from the states to the central govern-
ment. Thus, US authorities developed the practice of ‘implied powers’ or 
the ‘interstate clause’, which allowed the federal government to assume 
new powers by mere interpretation of the existing Constitution. A strong 
Supreme Court assisted in this.
Not so in Switzerland. From the very beginning, the Swiss parliament 
has been reluctant to provide the federation with new powers and inter-
preted Article 3 of the Constitution in a strict sense. Not only the estab-
lishment of a national bank, any form of federal taxes, the creation of a 
social security system, the construction of federal highways, subsidies to 
the cantonal universities and the introduction of environmental policies, 
but also ‘small’ issues like subsidies for hiking trails all needed formal con-
stitutional amendments and ratification. This is one of the reasons why in 
Switzerland constitutional amendments are proposed practically every 
year, while in the US they are rare events (Linder 1999). Switzerland also 
has a comparatively weak Supreme Court, which cannot review Federal 
Acts as to their constitutionality.
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Every proposal to bestow new powers upon the federation needs not 
only a majority in both chambers of parliament, but also a majority of 
cantons and of the people in a popular vote. Many proposed amendments 
failed several times before being accepted. The requirement has had a 
braking effect on centralisation and partly explains why many controversial 
policies—like the introduction of a national pension system—took a long 
time to be realised. Another consequence is that central government 
expenditure is far lower in Switzerland than in other countries (Table 3.1).
3.1.4  Relations Between the Federation and the Cantons
Although the role of the federation is in many ways restricted, within the 
bounds of its authority it exercises substantial legal control over the can-
tons and communes (cf. also Linder and Vatter 2001). The juridical foun-
dation of this control is an important rule: federal law is superior to 
cantonal law. Key issues of federal control are the following:
• Cantonal political institutions have to be ‘democratic’, meaning 
in accordance with the principal rules governing the separation of 
legislative, executive and judicial powers. The Federal Assembly, by 
Table 3.1  Central 
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approving amendments to cantonal constitutions, ensures adherence 
to this standard.
• Cantons must grant their inhabitants all the rights provided for in 
the Federal Constitution. For example, they must guarantee basic 
human and civil rights, equal protection by the law, and due process. 
These rights can be claimed by everyone through different legal 
channels and brought before the Federal Supreme Court.
• Cantons are bound to respect and implement federal law. However, 
the principle that ‘federal law breaks cantonal law’ does not mean 
that ‘federal policy breaks cantonal policy’. The actual implementa-
tion of federal law through the cantons depends heavily on their 
political will (see Sect. 2.3).
3.2  Federal elements 
In the decIsIon-makIng Process
3.2.1  Bicameralism
The Swiss parliament consists of two chambers, the National Council and 
the Council of States. They reflect different ideas of representation.
The National Council represents the Swiss people. Its 200 members are 
elected on the democratic principle of ‘one person, one vote’. Thus, the 
200 seats are divided among the cantons according to their population 
size. The fact that the National Council is elected in 26 electoral districts 
corresponding to the 26 cantons has two consequences. First, the choice 
given to the electorate differs between small and large cantons. Citizens in 
the canton of Zurich can elect 35 MPs, since its population of 1.5 million 
represents about 18% of the total population, whereas citizens in Uri 
(36,000 inhabitants) can choose only one person. Second, the different 
size of cantons as constituencies is a relevant factor to the proportional 
mode of election. The proportionality rule, which replaced the winner- 
take- all majority system in 1918, should give smaller parties a better 
chance of winning seats. This objective is fully realised in large cantons 
such as Zurich, where a small party can win one of the 35 seats with less 
than 3% of the votes. But in a small canton with, say, two seats, the same 
party would need 34% of votes to be sure of winning a seat. For this rea-
son, the effects of proportional representation are weakened in small can-
tons, where small parties risk being left with nothing. Overall, the 
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proportional rule favours the larger, historical parties, while it leaves small 
parties underrepresented (Table 3.2).
The Council of States, following the federal principle of equal represen-
tation of cantons, is composed of two members from every full canton, 
and one member from each half-canton. The election of the Council of 
States differs in two ways from that of the National Council. First, the 
cantons themselves determine the mode of election for their representa-
tives. Before direct election by the people became the rule in the 1970s, 
many cantons allowed their parliaments to choose their councillors.
Second, the members of almost all cantons are elected by majority/
plurality rule. This means that a candidate must gain at least 50% of votes 
Table 3.2 Composition of National Council and Council of States, 1999 
and 2019
Party National Council Council of States





















SVP 22.5 44 22.0 25.6 53 26.5 7 15.2 6 13.0
SP 22.5 51 25.5 16.8 39 19.5 6 13.0 9 19.6
FDP 19.9 43 21.5 15.1 29 14.5 17 37.0 12 26.1
CVP 15.9 35 17.5 11.4 25 12.5 15 32.6 13 28.3
Greens 5.3 9 4.5 13.2 28 14.0 0 0 5 10.9
GLPa – – – 7.8 16 8.0 – – 0 0.0
BDPb – – – 2.4 3 1.5 – – 0 0.0
LPSc 2.3 6 3.0 – – – 0 0 – –
LdU 0.7 1 0.5 – – – 0 0 – –
EVP 1.8 3 1.5 2.1 3 1.5 0 0 0 0.0
CSP 0.4 1 0.5 0.3 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0
PdA/
Sol.
1.5 3 1.5 1 2 1.0 0 0 0 0.0
EDU 1.3 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0.0
SD 1.8 1 0.5 0.1 0 0.0 0 0 0 0.0
Lega 0.9 2 1.0 0.8 1 0.5 0 0 0 0.0
Other 3.2 0 0.0 2.4 0 0.0 1 2.2 1 2.2
Total 100 200 100 100 200 100 46 100 46 100
ENPV/S 5.8 5.2 6.5 5.8 3.5 4.6
Note: asplit from Greens in 2007; bsplit from SVP in 2008; cmerged with FDP in 2009. ENPV/S = 
Effective number of parties in terms of votes or seats. Source: BFS (2020)
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to be elected, while in the second round a plurality suffices. This is again 
difficult for a candidate of a small party, even if she has a strong personality. 
On the other hand, if a party enjoys the support of a good 50% of the 
electorate, it can secure both seats, as was the case in small, rural Catholic 
cantons that were strongholds of the Conservatives (today the Christian- 
Democratic Party) for decades. Today, however, no party gets over 40% in 
a canton. A joint list of two parties, making a ticket of the two candidates 
to be elected, has the best chances for success. The most natural alliance is 
between the Socialists and the Greens, on the left; among the smaller cen-
trist parties, including the Christian-Democrats; and between the Liberals 
and the national-conservative Swiss People’s Party, on the right. The result 
can be seen in Table 3.2. In 2019, the two main centre parties, thanks to 
their tickets, won a majority of 25 out of the 46 seats with only about 27% 
electoral strength nationwide. While the Socialists are proportionally rep-
resented in the Council of States, the Swiss People’s Party, despite being 
by far the largest party, remains clearly underrepresented because it is less 
able to form strong alliances.
Parliamentary law-making reflects the equal importance of democratic 
and federal principles (see Box 3.2). Both chambers may initiate constitu-
tional amendments, new bills and regulations, as well as propose the revi-
sion of existing laws and regulations. All bills must be passed by both 
chambers in the exact same version, the common bureau deciding which 
chamber first considers a draft.
Box 3.2 The Powers of the Swiss Parliament
 A) Elections
The United Federal Assembly, which is the term for joint sessions 
of the two chambers—where the Council of States has one fifth of 
the votes—votes for the seven members of the Federal Council, the 
Federal Chancellor (administrative function), the members of the 
Federal Supreme Court, the Commander-in-Chief of the army in 
times of war and other major federal bodies.
(continued)
 W. LINDER AND S. MUELLER
69
If a bill fails to gain a majority in one of the two chambers, differences 
are sought to be eliminated through a procedure comprising different 
steps. If the second chamber proposes changes, the bill is sent back to the 
first chamber before being returned to the second. If both chambers insist 
on their version after three readings, each chamber appoints an equal 
number of delegates to a joint committee, which then tries to find a com-
mon solution. If the committee’s solution fails to be approved by either 
chamber, the bill does not go through.
This procedure reflects the rule of absolute equality of the two cham-
bers in all matters of legislation. The desire of the founders of the Swiss 
Constitution for strong federalism went further than in other European 
nations. In Germany, for instance, the Bundesrat, which represents the 
sub-national states of the republic, is composed of members of the gov-
ernments of the Länder. The number of members of each Land, however, 
varies according to population size, and the Bundesrat is empowered to 
exercise its veto only for constitutional revisions or in matters concerning 
the Länder directly.
 B) Legislation, budget, finance and controlling
Parliament is responsible for all political decisions of general 
importance. Three main categories exist: constitutional and legisla-
tive acts as well as parliamentary ordinances. In addition, the cham-
bers decide on budgets and finance and approve international treaties 
of major importance. The pre-parliamentary stage settles many issues 
even before a bill arrives to parliament. Nevertheless, parliament 
remains the key legislative actor: it sets the political agenda through 
parliamentary initiatives, motions and propositions and thoroughly 
examines and modifies draft bills. A parliamentary reform in the 
1990s introduced permanent committees, each having assured 
responsibilities in a defined policy area or in finance, auditing or the 
supervision of the federal government and its agencies. The reform 





How does bicameralism work out in law-making? In the nineteenth 
century, the English constitutionalist Walter Bagehot noted that hot tea, 
poured from a first cup into a second, can be drunk cooler. Modern politi-
cal science literature comes to the same conclusion: bicameralism pro-
duces decisions closer to the status quo (e.g. Vatter 2005; Tsebelis and 
Money 1997). In a federal system, bicameralism can have further effects. 
In Switzerland, where the second chamber represents the cantons, we 
note several dimensions of over-representation. First, by 2019 the 15 
smallest cantons represent only about 21% of the population but can, with 
25 votes, block every decision in the 46-member Council of States. This is 
more than theory because the small cantons have affinities: they are rather 
rural, Catholic, conservative and tending more towards the political right.
Second, these advantages of over-representation were used by different 
groups. In the early stages of the Swiss federation, the main cleavage was 
between the victorious Radicals, who favoured a strong central state, and 
the Conservative Catholic minority from small cantons who were resistant 
to the idea of central power. The Catholics’ deputation in the Council of 
States was therefore bound to prevent power shifting from the cantons to 
the federation. The rationale of these politics was evident: it allowed 
Catholics to maintain their conservative policies within the cantonal 
bounds of their majority influence. In the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, the main division was between bourgeois forces (often uniting 
Catholics and Protestants) and Socialists, who were concentrated in indus-
trial and urban cantons. The bourgeois majority, who enjoyed almost total 
control of the Council of States, was not opposed to new federal powers 
in general. However, they weakened or blocked measures aimed at 
improving the conditions of the working class that had been proposed 
in the National Council, where the Socialists had much more influence. 
This only changed after World War II, when the centre parties accepted 
the development of a modern welfare state. During all periods, however, 
the over-representation of rural regions in the Council of States led to 
privileged subsidies and regulations for agriculture. For a long time, the 
small chamber had the reputation of being committed to eliminating 
inequalities between poor and rich regions and between urban and rural 
areas, rather than between upper and lower social classes.
One might conclude that the Council of States, despite its official mis-
sion and reputation in the larger public, does not primarily subscribe to 
the federal ideal of maintaining decentralisation and cantonal powers. Yet 
a more convincing perspective is that different political forces—the 
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Catholics, then the bourgeois coalition and the rural cantons—used their 
over-representation in the Council of States to their own advantage. Thus, 
the Council of States has often played a conservative role, protecting the 
status quo against innovations proposed by the government and the other 
chamber. Yet this is an effect of the specific political composition of its 
majority, and not of the system itself. Indeed, between 2015 and 2019 the 
Council of States was a centre-left counterweight to the centre-right 
dominated National Council.
Those who say that the Council of States does not represent a truly 
federal point of view have strong empirical arguments. This assertion is 
corroborated by a theoretical perspective: the members of the Council of 
States and those of the National Council are elected in the same electoral 
districts, that is, the cantons, represent the same constituencies, and have 
the same interest of being re-elected. Thus, one must expect that the 
members of the Council of States defend the same group interests as those 
which dominate the National Council, and that they have no specific 
incentive to promote the collective interests of cantons as such. A system-
atic comparative analysis of the voting behaviour of both chambers during 
1995–1999 (Wiesli and Linder 2000) confirmed this hypothesis, but with 
a surprising point: on issues concerning the cantons, the Council of States 
was not more active than the National Council, but both chambers were 
highly committed and successful in defending the collective interests of 
the cantons.
3.2.2  The People’s and the Cantons’ Vote
All constitutional amendments and some international treaties pro-
posed by the Federal Assembly, and all popular initiatives proposing to 
change or amend the Constitution, have to be approved by both the 
people and the cantons. With (mandatory) referenda and popular ini-
tiatives, we thus again find that democratic and federal principles are 
co-equal elements of the decision-making process. Just like in parlia-
mentary decisions, there must be a double majority: on the one hand 
a majority of all voters, on the other a majority of cantons. The latter 
is calculated in a simple way: what the popular majority within a can-
ton decides counts as the vote of that canton. The votes of the 20 full 
cantons count as one vote each, the votes of the six half-cantons count 
half, which makes a total of 23 votes. If the result is tied (11.5:11.5), 
the proposal is rejected. As in the Federal Assembly, there can be a 
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collision between the principles of democracy and federalism: a 
particular constitutional amendment may obtain a popular majority, 
but a majority of cantons rejects it, and vice versa (see Tables 3.3 and 
3.4). However, unlike parliamentary proceedings, the popular vote 
does not foresee a negotiation process—in the case of conflicting 
majorities, a proposal simply fails and the status quo prevails.
Table 3.3  Constitutional 
revisions and amendments 
proposed by the Federal 
Assembly, 1848–2019, 
including direct counter-
proposals to popular 
initiatives
Went to a vote 240 100%
Accepted 174 73%
Total rejected, of which: 66 28%
—rejected by the people and the cantons 56 23%
—rejected by the cantons only 9 4%
—rejected by the people only 1 0.4%
Source: BFS (2020)
Table 3.4 Popular votes with different majorities of people and cantons, 1848–2020
Issue Year People(% for) Cantons (N)
For Against
Federal measures and weights 1866 50.5 9.5 12.5
Proportional representation 1910 47.5 12 10
Protection for tenants 1955 50.2 7 15
Civil protection service 1957 48.1 14 8
Federal finances 1970 55.4 9 13
Federal education 1973 52.8 10.5 11.5
Federal economic policy 1975 52.8 11 11
Federal energy policya 1983 50.9 11 12
Cultural policy 1994 51.0 11 12
Naturalisation of foreigners 1994 52.8 10 13
Abuse of asylum right 2002 49.9 12.5 10.5
Family policy 2013 54.3 10 13
Taxation of married couplesb 2016 49.2 16.5 7.5
Responsible Business Initiative 2020 50.7 8.5 14.5
Note: aBeginning in 1979, the inclusion of canton Jura brought the number of total cantonal votes to 23 
and the majority to 12. bThis vote was declared invalid by the Federal Supreme Court in April 2019. In 
italics: popular initiatives; all others: mandatory referendums
Sources: Germann (1991, 266), Linder and Mueller (2017, 224), BFS (2020)
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Details of direct democracy are explained in Chap. 4. Here we should 
mention further ways in which the cantons participate in federal decision- 
making. First, every canton is entitled to hand in proposals for a federal 
bill or constitutional amendment. This is called the right of cantonal initia-
tive. Though, if only one of the two chambers rejects the proposal it fails. 
A collective of at least eight cantons also has the right to demand a popular 
vote on every bill passed by parliament (cantonal referendum). This provi-
sion was used for the first time in 2003, when cantonal governments were 
strongly opposed to a new federal tax bill—and won the subsequent popu-
lar vote by a landslide.
Second, the informal, most usual and effective way for cantonal influ-
ence lies in pre-parliamentary consultation and lobbying. Given the 
importance of power-sharing in Switzerland, consultations preceding 
formal decisions are a process of intensive negotiation, which we con-
sider in Chap. 4. As implementation lies with the cantons, they are 
influential actors involved in both agenda-setting and drafting of federal 
legislation.
Box 3.3 Communes: The Cornerstone of the Swiss 
‘Bottom-Up’ State
Why the communes are the foundation of the Swiss state can be 
illustrated by way of the following two topics.
1. Subsidiarity: The idea of subsidiarity is that a central author-
ity should perform only those tasks which cannot be performed 
effectively at a lower level. It is a guiding principle of federalism. 
In the Swiss context, we find roots in Catholic social philosophy 
and liberal thinking which gave subsidiarity an additional mean-
ing: the state should take responsibility only for tasks which can-
not be performed by other societal organisations. Both meanings 
can be considered to form part of Swiss political culture long 
before subsidiarity became a constitutional guideline in 1999. In 
fact, surveys show that Swiss citizens expect less responsibility to 
be taken over by the state than do citizens from neighbouring 
countries, and that they prefer decentralised solutions whenever 
possible. This is exactly how the Swiss system reacts to new chal-




3.2.3  Local Governments: The Corner Stone of the Swiss 
‘Bottom-Up’ State
So far, we have been mainly concerned with the federation and the can-
tons, but emphasis should also be given to the particularities of local gov-
ernments (Horber-Papazian 2007). Communes are a corner stone of the 
problems—for example, regarding drug use or the integration of 
foreigners—solutions are first sought at the local level. A transfer 
of powers to the canton or federation happens only if and to the 
degree in which local solutions turn out to be unsatisfactory or 
incomplete.
2. Swiss citizenship: As already mentioned, the Swiss are citizens of 
a commune, a canton, and of the federation. If foreign residents 
want to acquire Swiss citizenship, they have to start at the local level. 
Local citizenship must be acquired before applicants are granted 
cantonal and finally federal citizenship. The whole procedure is bur-
densome, costly and time-consuming, and the highest hurdle is at 
the local level. Applicants must have lived in the same commune for 
a number of years; a local committee demands proof that the appli-
cant speaks a Swiss language, has a basic knowledge of Swiss society 
and its institutions and is socially integrated. In smaller communes of 
some cantons, it is the full assembly of the citizens who ultimately 
decide on each application. In the late 1990s, when discrimination 
happened against applicants from certain countries, the Federal 
Supreme Court (1990) intervened, defining standards of fair proce-
dure for the people’s assembly. While the decision was welcomed by 
Liberals, it was criticised by Conservatives: in their eyes, the court’s 
ruling was an offence against local autonomy. While the liberal view 
reflects a modern concept of the rule of law, the conservative posi-
tion illustrates that several elements of traditional political culture 
are still highly valued: a bottom-up idea of the state, local autonomy 
and a high degree of legitimacy through direct participation (see also 
Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Hainmueller et al. 2019).
Box 3.3 (continued)
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three-level federal system (see Box 3.3). The political autonomy of com-
munes is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Despite variations in the 
degree of local autonomy, which depends on cantonal law and politics 
(Mueller 2015), we can identify a common core that is characterised by 
the following:
 1. A (constitutional) right to exist, including the freedom to merge 
with other communes or to remain independent, which cannot be 
withdrawn by the cantons. This means that a reform of local govern-
ment ‘from above’, as happened in Germany in the 1960s when the 
Länder forced small communes to merge, would be rather impossi-
ble in Switzerland. Indeed, the number of communes, some 2200 
by early 2020, had barely decreased until the 1990s. Since then, 
about 800 municipalities have merged into larger units on their own 
political will. This is not astonishing because more than half of the 
Swiss communes counted less than 500 inhabitants and had increas-
ing difficulties fulfilling their tasks. Even though reasons of effi-
ciency are strong political arguments for merging, citizens sometimes 
prefer independence and autonomy. Mergers can fail because the 
majority of citizens must accept the project in a popular vote in each 
of the communes concerned.
 2. The freedom to choose, within the bounds of cantonal legislation, an 
adequate political structure and administration (see Box 3.4). 
There are cantons with numerous small communes and others 
with fewer but larger ones, and the degree of autonomy of the 
communes varies greatly from canton to canton. Furthermore, 
traditions of direct and assembly democracy are stronger in the 
German- and Romansh- speaking regions of Switzerland, whereas 
communes in the French and Italian-speaking regions favour rep-
resentative democracy. Apart from culture, the most important 
factor defining the type of political organisation is population size 
(Ladner and Fiechter 2012, 440). In small communes, local gov-
ernment consists of a few elected part- time officials who are 
poorly remunerated. Citizens meet several times a year to approve 
or reject their decisions. Large cities, in turn, have an elected par-
liament and full-time executive heading professional services. This 
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leads to somewhat strange proportions: the 30,000 local employees 
of Zurich, the country’s largest city with over 400,000 inhabit-
ants, are almost double the number of inhabitants (15,500) of the 
smallest canton, Appenzell Inner-Rhodes.
 3. The right to impose taxes for their own needs. The right to impose 
taxes and to decide on local tax rates is certainly the most important 
element in assuring the autonomy of local governments. Fiscal 
autonomy not only allows communes to decide on local infrastruc-
ture, services, land-use planning or other public utilities according 
to their own preferences. It also establishes responsibility on both 
sides of local government: authorities are held responsible for using 
their resources according to the people’s needs, and citizens have to 
contribute with their taxes to the services they demand and enjoy. 
Thus, decentralised governance brings the state closer to the people. 
Whereas in the UK and the US local taxes are mostly determined by 
the value of real estate, Swiss communes are entitled to impose an 
income tax. With some 30%, the local share of total state revenue 
and expenditure is considerable.
 4. Freedom of action in matters that are not in the competence of the can-
tons or the federation. The consequences of this principle are two-
fold. First, it defends local autonomy in situations of conflict. A 
corporation seeking a site, even for the purpose of a public benefit 
such as a nuclear power plant, cannot impose itself on a commune 
with the help of cantonal or federal authorities if the latter lack a 
formal competency in the issue. Therefore, depending on the cir-
cumstances, communes are also protected against their own canton. 
The Federal Supreme Court protects local autonomy in a similar 
way as it does individual human rights. Second, the principle can 
encourage political innovation, because communes are in the pole 
position to spot the need for new public services. Some social ser-
vices, schools for social workers, AIDS prevention, controlled drug 
use or recycling of waste are examples of new public tasks that 
started in the communes. When those activities are further devel-
oped at cantonal or federal level, we can speak of a trial-and-error 
process, which permits the use of small-scale experiences for large- 
scale benefits.
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Box 3.4  Local Government Institutions
Political structures vary considerably with the size of communes. 
This is the reason why we distinguish between small and large com-
munes in the following description:




A type of ‘assembly 
democracy’. All adult Swiss 
citizens living in the 
commune can participate.
Communal parliament:
Elected by the people. A type of 
semi-direct democracy.
The plenary assembly 
decides on propositions 
submitted by the executive 
of the commune and by 
ordinary citizens.
All important communal 
questions can be discussed.
Important decisions must be approved 
by a popular vote submitted by the 
executive (mandatory referendum). 
Other decisions can be challenged by an 
optional referendum. In the communes 
of most cantons, citizens have the right 




Collegiate council, elected directly by the citizens (exception: canton 
Neuchâtel, where the communal parliament appoints the executive 
council).
Part-time members as a rule, 
full professionals the 
exception.
Professional full-time members as a rule; 
part-time officials the exception.
Admini-
stration
Relies partly or entirely on 
the non-professional services 
of local volunteers.
Professional administration in 
combination with resources of non-
professional volunteers.
Note: In some French-speaking cantons, the traditions of ‘assembly democracy’ as well as of the 
referendum and the popular initiative are less known. Even small communes therefore rely on 
types of representative democracy with an executive and a legislative council
The main field of the Milizverwaltung is local government (Geser 
et al. 1987; Ladner 2008). In communes with less than 1000 inhabit-
ants, there are often just two full-time professional posts: mayor and 
communal secretary or clerk. The other seats of the communal 
council, as well as positions in social services and the fire brigade, in 
committees for land-use planning and school administration, are 
occupied by volunteers or are part-time jobs. Even in larger com-
munes and cities, the Milizverwaltung does not disappear entirely, 
but is combined with professional administration.
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3.2.4  Citizens’ Self-administration
In many areas of Swiss administration, public tasks are not fulfilled by 
employed civil servants or administrators. Instead, ordinary people them-
selves manage these public affairs by part-time engagement of a few hours 
or several days per week. In German this is called Milizverwaltung, a form 
of self-administration by people who volunteer for the public good. This 
part-time work is sometimes remunerated, sometimes not, depending on 
the nature and volume of the work. In some cantons the system dates back 
to the Middle Ages. In the canton of Valais, for instance, the water-supply 
system in the high valleys was realised via the Gemeinwerk (community 
work) into which every adult man was periodically drafted for several 
weeks to help with construction (Niederer 1965).
In its modern form, Milizverwaltung has three functions:
 1. It uses the professional skills of ordinary citizens for public affairs. 
This allows non-centralised self-administration and political auton-
omy even for small political units who lack the funds to hire profes-
sionals. By relying on the part-time involvement of their citizens, 
they can deliver their own community services.
 2. Self-administration, with a great number of persons involved in 
part-time tasks, posts and committees, allows for more democratic 
participation. In their voluntary role, citizens become part of and 
personify the political and administrative institutions.
 3. Communitarian traditions in Switzerland have been able to survive. 
There are many private organisations working for the poor, the 
handicapped, in cultural affairs, for the protection of the environ-
ment or the promotion of other public goods. These non-profit 
organisations fulfil public tasks outside of public administration, 
even though many of them are subsidised by the federation, the 
canton or the commune.
Milizverwaltung is found at the cantonal and federal level, too, for 
instance in the form of expert committees. In the 1980s, a first systematic 
inquiry found almost 400 federal expert committees with some 4000 per-
sons involved (Germann 1981). A more recent study, taking into account 
only committees nominated directly by the Federal Council, illustrates the 
importance of the federal Milizverwaltung: 40% of the 181 committees 
have a consultative function, 43% are decision-making and appeal organs, 
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while the rest fulfil leadership or representative mandates (Varone 2007). 
Moreover, many cantonal and district courts work on the basis of 
Milizverwaltung, and all members of all parliaments—federal, cantonal 
and local—formally exercise their mandate on a part-time basis. With the 
exception of executive members, most elected politicians in Switzerland 
work on another job besides their mandate.
Advocates of the Milizverwaltung claim that it is cheaper than profes-
sional administration, that the state remains in close contact with voters 
and that the system keeps the political elite from becoming an isolated 
class. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that it has led to too much 
amateurism and not enough professionalism in Swiss politics, as well as 
hidden transactions or even corruption if individuals do not carefully dis-
tinguish between private and public interests.
3.3  FederalIsm at Work
The actual functioning of federalism is best shown through concrete polit-
ical processes and conflicts. This is the reason why we illustrate the work-
ing of federalism through five issues, all of them dealing with important 
political questions to be settled, regulated and implemented by federal, 
cantonal and communal actors. Two of these issues—energy policy and 
the creation of the canton of Jura—represent enduring and still controver-
sial political questions. Their history is illustrated in the form of condensed 
case studies. Regarding the implementation of federal tasks, primary 
schools and financial compensation, we confine ourselves to describing the 
essential ideas and concepts.
3.3.1  Cooperative Federalism: How Federal Tasks Are 
Implemented by Cantons and Communes
In the middle of the nineteenth century, divisions between centralists and 
non-centralists led to a clear distinction and division of power between the 
federation and the cantons. This concept, however, has subsequently been 
overruled by the mechanisms of intensive cooperation between all three 
levels of the federal system. The complexities of modern infrastructure, 
economic intervention and social programmes stimulated the completion 
of federal legislation by the cantons, the implementation of federal pro-




The Swiss social security system provides a good example of this kind of 
‘cooperative federalism’. Its main element, which gives a minimum old- 
age pension to all retired persons as well as to widows and their children, 
was introduced in 1948 and has been regularly revised since then. The 
federation is responsible for legislation, regulates insurance contributions, 
and supervises the implementation of the programme. It also finances part 
of the costs and, through the Federal Supreme Court, guarantees equal 
application of the law.
While citizens may look to the national politics section of their newspa-
per to find the latest changes to social security payments, it is the local and 
cantonal authorities or even private organisations with whom they have to 
deal. The monthly contributions of employees and employers are collected 
by cantonal and regional agencies of the different industries, a reminder of 
the time when social security was based on private organisations. The same 
organisational scheme applies to other branches of social security, such as 
invalidity, maternity and unemployment insurance. The regional agencies 
and cantonal authorities are also responsible for most of the redistribution, 
along with the postman, who in earlier times took the money directly to 
pensioners. Indeed, the postal and telecommunication service, together 
with the federal railways (SBB), belong to the few federal services which 
deal directly with the public. Most federal programmes are implemented 
by the cantons and the communes, and there is no parallel federal admin-
istration, with its own regional services, agencies or even courts, like that 
in the US.
Where the social security system is concerned, the cooperation between 
the federation, the cantons and the communes goes even further. If a 
retired citizen is so poor that she cannot live on the federal pension, she 
may go to the local authority and apply for an additional benefit provided 
by the canton. The fact that the federal government pays a substantial part 
of that grant is an incentive for the cantons to run complementary social 
security programmes (otherwise they would not obtain a share of this part 
of the central budget), but the cantons are in sole charge of the pro-
grammes. Implementation, finally, is delegated to the communes, which 
are closest to inhabitants and therefore have better information based on 
which to evaluate the needs of claimants. Indeed, most of the other social 
services for which personal relations are essential—social aid to the poor, 
social work, homes for elderly people, mobile-meal and health services, 
childcare—are run by the communes, although sometimes they are dele-
gated to private organisations and publicly subsidised.
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This kind of cooperation again reflects the strong belief of the Swiss in 
the subsidiarity principle (see Box 3.3). Thus, public intervention and 
public help should only occur in situations where private means do not 
suffice to achieve a goal. Furthermore, if a public programme is really 
necessary, the Swiss start at the bottom, with the commune. Cantonal 
programmes kick in only when local programmes do not suffice, and only 
if a task exceeds the capacities of cantons do they relinquish power to the 
federation. Consequently, even in federal matters not all responsibilities 
are centralised. Whereas the federation has become responsible for legisla-
tion on many issues that once were under cantonal rule, the implementa-
tion of federal programmes is delegated back to the cantons and the 
communes whenever possible (Dardanelli and Mueller 2019). This applies 
even to the fiscal state: the cantons or in some places even the communes 
collect all income and property taxes from their inhabitants—not only 
their own but also those of the federal government.
3.3.2  Energy Policy: From Federal Deadlock to 
Cantonal Experiments
When the first oil crisis in 1973 shocked the industrialised world, the Swiss 
became aware of their extremely vulnerable energy supply. While water 
from the Alps can meet a good deal of electricity demand, this constitutes 
the only major renewable energy resource of Switzerland. For about 80% 
of its energy consumption, it is dependent on international markets: oil 
from the Middle East and Africa, gas from northern Europe and Russia 
and uranium from Canada and the US. In the view of the Swiss govern-
ment, a national energy policy was then considered urgent and necessary. 
A committee of experts was appointed to provide long-term forecasts of 
energy supply and consumption. Its report on a national energy pro-
gramme to the government made three key recommendations: substitute 
oil, boost research into alternative sources and encourage energy savings. 
In 1980, the Federal Council proposed a constitutional amendment which 
would have enabled a national energy policy to be developed. The two 
chambers of parliament approved yet in a referendum in 1983, the amend-
ment gained the people’s consent but failed to muster a cantonal majority.
It was not until 1990 that the federal authorities presented a new pro-
posal for a national energy policy that survived the referendum process. 
This constitutional amendment contained only a few moderate sugges-
tions. In the following decade, protagonists of effective energy saving 
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policies handed in three popular initiatives proposing taxes on non- 
renewable and subsidies for alternative energies. None of them was suc-
cessful, and two similar bills taking up the idea of subsidies for renewable 
energies were rejected by the people in 2000. In 2001, parliament accepted 
a law setting standards for the reduction of CO2 emissions. Thus, it took 
the federation almost 30 years to acquire a mandate for a national energy 
policy whose limited ambitions were far from the original hopes of the 
government. A more ambitious plan—the ‘Energy Strategy 2050’—was 
approved at the polls only in 2017 (SFOE 2018 and below).
This long delay may be exceptional. The example of energy policy, 
however, is typical of the difficulties the central government faces if it 
wants to acquire new competencies under the conditions of direct democ-
racy. There have been other occasions when the people have rejected fed-
eral projects several times, before finally accepting them in a different 
version. Even then it should be noted that the people may reject bills to 
implement a new policy when they have already approved the underlying 
constitutional amendment. This was the fate, for instance, of the mater-
nity insurance bill that was successfully challenged in popular referenda in 
1987 and 1999, although the constitutional principle had been approved 
as early as 1945.
The combination of federalism with direct democracy, therefore, gives 
the cantons high veto power and amounts to a considerable obstacle for 
federal innovation. One of the most common arguments against national 
policies is mistrust of the federal government and defence of cantonal 
autonomy. Anti-state, anti-centralist, as well as conservative and neo- 
liberal motives fit equally well into this pattern. They also played a role in 
the votes on energy. It was argued that new federal powers to intervene in 
the market were not necessary. Such activities would weaken regional 
competences, and it was said that the cantons were already doing all that 
was necessary. Thus, federal innovation attempts are far from being guar-
anteed success. And even if they do, it may take a long time because of the 
high consensus required by the double majority of people and cantons and 
because of the two stages of legislation, constitutional base and statutory 
enactment. Table  3.3 shows that over a quarter of all constitutional 
amendments proposed by the Federal Assembly between 1848 and 2019 
were rejected.
The case of the national energy policy, however, needs further explana-
tion. It involved a most controversial and polarising issue: nuclear energy. 
In the 1970s, the anti-nuclear movement successfully stopped the 
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construction of a power plant after several months of occupying the site. 
When first the Greens and then the Social-Democrats opposed the con-
struction of new nuclear power plants, the issue divided parliament, par-
ties and the people. Nuclear power was controversial where technical risks 
and gains were concerned, but underneath lurked a fundamental conflict 
of values. Proponents of nuclear power considered that economic growth 
and technical progress were at stake; opponents were deeply concerned 
about the protection of nature and of future generations against the dan-
gers of nuclear technology.
A popular initiative against the construction of new power plants failed 
in 1979, but 49% of the people voted in favour—the anti-nuclear move-
ment had successfully reached the masses. The protagonists of nuclear 
power were equally unable to win enough support for the continuation of 
the programme. When in 1985 the federal chambers authorised the 
resumption of the construction of the nuclear power plant in Kaiseraugst/
AG, it encountered unanimous protests by the two neighbouring half- 
cantons of Basel. Public opinion throughout Switzerland to a large degree 
disapproved of the resumption of works, and some federal authorities 
were convinced that completion would be impossible without police 
guards or even military protection. The work was thus not resumed, and 
in 1989 the federal parliament dropped the project, paying 350 million 
CHF in indemnities to the electrical company that had been licensed to 
undertake the work. This was two years after the nuclear accident at 
Chernobyl, whose radioactive fall-out reached large parts of 
Western Europe.
Thus, neither the opponents nor the protagonists of nuclear power 
could win the argument. In this deadlock, a compromise was found. In 
1990, the cantons and the people accepted a popular initiative for a ten- 
year moratorium on the authorisation and construction of new plants. 
When the moratorium ran out, opponents of nuclear power launched two 
popular initiatives: one to renew the moratorium, the other to pull out 
fully from nuclear energy within ten years. Both initiatives failed to muster 
the required cantonal and popular majorities in 2003, as did a third 
in 2016.
At the same time, the industry launched plans for the replacement of 
two existing nuclear plants, which led the anti-nuclear movement to reor-
ganise. Thus, as in other countries, the deadlock over nuclear energy 
seemed to continue—until in May 2011 the Federal Council announced 
the complete withdrawal from nuclear energy production, just two months 
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after the Fukushima catastrophe (SFOE 2018; Kammermann and 
Freiburghaus 2019). To compensate for the losses in domestic production 
accruing from this decision while at the same abiding by the targets of the 
Paris Agreement, it was decided to invest heavily in renewable energies as 
well as efficiency increases. A referendum against the new law was again 
called but this time unsuccessfully, in 2017 (ibid.).
For a long time, the deep conflict on the question of nuclear power had 
overshadowed and paralysed all other issues in national energy policy. The 
deadlock of federal politics in the 1980s and 1990s, however, did not pre-
vent important innovations in some cantons (see also Strebel and Widmer 
2012). In Basel-Countryside, for instance, where opposition to nuclear 
power was particularly strong, the authorities found a constructive way 
out of the dilemma: future energy shortfalls resulting from the rejection of 
nuclear power should be compensated for by effective energy-saving pro-
grammes. The authorities mandated experts with analysing the potential 
for energy-saving in all household appliances, and in industry, public 
buildings and transport.
In the 1980s, Basel-Countryside then pioneered energy saving poli-
cies, with considerable success. The new regulations for housing insula-
tion, for instance, stimulated innovation in the construction industry. 
Within ten years, energy consumption for heating in new houses dropped 
by nearly 40% because of better insulation and more efficient heating. 
Other cantons followed, and their laws further encouraged energy saving 
technologies to be applied in businesses and private homes. Thus, decen-
tralised energy policy was an early experiment. Cantons became labora-
tories for solving the problem of how to live with less energy without 
renouncing on comfort. Their experiments were realistic and allowed for 
the risk of failure. Decentralised experimenting and coordination allowed 
Switzerland to keep the costs of failure low, but let all participants ben-
efit from successful innovation. Cantons became testing grounds not 
only for new technologies but also for the federal authorities. When 
finally a national energy savings programme was passed, it could draw on 
cantonal lessons learned.
The success of these measures should not, however, be overestimated. 
Some cantons flatly rejected energy-saving programmes, others were 
reluctant or constrained by the national controversy about nuclear energy. 
Those who did participate had to realise that stabilising overall energy 
consumption was not an obtainable goal. Cantons are not authorised to 
raise gas or oil prices through taxation, which more than any other 
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measure would seem to stimulate a reduction in consumption. Cantons 
were able to stimulate the use of new technologies, such as solar or wind 
energy, but cantonal markets are much too small to hope for economies of 
scale by mass production. There was no national policy helping the small 
innovative enterprises to become competitive at an international level, and 
for some even the ‘Energy Strategy 2050’ falls short of this.
Meanwhile, other countries like Denmark or Germany have taken the 
lead in solar energy and other fields where Swiss firms were once pio-
neers. Even so, the cantonal experience was not in vain. It was a substitute 
for the long times blocked federal policy, contributed to overcoming 
some of the deep conflicts on the energy issue, and helped to develop 
ends and means of energy savings policies by a process of decentralised 
trial-and-error. Learning from decentralised or even competitive innova-
tion processes may be one of the most important advantages of federalism 
(see also Sager 2003).
Yet in the face of accelerating global warming, this might not be 
enough anymore. A series of school demonstrations—inspired by the 
Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg—for stricter climate change policies 
helped produce great wins for the two Green parties in the 2019 federal 
elections (see Table  3.2). The federal counterargument that cantons 
could already do a lot to encourage energy efficiency and careful land use 
proved unconvincing. With the warnings of global climate change, 
‘decarbonisation’—that is, policies for the substitution of oil and gas by 
renewable energy—has caught the attention of the larger public. It will 
require heavy interventions and high investments by the central authori-
ties. At the same time, even the most progressive, interventionist national 
policy to curb Swiss CO2-emissions will need to rely on the cantons for 
actual implementation (Dardanelli and Mueller 2019). Looking at the 
past, this won’t be an easy way.
3.3.3  Coping with Inequality: The Example of Swiss 
Primary Schools
While travelling in rural regions or hiking in the Alps, visitors to Switzerland 
are often astonished to see pretty and well-maintained school buildings 
even in small and evidently poor villages. Indeed, having their own schools 
for their children and a good school teacher is the pride of each commune. 
Another story, linked again to federalism, is how even small and poor vil-
lages are able to live up to this ideal.
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In the middle of the nineteenth century, education differed from can-
ton to canton. In some cantons, primary schools were run by the (Catholic) 
church, others were public. In mountain regions, school lessons were 
given only in winter, when children were not needed in the fields. Curricula 
and the length of children’s basic education varied considerably. The 
Radical majority of 1848 wanted education to remain a cantonal matter. 
This allowed for cultural diversity. Aware of the importance of education 
for a young nation and its democracy, however, the Radicals stipulated 
that there should be a federal benchmark. Thus, a constitutional provision 
required that ‘the cantons provide sufficient basic education’. This regula-
tion was, firstly, a plea for the (cantonal) state monopoly over schools and 
directed against the Catholic Church, which then controlled parts of the 
educational system. Second, the regulation obliged the cantons to offer a 
minimum standard of basic education, with a minimum number of years 
of schooling free of charge and compulsory.
These requirements greatly influenced the evolution of the Swiss edu-
cational system. Providing equal-quality education and training became 
the common concern of the cantons. In earlier times, there was a ‘brain 
drain’ of the best teachers to rich communes offering better salaries. 
Although in most cantons still nominated and paid by the communes, 
teachers today receive an almost equal salary throughout a canton. 
Curricula are more and more coordinated by inter-cantonal bodies. Poor 
communes receive subsidies for the salaries of their teachers and the 
construction of their school buildings—but these have to follow con-
struction standards that prohibit both luxury buildings and sub-standard 
classrooms.
Moreover, for long times, inadequately coordinated curricula created 
difficulties for schoolchildren when parents moved from one canton to 
another. Whilst it makes sense, for example, for Bernese schools to con-
centrate on the cultural specificities and history of their own canton, the 
argument for federalism is less strong when there are 26 different cantonal 
teaching programmes in mathematics. Thus, many of the old particulari-
ties of cantonal curricula have been eliminated—not by dictate of the fed-
eral government but rather by means of inter-cantonal coordination 
(Schwab and Surdez 2007; Schnabel and Mueller 2017).
Sixty years ago, access to higher education was highly unequal. 
Students from rural regions, from lower social classes and women were 
underrepresented. This changed with federal programs—subsidies for 
the new, decentralised cantonal institutions, and top-ups for cantonal 
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scholarships—that gave a big boost to higher education. Today, women 
as well as students from rural regions have equal chances. Class inequal-
ity, however, remains as big as it was then, and is a black spot in the 
Swiss welfare state. One has to consider, though, that social differences 
in access to higher education are more difficult to overcome than bar-
riers erected by distance or gender (Vellacot and Wolter 2004; Becker 
and Schoch 2018).
3.3.4  Swiss Federalism: Solidarity Is more Important 
than Competition
The federal policy of minimum standards is not limited to schooling; other 
public services work in the same way. Public transport now reaches practi-
cally every commune, even those in high mountain valleys. A dense and 
decentralised network of public infrastructure has helped to maintain the 
private services of doctors, local banks or grocery stores even in small vil-
lages. If Swiss statistics define communes with 10,000 inhabitants as ‘cit-
ies’, there is a reason for this: one can find lawyers and other professional 
specialists, computer and bookshops, theatres and swimming pools, vari-
ous other commodities and services, and even a local industry producing 
a particular product.
Instead of people flocking to where the money is, Swiss federalism has 
seen to it that the money is sent to where the people are, thus maintaining 
a decentralised economic and social structure. In the 1970s, when young 
people from mountain valleys found better jobs by moving to the cities, a 
large federal programme for public investment in the mountain regions 
was launched. Subsidies were provided on the condition that different 
communes agreed on a joint regional development plan. This plan had to 
demonstrate the development potential of the region1 and to coordinate 
1 The use of the term ‘region’ is ambiguous in Switzerland. It can designate (a) the geo-
graphical boundaries of the four language communities, or other geographical subdivisions 
of the country with a number of common characteristics (mountain, urban, rural and subur-
ban regions); (b) the geographic boundaries of several communes, belonging sometimes to 
different cantons, defined for the purpose of a specific federal policy programme, as in the 
case of the development of the mountain regions; or (c) administrative organisations, formed 
by several communes, for regional land-use planning and economic development. None of 
these regions are political organisations representing a ‘fourth tier’ in the federal system. In 




federal investments in roads, schools, sports sites and other facilities. The 
programme helped to develop new tourist industries and, together with 
other instruments, provided agriculture in mountain regions with a better 
chance of survival. In many areas the population drain was stopped. While 
evaluations of the programme were sometimes critical about its direct eco-
nomic effects, its socio-political success was undeniable. The programme 
provided the communes with an incentive to get together to analyse their 
own situations with a wider horizon and find shared perspectives of devel-
opment. Encouraging this social activity of ‘endogenous development’, 
some experts say, was even more important than money (Bassand and 
Hainard 1985).
With globalisation and the opening of the Swiss economy in the 1990s, 
this kind of regional policy became more difficult and less effective. It was 
therefore cancelled. Even so, equalisation policies for the different cantons 
and their regions are still at the core of Swiss ‘cooperative federalism’ 
(Vatter and Freitag 2004). The idea is that of a commonwealth of all 
regions, and of mutuality. At its heart, we find a broad system of financial 
compensation between the federation and the cantons (and, within the 
cantons, the same for communes) comprising revenue-sharing as well as 
financial compensation by block grants and subsidies (see Box 3.5 and 
Fig.  3.1) (Gaudard and Cudré-Mauroux 1997; Messerli 2004, Vatter 
2018, 186 f.).
7 resources-rich cantons:
BS, GE, NW, OW,
SZ, ZG, ZH
19 resources-poor cantons:
AG, AI, AR, BE, BL, FR, GL
GR, JU, LU,NE, SG, SH, SO,













Fig. 3.1 Net compensation transfers in 2020. Note: Own, simplified figure with 
data from Eidgenössische Finanzverwaltung (EFV) (2019), in CHF
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As can be seen from Fig. 3.1, financial compensation has two dimen-
sions: vertical between the federation and the cantons, and horizontal 
amongst the cantons. The same two-dimensional system can be found in 
the relations between a canton and its communes. The equalising policies 
of cooperative federalism are not uncontested. Some complain that shared 
responsibility makes actors less responsible, or that cooperative federalism 
encourages too much public spending. The critique was taken up in a 
major reform of Swiss federalism that started in the 1990s. Its most 
Box 3.5 Mechanisms of Financial Compensation
Financial compensation serves to adjust differences in financial rev-
enue and expenditure between rich and poor cantons or communes. 
There are two main reasons why Switzerland has such a policy. First, 
supposing that people in mountain cantons do not wish to leave, we 
are confronted with the problem that these cantons cannot compete 
with the urban cantons, where the economic opportunities are much 
greater. Besides different resources, the cantonal tax system can 
worsen the unequal starting position: tax revenues in the mountain 
cantons are very low whilst tax rates are rather high. Financial com-
pensation seeks to strengthen ‘poor’ cantons and communes and to 
enable them to offer basic public goods of a quality similar to those 
of ‘rich’ communes. Second, there is what economists call the ‘exter-
nality problem’. Some cantons or communes carry out tasks for oth-
ers. They offer infrastructural services, for example universities, 
theatres or hospitals, which are used by residents of other cantons 
and communes. Instead of pricing these services differently for these 
individuals—which is not always feasible—cantons or communes 
look for mutual compensation.
Thus, the federal system of financial compensation is based on 
two ideas:
 1. Financial compensation of resources: compensating for differ-
ences of resources between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ cantons.
 2. Financial compensation of spillovers: compensating the externali-
ties of public goods between the cantons or between the different 
levels of the federal system.
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important element comprised a disentanglement of responsibilities 
between the federation and the cantons. It followed the principle of fiscal 
equivalence: as much as possible, the territorial circle of a public good 
should coincide with the circle of both its beneficiaries and payers. Better 
coincidence should strengthen political responsibility. It was the baseline 
for a reform of the system of financial compensation that was meant to 
become more transparent and subsidiary in its character.
It was crucial, therefore, to clearly define objective criteria of relatively 
‘poor’ or ‘rich’ cantons, which in the end are decisive if a canton ends up 
being a net beneficiary or contributor of equalisation payments. Even so, 
it was not easy to overcome the opposition of the rich cantons, all the 
more so as the fiscal system is characterised by strong cantonal autonomy 
(see Box 3.6). We now see the political reason for the substantial financial 
participation of the federation: allowing that only a few cantons ended up 
as ‘losers’, it eased political conflict enough to guarantee success in parlia-
ment and the ensuing popular vote in 2004. Federal subsidies, leading to 
overconsumption in the past, were mostly discontinued in favour of block 
grants (Vatter 2005, 2018; Frey 2005).
Box 3.6 The Fiscal State: Paying Taxes in Switzerland
Every year, each household gets a tax form from the cantonal or 
local tax office. The responsible persons in the household are 
required to declare the salary earned last year and their fortune by 
the end of it. On the basis of their own declarations and after control 
by the authority, taxpayers get their bill. The commune or canton 
not only collects its own taxes but is mandated to also collect those 
of the other two levels. This demands much trust in the taxpayer and 
the collecting authority but is considered to be efficient for all parties 
involved.
The decentralised system allows cantons and communes to vary 
definitions of income and fortune, and to apply different tax rates. 
Households with the same revenue may pay different taxes depend-
ing on where they live—even within the same canton. Thus, Swiss 
federalism allows for competition, traditionally limited in its extent 
to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’. Even so, differences can be con-
siderable. A family with two children, having a gross annual income 
(continued)
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This notion of cooperative federalism is different from other ideas of 
federalism. Economic theory, for instance, relates federalism to competi-
tion. Some economists prefer many decentralised authorities to the 
monopoly of one central government. According to this view, the ideal 
situation is one where governments constantly compete and where citi-
zens have the option to ‘vote with the feet’ for the government they pre-
fer. One could say that US federalism is, and probably always was, 
influenced by this idea. The variety of US states is considered as something 
amongst which one chooses. Individuals migrating from East to West or 
North to South are trying to make the best choice they can. US cities and 
communities are in strong competition with each other. Living in a wealthy 
of 150,000 CHF, pays 42,000 CHF in (poor) Delémont but only 
about 20,000 in (rich) Zug (ESTV 2019). This reflects how the dif-
ferent economic situation of two regions can affect taxpayers. Tax 
competition became a political issue when the Canton of Obwalden, 
in order to attract rich taxpayers, was the first to introduce a flat rate. 
This was considered unfair competition because all other cantons 
use progressive tax tariffs.
Two other aspects of tax competition have become controversial 
on the international stage: local ‘tax treaties’ and the national ‘bank-
ing secrecy’. Both were legally defined offers to save taxes and attract 
rich people and/or their wealth from abroad. While defenders of 
these privileges claimed legal and fiscal autonomy, the opponents, 
raising moral questions or inequality of treatment, were not much 
heard in the Swiss political discourse. As to the banking secret, things 
changed when the biggest Swiss bank was accused in the US of sys-
tematically violating US tax legislation, and when in 2009 the OECD 
placed Switzerland on a grey list in order to change its banking 
secrecy and thus fight tax evasion. Meanwhile, banking secrecy is 
dead. While an international harmonisation of rules of tax competi-
tion seems to be logic and reasonable in times of globalisation, the 
Swiss government is worrying about who sets the rules, and what 




residential area or a poor suburb can mean all the difference between 
excellent or poor public services. People who find that the local public 
school is not good enough for their children send them to private schools 
or move to a better area. This can lead to vicious cycles where poor com-
munities get poorer and rich ones richer.
‘Voting with the feet’, then, may be part of the American political cul-
ture that favours individual liberty, and is a heritage of people who once 
took the ‘exit option’ to leave their home countries as emigrants. The 
attitude of the Swiss is different. The Swiss passport does not mention 
‘place of birth’, but the commune of family origin, dating back genera-
tions. In older times, this kind of citizenship was of great importance: 
before the creation of the modern welfare state, the commune of origin 
was legally obliged to care for ‘its’ elderly, homeless and destitute. Today, 
the place of origin has lost its importance. But most Swiss are strongly 
sedentary, emotionally attached to the communes and regions in which 
they grow up and live. This collective notion of freedom is in stark con-
trast to US-American understandings of liberty (Basta Fleiner 2000).
Many Swiss feel that choosing to make a living in another canton means 
the loss of familiar surroundings and mentalities. One finds Swiss people 
of all professions who prefer to stay in their own region rather than accept 
better jobs in other cantons or abroad. Moreover, there are the language 
boundaries. Only a very small proportion of the population changes lin-
guistic regions. Many of those who do so for professional reasons later 
return to their region of origin. Things are changing, though. Under the 
pressure of globalisation, the Swiss economy is subject to rapid structural 
change, requiring workforce to become more mobile. University students 
are today offered mobility programmes to receive part of their education 
abroad. Nevertheless, living close to their native region is the first choice 
of most people.
Under these conditions, we can understand the great importance of 
regional solidarity in Swiss politics. Creating fairly equal living conditions 
in the different regions is vital if collective values of local cultures are to be 
maintained and if people continue to feel emotionally attached to their 
place of living. In contrast to the US, then, the Swiss culture of federalism 
is not primarily based on competition, nor on voting with one’s feet by 
migrating, the ‘exit option’ in Hirschmans (1960) terms. By compensat-
ing for existing inequalities, Swiss federalism makes it possible for people 
to stay in their own region. It thus favours the ‘loyalty option’.
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3.3.5  Dealing with Separatism: The Arduous Birth 
of a New Canton
The problems of the Jura region have already been mentioned in Chap. 2 
(Sect. 2.4.3). The Jura represents an exception to Swiss integration of 
cultural minorities. Historical factors and worsening language, religious, 
cultural and socio-economic differences instead led to its separation from 
the canton of Bern (Aubert 1983; Jenkins 1986; Ganguillet 1998; Siroky 
et al. 2017; Vatter 2018, 230ff.). The Jura region, which is mainly Catholic 
and French-speaking, was incorporated into Protestant, German-speaking 
Bern at the 1815 Vienna Congress by arrangement with Prussia, England, 
Austria and Russia. As a minority located at the northern periphery of the 
canton, the people of Jura felt they were being discriminated against both 
politically and economically. An escalation of political clashes after World 
War II gave rise to a separatist movement, which triumphed in 1978 when 
the new Jura canton was created. Things were complicated by the fact that 
the population of Jura was itself divided: the three southern districts had 
been Protestant since the sixteenth century, were economically better off 
and had traditionally better relations with Bern. Thus, the deepening con-
flict was not only between Jura and Bern, but also between ‘separatists’ 
and (Bernese) ‘loyalists’ within Jura (see also Fig. 2.2).
How were the authorities to deal with a region that wanted to separate 
from an existing canton and form a new one? The founders of the federal 
state had not anticipated this problem, so before the game could be played 
the rules had to be invented.
As far as the game itself was concerned, it was clear that three actors 
would take part:
 1. The people of the Jura region, who had to decide whether they 
wanted to separate or stay with Bern;
 2. The people of the canton of Bern, who had to decide under what 
conditions they would accept the separation, if that was the will of 
the majority of the people of the Jura region; and
 3. The people and cantons of the entire Swiss federation who would, 
following the amendment of the Constitution, have to accept the 
decision of the Bernese and Jurassian peoples to split up and recog-
nise the new canton as a member of the federation.
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If Bern had long underestimated the importance of the Jura question, 
showing little regard for the cultural minority, it eventually was responsi-
ble for taking the most important initiatives to settle the conflict. In 1967, 
the Bernese government presented the people of Jura with three options 
from which to choose: the status quo, a statute of autonomy, or separation 
from Bern through the creation of a new canton. In the following year, a 
task-force or ‘federal advisory committee’ was created: two former mem-
bers of the Federal Council and two members of the Swiss parliament were 
appointed to investigate the implications of a statute of autonomy and of 
the separation of the Jura region from Bern. Institutionally, this meant not 
only the appointment of a neutral third party, but also the unofficial 
involvement of the federal government in a cantonal conflict that had 
acquired nationwide importance.
In the succeeding years, the separatist forces continued to espouse 
independence, so the Bernese government proposed a cascade system of 
popular votes:
 1. In the first votation, a simple majority of the people of the canton of 
Bern had to decide on the right of the Jura region to hold a referen-
dum on separation or not.
 2. In the second votation, the people of the entire region Jura were 
asked whether they wanted to create a new canton or stay with Bern.
 3. Whatever the outcome of this second votation (leave or remain), 
one fifth of the electorate of each district that had been overruled 
could demand a further vote on what the district would do, that is, 
remain or leave.
 4. If at least one district decided to leave, one fifth of the electorate of 
every commune lying on the new border could demand a final vote 
on whether to join the new canton or leave its district and remain 
with Bern.
The purpose of this cascade system was clear. The first votation would 
provide canton-wide democratic legitimacy for the subsequent procedure. 
The second would establish whether the Jurassian people did indeed wish 
to create their own canton but, given the internal division of the Jura 
people between separatists and loyalists, no district or commune would be 
forced to stay with the old canton or go with the new one against its will. 
Thus, the third and fourth votations would protect regional and local 
minorities on either side of the debate.
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In 1970, the Bernese people accepted the cascade system as a constitu-
tional amendment by an impressive majority of six to one (first votation). 
In 1974, the people of Jura voted with 37,000 for and 34,000 against 
independence (second votation). The cleavage between separatists and 
loyalists was clear: the Northern districts voted for separation by three to 
one, the three Southern districts voted to stay with the old canton by 
almost two to one. In 1975, the three Southern districts confirmed their 
preference to stay in the canton of Bern (third votation). Later that year, 
the fourth and final round of votations was held: Moutier, the main city of 
the Southern part of Jura, decided to stay with Bern whilst some other 
communes in that district chose to join the new canton.
After these votations the boundaries of the new canton, Jura, were 
known. In 1976 its people elected a constituent assembly which then drew 
up a draft constitution for the new canton. The constitution was accepted 
by the people of Jura in 1977, and one year later the Swiss people and the 
cantons accepted Jura as the 26th canton of the federation with effect of 1 
January 1979. The result of the national vote (1,310,000 for and 280,000 
against, with a large majority in all cantons, including Bern) was inter-
preted as revealing the great respect and understanding of the Swiss peo-
ple for its minority groups.
The creation of the new canton had split the Jura region, which was 
contrary to the political objectives of a good part of the separatist move-
ment which, on grounds of ethnicity, culture and language, had embraced 
the idea of independence for the whole of Jura. They had proposed other 
procedural rules, for instance that the right to vote for the creation of the 
canton should be given to all persons originating from Jura, regardless of 
their present place of residence. Instead of the separatists’ dream of unit-
ing the entire ethnic group within a single boundary, three districts 
remained with Bern. Yet this solution was modern in the sense that it 
rejected the nationalist formula of ‘one people, one language, one culture, 
one state’, which always leads to insoluble minority problems. In fact, 
migration and industrialisation have made mono-cultural societies and 
their states more and more an exception. In this respect, all boundaries are 
artificial. In Jura, they were founded on the principle of territorial self- 
determination on the smallest possible scale: first the region as a whole, 
then its districts and finally the (border) communes.
We could have witnessed quite a different outcome to the Jura ques-
tion. Bern, instead of opening the door to separation, could have contin-
ued a policy of oppression against the separatist movement, as we have 
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seen lately in the case of Madrid against the Catalans. Further escalation of 
the conflict between the Bernese majority and the Jurassian minority with-
out any realistic hope for a solution could have made federal intervention 
inevitable. Instead the Jura minority, despite discrimination, profited from 
individual and political liberties that were broad enough to allow it to 
organise its successful separation. Federal intervention was limited to an 
informal task-force that was able to gain the confidence of both sides, and 
the majority of the Bernese people, while anything but enthusiastic about 
the Jura minority, were willing to allow the Jurassians to leave the ‘grand 
old canton’ if so wished and expressed direct-democratically.
Fleiner (2012) rightly calls this procedure ‘creative minority protec-
tion’ (kreativer Minderheitenschutz) and regrets its non-application to 
other contexts. Indeed, thought through until its very end, self-determi-
nation stops with individuals, but the lowest-level community is the 
municipality. The other lesson to be learned from this case is that just 
because ‘the people’ have decided to leave or remain with Bern, this does 
not mean that future generations are forever bound by that decision. In 
fact, after much political agitation within and amicable discussions between 
Jura, Bern and the Swiss Federation, it was decided to let the people vote 
again. In 2013, the electorates of Jura canton (North) and the Bernese 
Jura (South) were asked whether they wanted start proceedings for a 
merger into a new, common canton. Just like 40 years before, the North 
overwhelmingly approved and the South rejected—with the exception of 
the Bernese city of Moutier, where 55% voted in favour of leaving (Siroky 
et al. 2016, 447). Since again every municipality was given the right to 
vote anew, Moutier held what was billed as the ‘final’ referendum on the 
entire Jura question, in summer 2017. On a record turnout of 88%, a nar-
row majority of 52% voted to join Jura (SRF 2019). However, two years 
later the courts cancelled that referendum because of several irregularities 
and so Moutier will—probably—vote anew.
3.4  the lImIts oF sWIss FederalIsm
3.4.1  Limits of Implementation: Why Some Foreigners Can Buy 
Real Estate in Switzerland But Others Cannot
People living abroad can acquire real estate in Switzerland only within 
certain legal restrictions. The history of this federal law goes back to the 
1960s. Xenophobes then complained not only that the foreign resident 
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share of 15% was too high, but that there was reason to fear a ‘sell-out of 
Swiss real estate’ (Ausverkauf der Heimat) to foreigners. When the xeno-
phobe movement announced the launch of a popular initiative to stop this 
development and the price of land soared, the government had to react. It 
thus adopted a regulation limiting the acquisition of real estate by persons 
and firms residing abroad. The issue was highly controversial. Liberal 
forces were against any state regulation of the real-estate market. The 
political left, on the other hand, wanted new regulations on land-use plan-
ning and the protection of tenants, but not in the sense of the xenophobe 
forces. Yet the government felt forced to do something to curb the politi-
cal growth of the movement, which had begun to make demands going 
much further than their original ones. Because of the highly controversial 
nature of the question, the regulations were many times revised. The bill 
contains exceptions and leaves room for complementary legislation by the 
cantons, which also have to implement the programme.
Twenty years after its start, the success of the programme was hardly 
convincing. Whereas in some cantons the sale of land and houses to for-
eigners stabilised or even fell, it rose sharply in others. What had hap-
pened? A closer analysis (Delley et al. 1982) revealed that the cantons had 
made full use of their legislative and implementing powers, thus adapting 
the federal law to their own needs. In some cantons, the objectives of the 
federal law coincided with their own strategies, as in Lucerne which aimed 
at a slow and gentle development of tourist sites. The federal programme 
and its cantonal complements were protective of the environment and 
implemented in Lucerne without reservation. In the canton of Geneva, 
the result was somewhat ambiguous. The city’s most urgent need was to 
provide housing, especially for low-income residents. Thus, the city said 
no to foreigners who wanted to buy existing villas. But it said yes to for-
eign investors willing to co-finance large apartment blocks on condition 
that some of the apartments were let to families on low incomes. In a third 
canton, however, the federal objectives were completely distorted. 
Ambitious development plans for new tourist sites in the canton of Valais 
were financed by foreign capital. At that time, one could find advertise-
ments in the business section of foreign newspapers saying: ‘For foreign-
ers, it’s still possible to realise their dream of a Swiss Chalet’. Indeed it was, 
because Valais offered much laxer conditions for authorisation than other 
cantons, thus attracting more foreign capital to finance its plans.
Whereas it is common for the cantons to adapt federal legislation to 
their own needs, it is rare for them to go as far as inverting its objectives. 
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Yet, the Valais example shows what many other studies (cf. Kissling-Näf 
and Wälti 2007; Rüfli and Sager 2004) confirm: the implementation of 
central government programmes in a federal system cannot be taken for 
granted. First, it depends on political will. If the political consensus is 
large, cantons and communes will make it a success, even if there are tech-
nical problems with implementation. Second, in a federal system consen-
sus is required at different levels of government, but this condition may 
not be forthcoming. Programmes almost unanimously welcomed in the 
Federal Assembly may be controversial in particular cantons. An analysis of 
the federal housing programme, for instance, has shown that its subsidies 
were not used where housing was most needed, but in cantons where 
political forces willing to protect tenants were the strongest (Bassand et al. 
1984). Third, lack of administrative resources at sub-national level can 
hinder a federal programme. For example, small cantons and communes 
are often unable to implement complex environmental policies because 
the necessary resources and expertise to analyse, implement, control and 
report are beyond their reach (Linder 1987, 224–227; Sager et al. 2018, 
119–22).
3.4.2  The Weakness of Federal Authorities: How a Canton Can 
Deny Human Rights to Its Citizens
In the nineteenth century, Switzerland was one of the first countries to 
attain a level of democracy free from property and other restrictions on an 
adult male’s right to vote. The realisation of women’s voting rights, how-
ever, was a long and difficult process. The first attempts to introduce 
women’s suffrage at the cantonal level failed in the 1920s in Neuchâtel, 
Basel, Glarus, Zurich, Geneva and St. Gall. In 1929, a petition demanding 
women’s suffrage at the federal level was handed in with a quarter of a 
million signatures. The petition led to nothing. In a 1959 a popular vote, 
Swiss men voted two to one against women’s suffrage. In 1971, Switzerland 
became one of the last countries to give women the right to vote, but it 
took another ten years before women were given equal rights and consti-
tutional protection against discrimination.
People often wonder why in Switzerland the recognition of women’s 
political and civil rights took so long. One answer may be that women’s 
organisations, after their early setbacks in the 1920s, had lost much of 
their motivation and energy to demand equal rights (Mesmer 1988). 
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Another reason may be that Swiss society is generally more conservative 
than others. In fact the Swiss, who never had to militarily defend their 
traditional values and autonomy during World Wars I and II and who 
never suffered a social revolution in the twentieth century, were particu-
larly late in recognising the need for a change in women’s societal position 
(Held and Levy 1974). When in 1958 Iris von Roten published Frauen 
im Laufgitter—a very critical report on the economic, political, sociologi-
cal and sexual situation of Swiss women—the author and her feminist 
work were destroyed by the media and effectively silenced (Köchli 1992). 
Only in 1991, when the almost forgotten book was re-edited, was Frauen 
im Laufgitter hailed as the Swiss equivalent of Simone de Beauvoir’s Le 
deuxième sexe (1949) or Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystic (1963). This 
clearly illustrates the late change of mind about the position of women in 
Swiss society.
From the perspective of political science, another factor should be 
recalled. The problem with the direct-democratic introduction of wom-
en’s suffrage was that women were not able to participate in the decision. 
Men alone decided whether they were willing to abandon their historical 
privilege and share their political rights with women. In parliamentary 
democracies, such a situation is easier to deal with. A party that wishes to 
introduce women’s suffrage can combine this proposition with other 
issues, for instance job security or minimal wages, in its election pro-
gramme. Thus, a worker fearing for his job would probably vote for that 
party, even if he was at odds with the idea of women’s suffrage. Should 
that party win the election, the introduction of women’s suffrage would 
be likely, because once introduced the new voting power of women would 
most probably support the government that had enfranchised them. This 
procedure was not possible in Switzerland, where women’s suffrage had to 
be introduced by popular vote—an all men’s vote.
Moreover, in order to prevent one issue from riding on the back of 
another, and to ensure that voters have the opportunity to express their 
preferences clearly, the Constitution prohibits the combining of different 
questions in a single popular vote. Thus, when attempting to introduce 
women’s suffrage in 1959, the federal authorities were unable to offer 
men some sort of incentive to share their electoral monopoly with women. 
All that the government could do was try to convince men that women 
were equal and that human rights should be universal. The most helpful 
thing, however, was the example provided by the cantons and a number of 
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communes which, during the 1959 votation and later, introduced women’s 
suffrage at the lower level. When in 1971 the federal government tried 
again, it could point to these successful ‘experiments’ (see however 
Banaszak 1991).
A few bastions of all-male democracy withstood all attempts at persua-
sion, which they perceived as outside interference. The Landsgemeinde 
(citizen assembly) of the canton of Appenzell Inner-Rhodes steadfastly 
refused to introduce women’s suffrage until 1990. Finally, when deciding 
on an appeal brought by a number of Appenzell women, the Federal 
Supreme Court ruled that this situation was unconstitutional. The court 
thus intervened drastically: it redefined Appenzell Inner-Rhodes constitu-
tion in such a way that it gave women the right to participate at the next 
Landsgemeinde.2
One may again ask why this process took so long. Was there no possi-
bility of the federal government intervening earlier to end the unconstitu-
tional situation in Appenzell? Theoretically the answer is yes. The Swiss 
federation has several means of intervening if cantons fail to comply with 
federal law. In the event of public disorder, it can even send in troops. 
Under certain circumstances it can also withdraw subsidies. Both sanc-
tions, however, would not have been of much help in this case. Moreover, 
they are used very rarely. Federal authorities deal with the cantons with 
almost as much respect as they deal with foreign states. More common is 
intervention by the Federal Supreme Court. Since every cantonal decision 
can be challanged with the charge that it violates federal law, the Court’s 
role in implementing equal protection is vital. Indeed, as the Federal 
Supreme Court deals with basic rights—freedom of the press, freedom of 
speech, the right to own property, freedom of association, equal protec-
tion by and due process of the law, and habeas corpus—it is probably the 
strongest authority of the central state with regard to the sub-national 
level. It says what can and cannot be done under the flag of federal auton-
omy. In defining common standards of constitutional law and equal pro-
tection, it acts as a counterbalance to the political variety of the cantons.3
2 While the cantons of Appenzell Outer-Rhodes, Nidwalden and Obwalden have aban-
doned their annual citizens assemblies in the 1990s, Appenzell Inner-Rhodes as well as 
Glarus still hold on to it (Möckli and Stahlberger 1987; Helg 2007; Schaub 2016).
3 On the effects of decentralisation on positive and negative discrimination in the asylum 
domain and also more generally, see Holzer et al. (2000).
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The case of women’s suffrage, however, was rather special. When intro-
duced at the federal level in 1971, the amendment allowed for a certain 
delay on the part of cantons to give them time to adjust their own regula-
tions. This was done for two reasons. First, the delay clause was likely to 
improve the chances of success in the popular vote. Second, it symbolised 
the hope that the male majority in those cantons that still resisted wom-
en’s suffrage would change their minds more quickly if the federal author-
ities refrained from exerting pressure. This hope was fulfilled in several 
cantons, but not in Appenzell Inner-Rhodes. Here, the Federal Supreme 
Court (1990) had to decide and declare that the transitional period, after 
almost 20 years, had finally run out.
The belief of Swiss political culture that it is better to refrain both from 
coercive power and direct confrontation between cantonal and federal 
authorities seems to be indestructible, at least among the political elite. It 
is significant that the women’s suffrage case was brought to the Federal 
Supreme Court by a few ‘ordinary women’ who had the guts to resist 
threats of harassment when doing so. The Swiss political elite, on the 
other hand, was not very creative in finding means of helping the Appenzell 
women. They even renounced symbolic politics. When it was the turn of 
an Appenzell Inner-Rhodes member of the Federal Council to become 
president in 1989, parliament could have said: we do not wish a represen-
tative of this canton to be the head of our state as long as it denies their 
women political rights. Nobody did. When it comes to its member states, 
the federation speaks softly and does not carry a big stick. The reason in 
this case is simple: federal intervention in the realm of the cantonal auton-
omy would have been perceived as an infringement by the Appenzell 
(male) voters to decide ‘independently’. It would probably not have 
helped women getting their voting rights sooner either.
In a more general way, the question of how to enforce and implement 
human or civil rights poses problems in every federal state. Its central 
authorities have to guarantee equal rights, but they also have to protect 
minority rights and the historic particularities of local cultures. If equalisa-
tion is a question of money, it poses less problems. Money is divisible, and 
economic equalisation can therefore be negotiated through compromises. 
This is not always so with the equalisation of human or constitutional 
rights. Politically, problems of ethical values are often perceived as binary 
questions. In the view of many people, there is either the right to have an 
abortion or there is not, and the death penalty is either constitutional or it 
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is not. Because of the fundamental nature of these questions, parliaments 
and supreme courts sometimes decide them constitutionally for the whole 
of society.
But is there in sub-national units a right to difference in the name of 
federalism? Given the perspective that human rights are fundamental and 
universal, there can be no tolerance for federal particularities which deny 
those. Member states should then be forced to comply with the solution 
decided for all. But such solutions can evoke fundamental conflicts. If the 
ethical question is highly controversial, the conflict can threaten other val-
ues—social peace for instance. In federal systems, it may therefore be pru-
dent to avoid single solutions when the issue is highly controversial. 
Moreover, if human rights are perceived as a historical product of eco-
nomic, social and cultural development and not as God-given, there may 
even be an argument for different solutions in federal states.
Autonomous solutions for particular member states may not only pre-
vent conflicts, but also allow the development of endogenous cultural pat-
terns that are necessary to make human rights effective in daily life. 
According to the constitutionalist Walter Kälin (1987, 187–200), the 
Swiss Federal Supreme Court has followed both lines: after an initial ‘uni-
fying’ period, it has later tried to valuate not only the federal, but also the 
cantonal tradition of constitutional rights, allowing regional and particular 
solutions. During the past ten years, however, there is a renewed tendency 
to impose stricter standards upon cantons when it comes to electoral 
systems and naturalisation procedures, or human rights in general.
Table 3.5 Federalist against democratic rule: practical veto power of small can-
tons in nine referenda
Year Issue No-votes from 11.5 or 12 smallest 
cantons [% of all votes cast]
1955 Protection of tenants 25.3
1970 Federal finances 24.0
1973 Federal education 21.7
1975 Federal economic policy 20.5
1983 Federal energy policy 20.0
1994 Cultural policy 19.5
1994 Naturalisation of foreigners 22.5
2013 Family policy 17.8
2020 Responsible Business Initiative 13.7
Sources: Germann (1991, 266), Linder and Mueller (2017, 225), BFS (2020)
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3.5  challenges
3.5.1  Federalism Versus Democracy: Why One Citizen from Uri 
Outweighs 35 Citizens from Zurich
Chapter 2 argued that federalism was an important institutional mecha-
nism in Swiss democracy for protecting minorities and dealing with cul-
tural divisions. However, this also implies a conflict between two principles 
of decision-making. Democracy insists on the equal weight of every indi-
vidual, that is, ‘one person, one vote’, whereas federalism guarantees equal 
representation to the member states of a federation, that is, ‘one region, 
one vote’. If the two modes of decision-making are used to decide the 
same question, they can lead to conflict (Germann 1991; Linder and 
Mueller 2017; Mueller 2020). In Switzerland, such collisions happen not 
only in parliament, if the Council of the States and the National Council 
disagree, but also in popular votes on constitutional questions, if the 
majority of the cantons and the majority of the people point in opposite 
directions. Table 3.4 shows all 14 instances of this occurring.
Most of these collisions are recent. The number of referenda on consti-
tutional matters has considerably increased. Before World War II, we 
count about ten referenda per decade. In the period after, this number 
quadrupled to more than 40. Constitutional amendments, once an excep-
tion, have become the norm for the introduction of all substantial new 
activities by central government. This leads to a greater risk of collision 
between the popular and cantonal majorities.
Also the differences in population size between cantons have increased 
because of migration from rural to urban regions. This has had an effect 
when more popular votations require a double majority. In 1848, one 
person from the small canton Uri cancelled out 17 persons from the larg-
est canton when the majority of the cantons was counted. Today, among 
eligible voters between the cantons of Uri and Zurich, the relationship is 
1:35. When the 11.5 smallest cantons vote together, they constitute a 
blocking federalist majority representing only a tiny democratic minority. 
Theoretically, the smallest federalist veto power (51% of voters in the 11.5 
smallest cantons against all others) represents just 10% of the Swiss elec-
torate. This means that some 500,000 citizens, if ideally distributed terri-
torially, could decide to keep all 8.5 million inhabitants in the constitutional 
status quo. In reality it is unlikely to find a 51% majority against a proposal 
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in all small cantons and 100% in favour everywhere else. We can, however, 
determine the practical ‘minimal veto power’ from the votes in Table 3.4, 
where in ten out of 14 cases the cantonal majority blocked a democratic 
majority. This is done for the last nine votations, calculating the sum of 
no-votes from the 11.5 or 12 smallest cantons as a percentage of all votes 
cast (Table 3.5). We see that the practical veto power of the small cantons 
represents a democratic minority of just 14–25%.
The above cases were important and controversial, and the veto power 
of the small cantons has further consequences. Political analyses show that 
the voting behaviour of the cantons on specific issues is relatively stable. 
One of the issues where small rural cantons vote differently from large 
urban cantons is foreign policy. When voting on a trade agreement with 
the European Communities (1972), on the first project for membership in 
the UN (1986), and on the Bretton Woods institutions (1992), the small 
cantons maintained classical attitudes of neutrality or autonomy and pre-
ferred non-engagement in foreign policy, whereas the large cantons were 
more open to Swiss participation in international affairs and organisations. 
As political scientists had predicted (e.g. Germann 1991, 269), this pat-
tern also held in the votation on Swiss membership of the European 
Economic Area in 1992, when 50.3% of the people and 19 cantons 
rejected the treaty. But a mere 30% of all votes, coming from the small 
cantons, were enough to block a federal vote in favour. For a ‘yes’ to the 
treaty, on the other hand, a very strong majority of 59% of the people 
would have been necessary to reach a majority of 12 cantons. The same 
pattern—but this time with a positive result—was seen during the second 
referendum on UN membership in 2002: 54.6% said yes to the UN, and 
this vote produced the smallest possible majority of 12 cantons. It is evi-
dent, therefore, that substantial decisions in foreign policy—such as join-
ing the EU, for instance—will meet a particular difficulty when it comes 
to a vote. If such a decision is a constitutional matter, a simple majority of 
the people will not suffice. A rather strong preference of 55–60% of the 
people will be necessary to achieve the double majority required.
To what extent is it justified that thanks to the federal principle a small 
minority can overrule the democratic majority? ‘Do not mix up two differ-
ent things’, would say protagonists from small cantons. To protect minori-
ties against a democratic majority is the very aim and legitimacy of 
federalism. If you accept the principle of ‘one region, one vote’, you have 
to accept a federalist majority no matter how small a part it may be of the 
democratic electorate. ‘Of course, minority rights are important’, others 
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might say. They will object, however, that a federalism weighing the votes 
of some persons 35 times more heavily than those of others is denying 
democracy and its principle of ‘one person, one vote’ too much. 
Theoretically, every federal democracy faces this problem. There is a con-
tradiction, and a trade-off, between the principle of equal rights of mem-
ber states and of citizens as such.
It is impossible to find a general answer to the question as to the extent 
to which federalism may legitimately be allowed to outweigh democracy. 
Different solutions depend on a country’s historical situation, and on the 
importance a federation gives to minority rights or to the autonomy of its 
member states. The collision between democratic and federal majorities 
may be settled more easily in bicameral parliamentary decisions, where 
there are ways of negotiating between the two chambers, than in popular 
votations which lack this possibility. Some countries may not be worried 
by and therefore not become aware of the problem of the collision between 
federalism and democracy. In the US, the difference between the smallest 
and the largest states can reach a ratio of 1 to 50 or more. But small states 
such as Alaska, Wyoming, Vermont and Delaware do not often form 
themselves into a coalition as in Switzerland.
There is, however, an important lesson to be drawn from the Swiss 
example. Because of migration between the cantons, the weight of the 
principle of federalism has increased in comparison with democratic major-
ity rule. One could argue that this is against the logic of Swiss history, 
because the importance of classical federal cleavages such as religion and 
language has diminished over the past 100 years. Why not therefore reas-
sess the relative importance of federalism and democracy? Why not go 
back to the equilibrium, for instance, of 1848?
Theoretically, many solutions are possible. One could redistribute the 
seats in the Council of States. Given the increasing difference in the popu-
lation size of cantons, one could modify their equal representation, for 
instance, giving large cantons three seats, the middle-sized ones two and 
the small cantons one seat. The majority of cantons in a popular votation 
could be calculated in a similar way. Or one could imagine rules for a divi-
sion of power that would allow the federation to undertake new activities 
without amending the Constitution in every single case. Some such 
attempts have been made, but their failure was to be expected. Changing 
the rules of federalism is a game to be played under the existing rules, and 
there is no reason for minorities to renounce on their long-held veto rights 
when asked to do so.
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More generally, the constitutional design of federalism has to be con-
sidered carefully. A simple democratic majority may grant over- 
representation to its small units. But the institutionalisation of such rights 
is a one-way street: federal minority rights, once introduced, cannot be 
revoked by a simple democratic majority.
3.5.2  Urban Regions—The Forgotten Dimension 
of Swiss Federalism
Urbanisation in Switzerland followed the same pattern as in other coun-
tries. It crystallised around historic centres, once complete microcosms 
where the same people were working, shopping, living and spending their 
free time. With the development of public transport and the spread of 
cars, the ‘complete’ historic city has been torn apart: its centre attracts the 
service industry, and the more services concentrate in the centre, the more 
they can specialise and the more they attract people from far away to use 
them. The service industry is able to pay higher rents than residents. Land 
prices rise. Residents are driven out. They may still work in the city, now a 
central business district, but they have to find an apartment in the suburbs. 
Old industrial plants, too, move out of the city into its surrounding areas. 
Consumers buy their commodities in shopping centres built close to 
motorways. Traffic grows faster than anything else. Urban people become 
commuters. Part of their growing income and leisure has to be spent on 
longer daily travel between workplace, shopping and recreation areas and 
home. The old city is transformed into an urban region, or an ‘agglomera-
tion’, as it is called in Switzerland, which overruns traditional communal 
boundaries and is composed of a central city with perhaps 30 or more sur-
rounding communes.
Swiss agglomerations may be smaller than those of other countries, but 
according to official statistics about 70% of the Swiss population live in 
them. However, there is no political organisation for the common needs 
of their inhabitants. For defence matters, there is the federation. For hos-
pitals, there are cantons, and for sports facilities the communes are respon-
sible. When it comes to the infrastructure of agglomerations, there is no 
common authority. Other ways have to be found to finance and run public 
facilities of common interest. For public transport systems, several organ-
isations may work together: federal railways, private railways, buses run by 
the postal services and communal trams and trolleybuses. In some agglom-
erations this kind of cooperation works well. In others it fails because 
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every single suburban commune may exercise a kind of a veto on most 
issues (e.g. Koll-Schretzenmayr and Schmid 2003).
The balance between the quality of life in cities and suburbs has been 
disturbed. Central cities are worried about the concentration of pollution 
and noise, and about the runaway cost of public services such as theatres 
and schools, which are supported by city taxpayers alone even though resi-
dents of the whole region use them. Through social segregation, the poor 
concentrate in the cities, whereas rich taxpayers—including firms—move 
into suburban residential areas. Over the last 30 years, the idea that wealthy 
cities are the motors of their surrounding areas has changed considerably. 
Scholars differ in their assessments of the extent to which central cities are 
losing out economically to suburban communes. There is evidence, how-
ever, that in today’s urbanisation process Swiss cities are living through a 
difficult period. They are hampered in their development and are running 
out of planning options that do not extend into surrounding communes. 
They risk being overrun by barely controllable commuter traffic. Some of 
them are becoming increasingly indebted, despite levying higher tax rates 
than in suburbia. No wonder political tensions between central cities and 
the surrounding communes are growing. Moreover, we see a revival of 
historical conflicts between the urban and the rural. Rural and urban 
societies seem to be faced with different problems. They develop different 
preferences in lifestyles and vote for different parties: Greens and Social- 
Democrats in the city, Liberals and Conservatives in suburbia and the 
countryside, respectively (Kübler 2017, 171ff.; also Scheuss 2013; 
Maxwell 2020).
Should there be a kind of a metropolitan authority for all shared services 
and public goods in urban areas? There is a strong theoretical argument 
for it in the idea that electoral and fiscal responsibility for a public good 
should coincide with those who benefit from it. Yet metropolitan govern-
ments who decide on all public goods, from transport and planning to 
health and culture, are rare in Europe. Instead of one political authority 
we find a multitude of special agencies, each dealing with one particular 
metropolitan service. In Switzerland, the idea of a political statute for 
agglomerations runs counter to the tradition of local autonomy (e.g. Koch 
2013). One could argue that the country does not need a fourth tier in a 
federal system that is already too complex. But the problem remains. 
European urbanisation is transgressing national boundaries and pushing 
for larger dimensions. These pressures will probably help the Swiss to find 
their own solution (e.g. Sager 2002).
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So far, the inauguration of a ‘Tripartite Agglomeration Conference’ is 
an interesting innovation because it brings together all three federal levels 
in order to deliberate on common problems. A stronger institution- 
building could follow two courses. Either cantons and communes will see 
a revitalisation of historical districts,4 with the advantage that the old geo-
graphical patterns of common political culture can be utilised. Or the con-
solidation of urban government will be achieved by the statutory creation 
of a special region. Urban regions can be designed to effectively cover the 
entire geographic range of public goods. Yet people may consider them 
artificial because their boundaries do not represent patterns of common 
political culture or reflect a sense of political community. If both ways are 
unsatisfactory, a third option may be considered. It consists of a flexible 
organisation in which just those communes cooperate who are willing to 
share part of their facilities and public services. Prices for common public 
services are higher for non-members than for members. This organisation 
helps to restrict the benefits of cooperation to members and creates incen-
tives for initial non-members to join (Arbeitsgruppe 1992; Lehmann 
et al. 2003).
3.5.3  The External Challenge: Federalism in a Period 
of Globalisation
The last few decades have been characterised by a rapid liberalisation and 
globalisation of national economies. Some Swiss industries—like agricul-
ture or small trade—came under great pressure because the opening of 
markets meant the end of national tariff and non-tariff boundaries that 
had protected them from international competition. For the export indus-
try, however, internationalisation was nothing new. Swiss banks, Nestlé, 
and the chemical and pharmaceutical products of Roche or Novartis are 
known on all continents. While political neutrality and stability have 
attracted capital to Switzerland, its firms have invested all over the world, 
and a great part of their working places are located at production sites and 
services centres abroad: according to official statistics, in 2018 
4 Districts (German: Bezirke; French: districts) are subdivisions of cantons, comprising a 
number of communes. Originally, the districts were created to decentralise cantonal power 
and institutions, an idea that was mostly substituted by direct delegation of cantonal tasks to 
the communes. Today, the responsibilities of districts are limited to judicial organisation and 
some police tasks. Furthermore, they usually serve as constituencies for the election of mem-
bers of cantonal parliaments.
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employment in Switzerland numbered 5 million, among them 1.6 million 
non- Swiss workers (BFS 2020). At the same time, Swiss-controlled com-
panies employed some 2.1 million people abroad, mainly in Europe (44%) 
and Asia (26%) (SNB 2018, 4). And with 120% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), international trade is more important than in most other indus-
trial nations (average for 2015–2018; EU average: 84%; World Bank 
2019). No wonder that Swiss export industries welcome globalisation 
which gives them wider options and access to new markets.
Yet globalisation is more than an economic process. It has become pro-
foundly political. For many problems, the nation-state has become too 
small. International or supranational organisations are taking part in the 
political functions and responsibilities that were once the domain of the 
nation-state. The political dynamics of globalisation have deep conse-
quences for Switzerland. First, they question its traditional foreign policy, 
which consisted of active participation in international economic affairs 
but saw neutrality as the guiding principle and refrained from engaging in 
international conflict. In the 1990s, the Swiss government redefined the 
idea of neutrality, allowing a more active foreign policy and engagement in 
international affairs (Goetschel et al. 2005). This prepared it to become a 
member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and later the UN.
Second, the pronounced liberalisation policy of the WTO made it 
impossible to continue Switzerland’s double-faced economic policy: pro-
tecting agriculture and some domestic branches of industry and trade 
from international competition while fostering liberal world trade for its 
own exports. Third and most important: despite the fact that the Swiss 
people in 1992 refused to join the European Economic Area (EEA), 
which would have offered comprehensive access to the EU’s single mar-
ket, Switzerland is in a process of constant ‘selective Europeanisation’. 
Because of their intense economic relations, Switzerland and the EU have 
concluded a series of bilateral treaties. Forced by circumstances, Switzerland 
adapts most of its economic regulations to EU standards. Switzerland is in 
fact ‘Europeanised’ without being a member of the EU (Linder 2011; 
Jenni 2016).
How do globalisation and ‘Europeanisation’ affect federalism? Does 
Switzerland, in a process of international centralisation and harmonisa-
tion, have a chance to keep its national federalism and decentralised gov-
ernance? To answer these questions, let us discuss some challenges 
resulting from outside pressure (cf. also Sciarini et al. 2004; Church 2007).
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A first challenge is the different rhythm of decision-making. One of the 
characteristics of European integration is its rapid evolution, and the great 
scope of many of Brussel’s decisions. This flatly contrasts with Swiss policy- 
making, where federalism and direct democracy require time and allow for 
marginal innovation only. Moreover, as EU regulations and other interna-
tional treaties can affect also cantonal responsibilities, cantonal govern-
ments have pushed for more participation in foreign policy. As a result, it 
is difficult for the Swiss government to formulate a foresighted and proac-
tive policy.
A second challenge is the overruling of federalism. The majority of the 
Swiss people, for the moment, do not want to join the EU. But Switzerland 
cannot afford to cut itself off from the common market and have different 
economic regulations. Export industries and consumer organisations push 
for the opening and liberalisation of Swiss markets. The Swiss government 
‘autonomously’ adopts many EU regulations and seeks the ‘euro- 
compatibility’ of new domestic regulations (Linder 2014, 229). Contrary 
to proactive policy, in which we observe weaknesses, the Swiss government 
is quick and alert in reactive adaptation. Some even say that the Swiss gov-
ernment adopts more EU standards than many EU members themselves.
How is this possible? Political analysts see two reasons. Firstly, pressure 
from the outside can go hand in hand with certain domestic interests. As 
already mentioned, many Swiss industries are interested in liberalisation, 
deregulation and open markets. Pressure from the outside and from the EU 
is ‘instrumentalised’ by a strong coalition of government and part of the 
economy (Mach et al. 2003; Trampusch 2010). This coalition, secondly, 
legitimises shortcuts in the political process, whereby the government is 
given more powers to decide. This can be illustrated by traffic regulations. 
Before 1997, dimensions and weights allowed for lorries were regulated by 
a formal law. When in 1990 the government wanted to increase weights to 
European standards, opponents feared an invasion of lorries crossing the 
Alps and launched a referendum. In 1997, parliament revised the law, del-
egating the competencies for the adaptation of weights and dimensions to 
the Federal Council. Soon afterwards the government made use of this 
competency for the first time and ‘harmonised’ some regulations according 
to EU standards. Under this regime, referenda are no longer possible.
Thus, globalisation leads to a change of the internal power balances and 
strengthens the executive. This can go at the cost of parliament, of peo-
ple’s rights—and of federalism as is illustrated by the following example. 
In 1999, the education ministers of 29 states signed the ‘Bologna treaty’ 
for the harmonisation of higher education in Europe. The Swiss minister 
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also signed on, but without much consultation of parliament or cantons. 
This was remarkable, as most universities in Switzerland are cantonal and 
education matters are key domains of the cantons. The overruled cantons, 
formerly eager to defend their autonomy in educational matters, did not 
even protest, and the reform was implemented quickly. The example 
shows that federalism is ruled out not only in a formal but also in a sub-
stantial way. With the harmonisation of Bologna, Swiss universities cannot 
showcase cantonal or national particularities and offer an internationally 
standardised curriculum instead. University students rightly wonder if the 
promise of having a Europe-wide recognised MA degree will give them 
better job chances on the domestic market.
This points to a more general effect of globalisation. Many economic 
branches, for instance agriculture or crafts, see no future because given 
higher production costs domestically, they cannot compete in an interna-
tionally liberalised regime, nor can they outsource work to cheaper coun-
tries. These losers of globalisation are located primarily in rural regions. 
Cantonal regulations and regional policies cannot help them any longer: 
globalisation not only makes national but also cantonal boundaries obso-
lete. The cleavages between the urban and rural segments of the popula-
tion, and between rural and urban cantons, become deeper. Modern Swiss 
federalism thus faces a completely new challenge: the domestic power bal-
ance is under threat from abroad (Linder 2016).
3.5.4  The Internal Challenge: Why Do the Swiss Want 
to Preserve Federalism?
Globalisation and especially ‘Europeanisation’ can put traditional Swiss 
federalism at risk. But there are more challenges. Some traditional can-
tonal particularities that have lost their significance, for instance judicial 
procedures in civil and criminal law, which have been abandoned and uni-
fied by federal law. While such incremental steps for unification sometimes 
pass without opposition, a more fundamental critique gets more and more 
attention: that the Swiss cantons have become too small to effectively 
exercise their responsibilities.
Indeed, a canton with a population of 30,000 inhabitants may not be 
capable of running a high-tech lab for food control or run a specialised 
hospital. Critics say that instead of having 26 cantons of different popula-
tion size, it would be better to have only seven, each of them having a size 
of about one million inhabitants. These new federal units could benefit 
from economies of scale and offer a higher quality of public goods at 
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cheaper prices. One could even object that one million inhabitants is still 
small for a federal unit, go further and create a seven-million unitary sys-
tem with no cantons. Yet even then it would be considerably smaller than 
the Free State of Bavaria with 13 million inhabitants. Is Switzerland simply 
too tiny anyway?
We would deny that because the managerial argument for the advan-
tages of big size overlooks one essential point: the smallness of political 
units is not only a disadvantage but can offer advantages, too. In smaller 
units, there is often less bureaucracy, better political integration, greater 
identification with the authorities and better responsiveness to the citizen 
preferences. Let us take up the last point, illustrating the example of the 
Swiss health care system. Partly regulated by the federation, health infra-
structure and services are organised by the cantons, and therefore of a 
different level of specialisation. Naturally, small cantons are restricted in 
their possibilities, and most sophistication is to be found in the big urban 
cantons with university hospitals. Here, not only public health expendi-
ture per capita is higher but also the health insurance premiums paid by 
residents. But while explaining differences, there is yet another dimension 
to be found: experts speak of an East-West difference, with St. Gall and 
Appenzell at the low and Vaud and Geneva at the high end of expendi-
tures. Some interpret this as a difference of mentality: people in the 
French-speaking West have a higher appreciation of medical services and 
use them more intensely than people in the German-speaking East. Thus, 
a centralised health system would give less satisfaction to both parts: peo-
ple in the East would pay more and get more than what they want, people 
in the West less.
Maybe the time will come when some cantons merge with others. But 
this can happen only as a bottom-up process. If you ask Swiss people how 
they feel about their canton, you get different answers. Some identify 
strongly with it despite critique or are attached to its history and natural 
beauty, others like the emblem of their canton on the car plate, which in 
traffic distinguishes them visibly from drivers of another canton. But most 
would say that the federal government in ‘Bern’ is far away and an anony-
mous bureaucracy, and that they feel more comfortable with the canton 
whose service they use daily. These may be traditional feelings or pure 
intuitions, yet not entirely unfounded. The Swiss strongly prefer non- 
centralised governance, which brings the state closer to the people. Thus 
far the Swiss are also willing to pay for it. In today’s welfare state, decen-
tralised governance has modern meanings, as we have illustrated using the 
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example of public health: it is more responsive to the different values and 
preferences of different peoples. This is the meaning of the saying: ‘feder-
alism makes happy’.
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4.1  IntroductIon: the Vote to AbolIsh 
the swIss Army
On 27 November 1989, the New York Times reported the following news 
from Switzerland:
Swiss Reject Plan to Scrap Army
Geneva. Switzerland today voted to keep its army as the best way of 
maintaining its neutrality. An initiative to abolish the army was turned down 
by a margin of almost two to one. ‘A majority of the states rejected it’, a 
Government spokesman said. Only in Geneva and Jura did the majority vote 
in favour of the proposal. The initiative, forced by a petition signed by 
111,300 citizens, set off a fierce national debate on the usefulness of an 
army in a small neutral country.
Readers of the New York Times may well have been stunned and 
wondering:
• How is it that a handful of citizens can challenge the federal govern-
ment to an extent of proposing such a revolutionary idea as the abo-
lition of the entire army? And if the Swiss people can revolutionise 
their country at the ballot box, why is Switzerland’s government a 
symbol of stability and its policies so conservative?
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• Does direct democracy really have an impact on policy, as this vote 
on the army implies, or is it just a kind of theatre with the political 
elite holding real power backstage?
• If—as described in Chap. 2—direct democracy is part of an 
old cultural tradition, has it now become obsolete? Can democracy 
in a modern society keep up with growing complexities if the most 
important decisions are taken by ordinary people?
• And if so, how does direct democracy actually work? Who partici-
pates, who does not and how do voters react when confronted with 
difficult questions? What are the wider effects of direct democracy on 
the politics of government and parliament as well as political parties?
In this chapter, we shall try to answer some of these questions.
4.2  InstItutIons, hIstorIcAl deVelopment 
And meAnIngs of dIrect democrAcy
4.2.1  Obligatory and Optional Referenda
A ‘referendum’ in this context means a popular vote on a specific parlia-
mentary decision, with the citizens having the last word: they decide 
whether the proposal becomes law or is rejected. In Switzerland, there are 
two types of referendum. First, all proposals for constitutional amend-
ments and important international treaties are subject to an obligatory 
referendum. This requires a double majority of the Swiss people and the 
cantons, thus offering a kind of federal participation (see Chap. 3). The 
obligatory referendum is relatively frequent. Since Article 3 of the 
Constitution leaves all powers to the cantons unless specifically delegated 
to the federation, the authorities have to propose an amendment for every 
major new responsibility undertaken at national level.
Second, most parliamentary acts and regulations are subject to an 
optional (or facultative) referendum. In these cases, a parliamentary deci-
sion becomes law unless 50,000 citizens or eight cantons, within 100 days, 
demand the holding of a popular vote. If a popular vote is held, a simple 
majority of the voting people decides whether the bill is approved or 
rejected, the wishes of the cantons being irrelevant. Since the obligatory 
referendum refers to constitutional amendments and the optional 
 W. LINDER AND S. MUELLER
121
referendum to ordinary legislation, the two instruments are often distin-
guished as the ‘constitutional’ and the ‘legislative’ referendum (Aubert 
and Mahon 2003, 1061–116) (Table 4.1).
At cantonal and local levels, referenda occasionally go even further. 
Some cantons hold an obligatory referendum for most laws and important 
acts, and referenda may also be held on specific financial decisions (Lutz 
and Strohmann 1998). Direct-democratic instruments are, on the whole, 
more widely used in the Swiss-German cantons and communes than in the 
French- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland (Vatter 2002, 219ff.; 
Trechsel and Serdült 1999; Lafitte 1987; Karr 2003). In the latter, the 
‘liberal’, representative idea of democracy dominates the ‘radical’, participatory 
one (Bühlmann et al. 2014, 404–6).
4.2.2  The Popular Initiative
One hundred thousand citizens can, by signing up to a formal proposi-
tion, demand a constitutional amendment and/or propose the revision or 
removal of an existing provision. The proposition can be expressed as a 
fully formulated text or in general terms upon which the Federal Assembly 
can then make a formal proposition. After signatures have been collected 
successfully, the initiative is discussed by the Federal Council and parlia-
ment, which then adopt formal positions on the proposed changes. 
This can involve drawing up an alternative proposition or, if the popular 
initiative is couched in general terms, formulating precise propositions. 
Initiatives and eventual counterproposals are presented simultaneously to 
the people. As with all constitutional changes, acceptance requires majori-
ties of both individual voters and cantons.
The cantons dispose of additional instruments of direct democracy. 
Whereas at federal level the popular initiative is restricted to constitutional 
matters, it can be used to propose ordinary laws and acts at the cantonal 
and local level. The process leading to popular votes, notably the number 
of signatures required and the time allowed for their collection, varies 
markedly from canton to canton. One would imagine that the height of 
this hurdle would influence the use of the referendum and the popular 
initiative. However, this is not the case. There is no statistical evidence to 
suggest that in cantons with high hurdles, referenda or initiatives are used 
less often than in cantons with low hurdles (Vatter 2018, 372; Moser 1987).
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Table 4.1 Types of referendum and popular initiative (federal level)
Type, year of introduction 




accession to organisations 






In cases of total revision of the 
Constitution, in cases of amendments 
and, since 1977, for decisions concerning 
membership of supranational 
organisations. All obligatory referenda 
must win a double majority—more than 
50% of the votes nationwide and a 
majority of votes in a majority of cantons.
Legislative referendum 




or 8 cantons 
within 100 days 
of the publication 
of the act
Any law of the Federal Assembly and any 
important international treaty may be 
challenged. If a popular majority votes 
no, the law or treaty does not enter into 
force.
Abrogative referendum I 
(1949)
50,000 signatures 
or 8 cantons 
within 100 days 
of the publication 
of the act
‘Urgent’ laws become immediately valid 
but may be challenged by way of an 
optional referendum during the first year 
after enactment.




‘Urgent’ laws without constitutional base 
become immediately valid but have to be 
submitted to an obligatory vote within a 
year. They are abrogated unless accepted 
by the double majority of the people and 
the cantons.
Popular initiative for the 





The proposal is submitted first to the 
people. If a simple popular majority 
agrees, parliament is dissolved and a new 
assembly elected to draft a new 
Constitution. The resulting document is 
then be submitted to a referendum, in 
which it must gain a double majority.a
Popular initiative for the 





Citizens’ proposal for a constitutional 
amendment/partial change. Government 
and parliament propose to reject or 
endorse the popular initiative. The 
constitution is changed only if the 
proposal is accepted by a majority of the 
people and the cantons.
aA popular initiative for the total revision of the Federal Constitution was only submitted once, in 1935, 
by the so-called Frontist Movement, and rejected in stage one (Swissvotes 2019)
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4.2.3  Direct and Semi-direct Democracy: Historical Origins 
and Development
Swiss political rights have resulted from cultural patterns and history, 
political struggles and coincidences. There are some myths about direct 
democracy. Its protagonists in the nineteenth century claimed that it was 
a revival of old democratic freedoms. In reality, the Swiss confederation in 
medieval times had its landlords and familial oligarchies just as their neigh-
bours had their nobility. The French Revolution ended the Ancien Régime 
and the privileges of old cantons over their subject regions in Switzerland. 
Democracy was imposed by Napoleon, not invented in old Switzerland.
Alfred Kölz (1992, 615–20), in his book on the history of the Swiss 
Constitution, shows that democratic institutions were directly influenced 
by theorists of the French Revolution, but official history in the nine-
teenth century declared them to be of Swiss origin. When in 1831 the 
progressive cantons began to establish democracy, it was under the slogan 
‘sovereignty of the people’, and the constitutional framework provided for 
the division of power and the free election of representatives. But the 
representative system reminded the protagonists of democratisation too 
much of the old regime and its power elites. Thus, democratic forces 
called for full democracy, that is, law-making by the people and self- 
government. Whereas the holding of referenda would give the people 
control over parliament by ensuring they would have the last word on all 
important decisions, the initiative would bring citizens’ own ideas to bear 
on law-making. The democratic forces demanding these rights were suc-
cessful. The referendum and the initiative were introduced first in the can-
tons, and later in the federation, whose original 1848 Constitution more 
resembled a parliamentary democracy.
When the legislative referendum and the initiative for partial revisions 
of the Constitution were introduced at federal level in 1874 and 1891, 
respectively, there was a second motive behind the calls for direct democ-
racy: to prevent political and economic power being concentrated in the 
same few hands. As Karl Bürkli, a fervent democrat and trade union leader, 
wrote in 1869:
Our law-makers, elected by the people, are incapable of making good laws 
for the working class, even if they make excellent laws for the bourgeois 
class. Why? Because the representative bodies, in their majority, consist of 
capitalists and their servants who are hostile to social progress. Just as 
 slave- holders are incapable of making laws in the interests of slaves, capitalist- 
representatives are incapable of making laws in the interest of workers. 
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Representative democracy is not a form of government able to improve the 
living conditions of the working class and to resolve social problems. (Own 
translation)
But unlike Karl Marx, who 20 years previously had called for a revolu-
tionary class struggle against the ‘bourgeois’ state, Bürkli put all his hopes 
in direct democracy as law-making by the people. If direct democracy is 
realised, he wrote, ‘the people will find the right way to social freedom, 
because they feel themselves its daily sorrows and the need for change’.
From the very beginning, this expansion of the people’s rights not only 
to elect its authorities but also to vote on certain issues led to another 
understanding of democracy. The model of pure representative democracy 
promotes the idea of an elected government and parliament who decide 
for the people. They are entitled to do so because they represent the peo-
ple or its majority. Representative democracy requires trust in the parlia-
mentary elite, and trust that the will of parliament is consistent with the 
preferences of the majority of citizens. Bürkli was not the only political 
leader distrusting the political elites. In the cantons, many bourgeois poli-
ticians, too, were unsatisfied with the politics of their government and 
parliament. Distrust in government for the people led to the different idea 
of government through the people, that is, ‘self-rule’ in the name of the 
‘sovereignty of the people’.
The Swiss were aware that government through the people was not 
possible for every decision. However, they wanted citizens to participate 
in the most important ones. Democrats demanded that the people should 
not be excluded from participation in the most important decisions, and 
that there should be agreement between the authorities and the electorate 
on all important issues. This constitutional system involves three types of 
procedures (see also Table 4.2):
Table 4.2 Constitutional selection of direct-democracy issues at federal level
Issue Legal form Deliberating 
authority





Parliament Popular initiative, obligatory 
referendum
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• The most important questions are constitutional. Here, the people—
and the cantons—always participate through obligatory referenda 
(voting on all amendments proposed by parliament) or popular ini-
tiatives (proposing constitutional amendments).
• Questions of secondary importance concern ordinary laws and regu-
lations, decided by parliament. Here, citizens can intervene if they so 
wish: the optional referendum permits them to challenge parliamen-
tary decisions. However, at the federal level it is not possible to pro-
pose your own law by means of the initiative.
• Questions of less importance are settled through simple regulations 
or government ordinances. They are left to the government, some-
times to parliament.
This constitutional order fulfils four functions:
 1. Selectivity: The above given constitutional order provides a selection 
system. Not all decisions are open to the people, but the people 
always have the last word on the most important issues of constitu-
tional policies, and they have an option to control the legislation on 
important issues.
 2. Securing the highest legitimacy for the most important and controver-
sial political decisions: In the ideology of the ‘sovereignty of the 
people’, the people’s own decisions are seen as the ‘purest’ form of 
democracy. ‘Authentic’ decisions by the people enjoy the highest 
legitimacy because they constitute ‘self-rule’. That is also the reason 
why the Federal Supreme Court cannot invalidate Federal Laws: the 
people have either approved them in a referendum or decided not to 
contest it, which amounts to the same (qui tacet consentit).
 3. Keeping parliament involved: Only a small part of all laws enacted by 
parliament are actually challenged through a referendum, and gov-
ernment ordinances are excluded from direct participation. Hence, 
most decisions in Swiss politics are taken by the parliament and the 
executive, just as in representative systems. That is why the Swiss 
system is best referred to as a ‘semi-direct democracy’,1 which means 
1 We therefore use the term ‘semi-direct democracy’ when referring to the Swiss political 
system and its elements of representative and direct democracy as a whole, and ‘direct 
democracy’ when referring to the two instruments of the referendum and the initiative as 
well as to their use.
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that decision-making contains elements of both representative and 
direct democracy. The constitutional order tells us how this shall be 
done, indicating who has the last word on a political decision.
 4. No plebiscites: In countries which have ‘plebiscites’, it is the par-
liament or the president who call a referendum. France’s General 
de Gaulle, for instance, endorsed his project to give indepen-
dence to Algeria by a plebiscite in order to have more political 
support and legitimacy for this historical decision. Swiss direct 
democracy is fundamentally different. It is not the privilege of 
politicians to decide if a referendum is held, but the Constitution 
states that all constitutional amendments have to be voted upon, 
and that every law must be open to an optional referendum. 
Sometimes constitutional lawyers have different opinions on 
whether an issue must be regulated by a constitutional amend-
ment or an ordinary law, but this discretionary power is marginal. 
Thus, the constitutional order provides an effective guarantee of 
the people’s right to direct participation.
Over the last hundred years, much of the great enthusiasm for direct 
democracy has disappeared. Many of the hopes put on the effects of 
‘people’s law-making’, as expressed by Bürkli in 1869, have been 
dashed by the experiences of semi-direct democracy. The political left 
had to learn that the people did not want revolutions. But the same 
people also rejected many projects of the bourgeois majority. Direct 
democracy has not replaced, but rather complemented parliamentary 
politics: both the referendum and the initiative have become the most 
powerful instruments of the opposition and allow for protest against 
the political elite.2 This partly explains why the political rights have 
become so popular: in surveys, they regularly show up as the most pre-
cious elements of Swiss democracy and identity—even for those who 
belong to the losers in many votations.
2 For a recent, forceful defense of the optional (‘bottom-up’) referendum from a normative 
perspective, see Cheneval and el-Wakil (2018) and el-Wakil and Cheneval (2018).
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4.3  A closer look At the referendum 
And the InItIAtIVe
4.3.1  The Issues
We remember the call of democratic forces for the ‘sovereignty of the 
people’ when fighting for participation rights. They believed that no deci-
sion of great importance should be excluded from the direct influence of 
the people. This historical expectation was probably too optimistic. But 
when looking at the list of federal votations held in the last three years 
alone (Table 4.3), we can see that there is practically no kind of issue that 
was not subject to either a referendum or an initiative.
Table 4.3 Federal votations held 2017–2019
Date Title/Topic Typea Result
19.05.2019 Implementation of EU gun law directive LR Accepted
Corporate tax and public pension reform LR Accepted
10.02.2019 Urban sprawl PI Rejected
25.11.2018 Insurance detectives LR Accepted
Self-determination PI Rejected
Cow horns PI Rejected
23.09.2018 Food sovereignty PI Rejected
Fair food PI Rejected
Bicycle lanes and hiking paths CP Accepted
10.06.2018 Gambling LR Accepted
Sovereign money/banking PI Rejected
04.03.2018 Public TV and radio fees PI Rejected
Federal taxes CR Accepted
24.09.2017 Pension reform LR Rejected
Financing of pension reform CR Rejected
Food security CP Accepted
21.05.2017 Energy law LR Accepted
12.02.2017 Corporate tax reform LR Rejected
Highway and urban street plans and financing CR Accepted
Simplified naturalisation of foreigners CR Accepted
Source: Swissvotes (2019)
Note: aCR = Constitutional/obligatory referendum; LR = Legislative/optional referendum; PI = Popular 
Initiative, CP = Counter-proposal
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4.3.2  Direct Democracy’s Role in Political Agenda-Setting
Table 4.3 shows a wide variety of issues that have been put to popular 
vote, ranging from more bicycle lanes to less public TV and radio. We 
could certainly ask whether these two issues should be removed from a 
future list of votations—the first because it is of too little importance to 
merit a popular vote, the second because it is of too great an importance. 
Yet this would not be in line with Swiss thinking. With the optional refer-
endum and the popular initiative, it is left to the people, political parties 
and other organisations to decide what they consider to be a case worth 
voting upon. Politicians may complain about the overloading of direct 
democracy with minor issues, but they would not overtly deny the right of 
any group to place a ‘bothersome’ problem on the agenda if it successfully 
attracts the required number of signatures.
As regards popular initiatives, there is first a formal control by the 
Federal Chancellery and then by the Federal Council of whether or not 
the proposal is compatible with constitutional law and certain principles of 
international law. On the abolition of the army, for example, some officials 
claimed that the proposal was unconstitutional because it would destroy 
the fundamental task of the Swiss federation to defend its independence 
and neutrality in times of war. The Federal Council, however, did not find 
it politically wise to follow this advice and preferred a democratic vote to 
be held on the issue—they were convinced that the people’s common 
sense would lead them to vote the ‘right’ way.
The role of the Federal Assembly is to ensure that popular initiatives are 
in accordance with the principle of ‘consistency of subject matter’. This 
means that a popular initiative cannot combine different issues; citizens 
must be able to express their preference on a single question at a time. If 
an initiative contains more than one issue, it has to be split up into separate 
initiatives that are voted upon individually. The Federal Assembly is reluc-
tant to invalidate an initiative on the ground that it concerns questions 
that do not belong to the constitutional domain.3 The fact that practically 
any issue can become the subject of a popular initiative has two effects:
First, the Swiss Constitution is much less a historical document to pre-
serve the spirit of the founding generation than an open book which every 
generation of people and parliament is authorised to change. The Swiss 
3 On the cantonal level, we find similar procedures for cantonal initiatives, with the differ-
ence that a final decision on the validity of a popular initiative may be demanded from the 
Federal Supreme Court (cf. Schubiger 2017).
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Constitution, therefore, has become a rather unsystematic charter, a col-
lection of important fundamental principles as well as of rather unimport-
ant and detailed regulations. This was the reason why, in 1999, the 
Constitution was totally revised, bringing more coherence to the constitu-
tional text. Even so, with 32 new amendments accepted since then 
(Swissvotes 2019), the Constitution remains a living document. It is the 
written evidence on the development of Swiss politics and policies—initi-
ated mostly by the parliament but controlled by the people and the 
cantons.
Second, the people have a considerable influence on the political 
agenda. The control of the political agenda is an unresolved problem in 
theories of representative democracy because, by tacit arrangement, ruling 
political elites can agree to circumvent questions that would impair their 
re-election. Some scholars go as far as to say that the ‘politics of non- 
issues’—that is, withholding ‘bothersome’ questions from the agenda—
represents the core of a hidden power game. It limits democratic discussion 
to questions of conformity and suppresses issues disliked by the political 
elites (Bachrach and Baratz 1963). Direct democracy corrects some of 
these imperfections. In fact, many issues—abolition of the army, immigra-
tion policy, restrictions on genetic engineering, protection of the environ-
ment and so on—were brought forward by means of popular initiatives 
and sometimes against the firm convictions of almost the entire political 
elite. Though their direct success is limited, popular initiatives widen the 
horizon of what is politically conceivable. Government and parliament do 
not have complete control of political agenda-setting, and direct democ-
racy enables decisions to be taken on questions which the political elite 
would prefer to remain ‘non-issues’.
4.3.3  The Use of Referenda and Initiatives
In the first decades of the Swiss federation, popular votes were rare. After 
World War II, the constant expansion of the responsibilities and expendi-
tures of the federal state made votations much more frequent. Today, on 
four Sundays per year, the Federal Council organises a ballot, and the 
people vote on up to about 12 issues. Table 4.4 shows the number of votes 
held between 1848 and 2019—644 in total.
The first section refers to constitutional amendments proposed by the 
Federal Assembly, subject of the obligatory referendum. About one quar-
ter of all proposals were rejected by the people and/or cantons, which 
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reflects the rather sceptical attitude of the Swiss people towards giving the 
federal government new responsibilities.
The popular initiative is also widely used, but it does not always lead to 
a votation. In a few cases, the proposal is invalid for practical or legal rea-
sons. More than one fourth of all popular initiatives are withdrawn, some-
times after successful negotiations with the authorities for a counterproposal. 
At 10%, the success rate of popular initiatives is rather low. Counterproposals 
by the Federal Assembly, mostly voted upon in direct confrontation with 
the initiative, have a considerably higher success rate.
The optional referendum is the instrument challenging the ‘ordinary’ 
legislative activity of the Federal Assembly. Groups contesting a bill may 
fail to collect the required number of signatures within the 100-day limit. 
Table 4.4 National referenda and popular initiatives, 1848–2019a
Obligatory referenda
Voted 198 (100%)
Accepted by the cantons and the people 148 (74.7%)
Rejected by the cantons and/or the people 50 (25.3%)
Popular initiatives
Proposals handed in 474
Insufficient number of signatures 120
Withdrawn 100
Lapsed or declared invalid 6
Pending at time of writing (Oct. 2019) 32
Voted 216 (100%)
Accepted by the cantons and the people 22 (10.2%)
Rejected 194 (89.8%)





Bills subject to referendum (–June 2019) 3012
Referendum attempted but failed at signature stage 35
Referendum passed signature stage 190 (6.3% of all 
bills)
Referendums voted (–May 2019) 188 (100%)
Challenge by referendum failed (=parliamentary bill successful) 108 (57.4%)
Challenge by referendum successful (=bill rejected) 80 (42.6%)
Sources: Swissvotes (2019); BK (2019)
aFor a concise discussion of every popular vote held between 1848 and 2007, see Linder et al. (2010). For 
later votes, see https://swissvotes.ch/
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From Table 4.4, we see that less than 7% of all bills passed by parliament 
are actually so challenged. If, however, the referendum challenge materi-
alises into a popular vote, opponents of the bill have a 43% chance of suc-
cess. This means that less than 3% of all parliamentary bills are actually 
rejected at the polls.
From these statistics, we can draw some preliminary conclusions. 
Constitutional policies of the Federal Assembly, which is mainly concerned 
with providing legal bases for new federal responsibilities, suffer frequent 
defeats, being rejected once in every four votations. Nevertheless, groups 
of citizens who wish to promote new federal activities by means of the 
popular initiative are even less successful. Their success rate is a mere 10%. 
From a first glance at statistics on ordinary legislation we might think that 
the optional referendum is of comparatively low effect. In fact, the reverse 
is true for two reasons. First, the 6% referenda cases typically represent 
important bills of a controversial nature and, if there is a vote, the chances 
of the opponents of the bill are rather high. Therefore, the risk of an 
optional referendum defeat is taken seriously by federal authorities. 
Second, and as we shall discuss in the next chapter, the perceived omni-
present risk of a referendum being organised leads the federal authorities 
to avoid the referendum trap by two means: first, an intensive pre- 
parliamentary consultation phase allows ascertaining the degree of disap-
proval by different actors. Second, in taking into account opposing views 
that are dangerous enough to bring everything down, the government 
then presents a legislative bill to parliament that is already a compromise 
backed by a large coalition of interest groups and political parties.
4.3.4  ‘Braking’ Referenda and ‘Innovating’ Initiatives: Two 
Different Devices of Direct Democracy
Our previous discussion has shown that both initiatives and referenda in 
some ways ‘correct’ the policies of government and parliament. Yet apart 
from this, the two instruments of direct democracy fulfil fundamentally 
different functions. The referendum, particularly in its optional form, 
allows people to object to proposals by the authorities. The popular initia-
tive, however, is conceived as an active way of shaping constitutional 
rules—in most cases against the will of government and parliament. From 
a citizen’s point of view, we could argue that the referendum has a ‘brak-
ing’ effect and the initiative an innovative one. Let us take a closer look at 
this distinction.
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4.3.4.1  The Braking Effect of the Referendum
Democrats—the faction of the Radicals that fought for the introduction of 
the referendum in the nineteenth century—considered themselves ‘pro-
gressive’ and saw in the referendum a tool to promote reformist policies 
with the help of the people. Yet things turned out differently. From the 
very start, when the referendum was introduced in 1874, it was used by 
the Catholic-Conservative opposition to their own advantage, and proj-
ects of the radical liberal majority were shot down as if with a machine gun 
(Steiner 1991, 139).
The democratic forces had to learn a lesson important to many 
institution- builders: the consequences of institutional designs are very 
hard to foresee. Decision-making devices are tools which can be used both 
by other actors and for purposes other than those envisaged by their pro-
tagonists. In many cases, only history can reveal the effects of institutional 
mechanisms.
If the referendum is used as a plebiscite to give the authorities’ policy 
greater backing and legitimacy, the government should have the sole 
power to define under what conditions and on which occasions it is held. 
This is the case with plebiscites in France. The president of the French 
Republic organises a plebiscite when, confident that he has the backing of 
the popular majority on an important issue, the popular vote would help 
him to continue the general policy of his presidential mandate. Even then 
this procedure is not without risks, as De Gaulle learned in 1969, when 
the defeat of his proposal for regionalisation and senate reform forced him 
to resign (Aubert 1974, 43–4). Yet if plebiscites are unsuccessful, politi-
cians find ways to do without them. When in 2005 the French and the 
Dutch people said No to the European Constitution, the EU authorities 
proposed similar steps to integration by way of the Lisbon Treaty, on 
which no plebiscites in these two countries were held.4
Swiss politicians have the discretionary power neither to make an issue 
the subject of a referendum, nor to prevent a votation. As explained ear-
lier, the Constitution says which type of parliamentary decision is linked 
with which type of referendum. Parliament cannot circumvent referenda, 
even though for some decisions it may be particularly difficult to obtain a 
majority. New taxes, for example, are not very popular in any state. In pure 
representative democracies, political leaders impose them after elections in 
4 In Ireland, an obligatory referendum had to be held and failed in 2008. The Treaty was 
accepted in a second attempt one year later, however.
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the hope that the people will have forgotten about them by the next elec-
tion. This is not possible in Swiss direct democracy, where the political 
authorities have to convince the people that higher taxes are necessary. 
Therefore, the obstacles for success are high, not only for amendments to 
the Constitution where the double majority of the people and the cantons 
are required. In ordinary law-making, parliament can never rule out the 
possibility that its decision will eventually be challenged by a referendum 
launched by a political party, an interest group, or by a spontaneous social 
movement able to collect 50,000 signatures. Parliament therefore is 
bound to be cautious in law-making. Finally, it seems that negative majori-
ties are easier to build than coalitions in support of change (Box 4.1).
Box 4.1 Difficulties of Building Up ‘Constructive Majorities’: The 
Example of Taxation in Theory and Practice
If the government needs more revenue, it must theoretically encoun-
ter tax resistance from all citizens. However, it may propose a solu-
tion that obtains a majority of rational voters, for instance reducing 
the tax burden for a majority of modest-income households by a 
small amount and raising taxes for a much smaller group with higher 
income. By doing so, the government may expect a political majority 
for its project of a net fiscal gain. However, its hopes can be dashed 
for two main reasons. Firstly, the proposed solution may have an 
impact on participation behaviour: higher-income classes, highly 
affected by and opposed to the bill, may mobilise and participate 
more in the vote than people with modest salaries. Moreover, the 
government cannot even be sure that people with a modest income 
will vote for the bill by offering them only a small gain: voters of 
lower social or economic status sometimes do not vote according to 
their actual status, but according to the status to which they aspire. 
So they may vote no, as if they belonged to a higher-income class. 
Secondly, opponents may bring up the argument of ‘federalism’, 
stating that new taxes are much more important on the cantonal 
than on the federal level. The ‘federalist’ argument is strong because 
in many issues it is able to divide the entire electorate.
Thus, the government will end up facing a coalition of three 
groups opposed to the bill, albeit for different reasons:
(continued)
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For these reasons, the referendum is an instrument of the opposition 
and favours the status quo. Over decades, the referendum was the favou-
rite instrument of conservative right-wing forces fighting against new 
competencies of the federation and the development of the welfare state. 
In the last 30 years, however, it has been the political left which success-
fully used the referendum against conservative propositions to cut social 
security programmes, privatise and liberalise working regulations. This 
illustrates that the status quo bias of the referendum is of a systemic nature 
and can be used against innovations from any side. The referendum 
appears to be a versatile vessel, comparable to a sailing ship propelled by 
the wind of popularity—no matter the direction from which that wind 
blows. But there is no doubt about the shores the crews on referenda ships 
are heading for: the defeat of a bill. And this means the maintenance of the 
status quo.
• higher-income groups affected by higher taxes;
• lower-income groups voting as if they had higher-income status;
• all income groups preferring cantonal taxes.
On the supporting side, the government may expect one group 
only: lower-income groups voting in line with their current status 
and preferring federal taxes. The actual supporting side may thus be 
smaller than expected and lose against a heterogeneous opposition.
In practice, the federal authorities were able to successfully raise 
revenue in the past but seemed well aware of the theoretical difficul-
ties just mentioned. Value added tax (VAT), disliked by most house-
holds, is lower than in other countries, and federal revenue relies 
much more on income than consumer taxes. Progression of income 
tax is also high—a minority of people with high income contribute 
more to federal revenue than all other households. The regime on 
federal income and consumer taxes is also limited in time—after a 
decade or so, the people vote again on it. Finally, a good part of 
federal revenue is paid back to the cantons in the form of transfers. 
All these factors may have helped to build ‘constructive majorities’ 
on a difficult issue.
Box 4.1 (continued)
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We now see the direct effect of the referendum on the political process. 
Its status quo bias renders ‘big innovations’ unlikely. Political elites must 
anticipate the risk of defeat in a future referendum and are therefore bound 
to incremental progress. For every political project they have to look for 
an oversized coalition able to defeat the veto power of possible opposition 
forces in a popular vote.
This leads to a second, indirect effect. The referendum has profoundly 
changed the Swiss way of political decision-making. When, at the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Radical majority realised it could be beaten 
time and again by a ‘destructive’ conservative minority via the referen-
dum, it changed its policy of pure majority rule in government, allocating 
one of the seven seats of the Federal Council to a Catholic-Conservative 
(Neidhart 1970; Bolliger and Zürcher 2004). The majority thus began to 
strike political compromises with the minority, finding solutions that did 
not threaten the status quo of groups capable of challenging the bill. This 
integrative pressure of the referendum transformed majoritarian politics 
into power-sharing—an institutional effect of direct democracy discussed 
further in Chap. 5.
Finally, the referendum and its status quo bias had important long-term 
effects on the development of the federal state. Compared to other indus-
trialised Western democracies, we note:
• The historically late development of certain activities of the Swiss 
central government, especially in social policy. As every new federal 
responsibility must obtain the double majority of people and  cantons, 
obstacles are high. In fact, many proposals for amendments to the 
Constitution were rejected at first and accepted only in a sec-
ond attempt.
• The low (33) percentage of total public expenditure accounted for 
by the central government and the modest public sector nationwide, 
which accounts for less than 35% of Switzerland’s GDP (EFV 
2019, 5 & 97).
• The unique fact that among industrialised democracies, Switzerland’s 
central government is the only one which can rely on income and 
value added taxes only on a provisional legal basis.
• A small bureaucracy: only 11% (38,000 out of 325,000) of all Swiss 
administration employees work for the federation. The public sector 
in Switzerland amounts to only 14% of total employment (BFS 2019).
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• Compared with other neutral states, a rather discreet position in 
international affairs. In 1992, the Swiss people and cantons refused 
to join the European Economic Area, and Switzerland is unlikely to 
become a member of the EU in the near future. Switzerland was one 
of the last countries to join the UN, in 2002—the first to do so via a 
popular vote, however. One important reason for the sceptical atti-
tude of Swiss voters in foreign affairs is neutrality. Neutrality is more 
than an elite’s preference in foreign policy. It is part of the national 
identity, even myth, held by a majority of people that Switzerland 
should always stay neutral and not be committing too much in inter-
national politics.
4.3.4.2  The Innovating Effect of the Popular Initiative
In contrast to the referendum, the popular initiative is a promoter of polit-
ical innovation. Moreover, it promotes innovation against the will of the 
political elite. We have already discussed one such innovating effect: the 
initiative widens the political agenda and gives authoritative voice to prob-
lems that might remain non-issues as far as the elites are concerned. Yet 
agenda-setting alone does not mean gaining majority approval for a pro-
posal. Statistics show that hopes for political change by means of the initia-
tive are dashed in 90% of cases that come to a vote (Table 4.4). If the 
people are so sceptical towards grass-roots innovation, we have to ask why 
so many initiatives are handed in. Practice shows that the popular initiative 
may serve four different objectives:
 1. Direct success against the federal authorities: In parliament, the per-
manent coalition of governmental parties may constantly ignore the 
claims of the opposition parties. Thus, the popular initiative can be 
an instrument for parliamentary minority groups. They hope that 
their issue will be popular enough to find a majority in the vota-
tion—even against the mainstream of the political elite. For a long 
time, it was primarily the Social-Democrats and trade unions who 
used the initiative to compensate for the lack of support for social 
reform in parliament. They made the experience, however, that an 
initiative is a good instrument for political protest but less suited to 
realise their claims. For initiatives seeking direct success, the degree 
of innovation must be modest. Typical examples are the introduc-
tion of a national holiday on 1st of August in 1993 or the protection 
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of moor landscapes in 1987. In recent years, however, some quite 
radical conservative initiatives (ban on minarets, ‘against mass immi-
gration’ and life-long detention for sex-offenders) were successful.
 2. Indirect success through negotiation with the authorities: As just 
mentioned, direct success in a popular vote is rare. But defeat 
does not always leave proponents with nothing. Sometimes the 
federal authorities pick up ideas from an initiative by drafting a 
counterproposal or fitting them into ongoing legislative projects. 
This way the long shots of popular initiatives are transformed into 
proposals that are more in line with conventional wisdom and 
therefore stand a better chance of being accepted. At the root of 
many important federal policies—from social security through the 
environment to equal rights—we can find a popular initiative. In 
this way, ideas too innovative and radical at first can later be trans-
formed into proposals acceptable to a majority. In the long run, 
these indirect effects of the initiative may be even more important 
than rare direct success (Delley 1978; Sigg 1978; Werder 1978; 
Papadopoulos 1994).
 3. Mobilisation of new issues and political tendencies: The objectives of 
radical groups are different. They may prefer agenda-setting and dis-
cussion of political taboos and non-issues, which is provided by the 
arena of a popular vote. They refuse to pay the price of negotiation 
and compromise. Therefore, these groups draft ‘long-shot’ proposi-
tions, even if their chances of success are minimal or even zero. The 
initiative on the abolition of the Swiss army is a good example. From 
the very beginning, its proponents were aware that they would not 
win a majority of the vote. Still, they used the four years’ discussion 
to change political attitudes on the formerly taboo subject of Swiss 
military and peace politics, and with considerable success.
 4. Self-staging and mobilisation for electoral success: Finally, political 
parties and social movements can use the popular initiative as a plat-
form for electoral success. Popular initiatives not only ‘create’ issues 
but also help to establish new political parties and rally the followers 
around a common cause. This is typical of the way in which several 
grass-roots movements of the 1970s put environmental issues onto 
the national agenda and finally established a new, national Green 
Party. The xenophobe movement of that period also regularly 
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launched popular initiatives asking for restrictions on immigration. 
This helped the small anti-immigration parties not only to keep their 
pet issue on the political agenda, but also to survive for quite a 
long time.5
4.4  pArtIcIpAtIon In dIrect democrAcy
4.4.1  The Deciding Majority, Or Who Are the People?
On the evening of a popular vote, the news readers on TV and radio often 
say: ‘The Sovereign of Switzerland has accepted (or rejected) the follow-
ing propositions …’. The allusion to the ‘Sovereign’ (der Souverän) is an 
old expression for the highest democratic organ or authority, but who is 
that? The expression ‘direct democracy’ implies that it is the people, or at 
least its majority. We shall see that, in practice, it is far from this.
First, the share of people who are qualified to vote in Switzerland is 
only about 62% of the total population. Those under the age of 18 and 
foreign nationals, who make up 25% of the resident population, are not 
allowed to vote. Then again not all those who do qualify take part in a 
vote—participation over past year averaged some 45%. If voters are split 
roughly 50:50, the deciding majority may become rather small. Using the 
above figures, 100% * 0.62 * 0.45 * 0.5 equals 14% of the entire popula-
tion. Figure 4.1 shows the deciding majorities in federal votations as a 
percentage of the total Swiss population since 1866.
It shows that during the long decades of male-only democracy, before 
women’s suffrage was introduced in 1971, the actual ‘Sovereign’ could be 
as small as 5–15%. Since then, the deciding majority has varied between 
12% and 22%. Even so, the democratic majority never represents the 
majority of the population, and the ‘will of the Sovereign’ is in reality the 
vote of a minority. Moreover, as we shall see, the participation of the dif-
ferent strata of citizens is far from being equal. One could argue, there-
fore, that a serious survey of 30,000 people would cost less and give more 
accurate information on the true preferences of the people. This argu-
ment, however, misses the point.
5 This ended only in the 1990s, when the Swiss People’s Party took over the immigration 
issue and ‘swallowed’ the small anti-immigration parties and their protest voters.
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The goal of a votation is not the most precise reproduction of public 
opinion, but the participation of active citizens in a collectively binding 
decision. This process of direct participation gives high democratic legiti-
mation to the decision taken, for several reasons. First, the legitimating 
effect lies in the fact that all citizens are offered the chance to participate, 
and in that those who do so put time and effort into making up their 
minds and casting their votes. Second, a popular vote is usually accompa-
nied by intensive campaigns for and against the proposal, including adver-
sarial public meetings, party recommendations, lobby slogans and 
extensive coverage in the media and online. This process of public delib-
eration and decision-making may lead to changes in public opinion and 
individual preferences. It is a collective learning process. Third, the collec-
tive decision is authentic: people are binding themselves with the conse-
quences of their own decision. It is their own decision, not one imposed 
on them by political elites. Direct participation corresponds to the idea of 
‘self-rule’. All this creates double legitimacy—for the concrete decision at 
stake and for the democratic institutions in general.
From a normative point of view, one could still argue about two imper-
fections of direct democracy. First, what about foreign nationals living in 
Switzerland who, despite paying taxes and otherwise contributing to pub-
lic welfare, are excluded from participation? Indeed, while a large part of 

































































































Fig. 4.1 Deciding majorities as a percentage of the total Swiss population in 
federal votations, 1866–2019. (Source: own calculations and graph based on BFS 
[2019; population censuses and referendum results]. After 1977 including Swiss 
citizens living abroad [cf. Kuenzi 2018])
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imperfect state of democracy. This reminds us that the concept of democ-
racy continues to change. The entitlement to vote has evolved over time: 
once it was restricted to adult married men with some degree of wealth 
and social status. This restriction was later abolished. While Switzerland 
may have been late in granting political rights to women, there is one can-
ton that introduced political rights for foreigners as early as in the nine-
teenth century: in the communes of the canton of Neuchatel, foreigners 
have participated in elections and votations since 1850.6 The canton of 
Jura followed in 1979, but in many other cantons proposals to extend 
political rights to foreigners have failed.7 In turn, Swiss citizens living 
abroad, counting for more than half a million by the end of 2019, have 
been given the possibility to vote since 1977. Since 1992, they can do so 
without having to travel to Switzerland to exercise this right (Kuenzi 
2018). This illustrates that the historical process of the ‘inclusion’ by polit-
ical rights is long but certainly not at its end yet.
The second question is, does low participation not discredit direct 
democracy despite its procedural value? Should not a turnout of, say, 40% 
or 50% be required, the result being invalidated if participation falls below 
that level—an idea that is applied in Italy, for example? In order to answer 
this question, let us have a closer look at individual participation.
4.4.2  Regular Voters, Occasional Participants 
and Abstentionists
As shown in Fig. 4.2, the level of participation in federal votations varies 
above and below an average of 45%, depending on the attractiveness of the 
issue voted. Controversial subjects of great importance to everybody 
attract the most voters, such as those to abolish the army, limit immigra-
tion, or joining the UN.
6 One of the deputies in 1850 explained his motive as follows: ‘If we have to allow citizens 
of other cantons to vote on national issues, there is no reason why French or Italians should 
not have this same right’ (Schmitt 1989). Since 2001, foreign residents can also participate 
in cantonal elections and votes.
7 Some cantons allow foreigners to vote in  local matters (Vaud, Fribourg and Geneva) 
whereas in a further three (Appenzell Outer-Rhodes, Grisons and Basel-City) the municipali-
ties can decide. See https://www.ekm.admin.ch/ekm/de/home/staatsbuergerschaft-citoy-
ennete/Citoy/buergerrechte/panorama.html [1.4.2020].
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From post-vote surveys, Sciarini et  al. (2015, table 1) and Serdült 
(2013, 48), we learn that Swiss voters fall into three groups which differ 
in behaviour and general attitude towards voting:
• The first group, comprising some 25–30% of citizens, always votes, 
that is, at least nine out of ten times. These ‘duty-conscious citizens’ 
interpret their political right to vote as being a citizen’s duty as well.
• The second group of about 20–25%, the ‘abstainers’, never partici-
pates at all. Different reasons can be found for such behaviour. Some 
are disillusioned; some feel incapable of dealing with the issues 
involved; others are simply not interested in politics.
• The third and largest group, some 50–55% of the electorate, consists 
of occasional voters, participating à la carte. They participate in 
between one and eight votes out of ten. Their selective interest in 
politics according to the issue at stake makes the participation rate 
fluctuate between 30% and 70%. Occasional voters participate when 
they feel they are personally involved or when concrete advantages or 
disadvantages for them are in play.
The criticism is often made that the low level of participation, which 
occasionally can go down to 25%, discredits direct democracy. However, 
proposals to introduce a minimum participation rate for the vote to be 











Fig. 4.2 Voter turnout in Swiss ballots, 1980–2019. (Source: own graph based 
on BFS [2019])
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a measure would probably be more likely to punish and disappoint active 
voters than incite the inactive majority to take part. The strongest argu-
ment against a participation quorum is that it destroys the deliberative 
nature of a votation: while proponents have to argue with substantive 
arguments for the project, opponents can renounce on any argument by a 
simple call to boycott the vote. The opposition not only has better cards 
in the game but destroys it: if non-participation pays better than participa-
tion, the legitimation of direct democracy itself will suffer.
We also have to recognise that participation in direct democracy is very 
demanding. Voters in Swiss democracy are supposed to vote on issues that 
are sometimes very complicated. To read the official documentation on 
four or five proposals can take several hours. Together with votations on 
cantonal and local affairs, a voter is supposed to give his or her preference 
on up to 20 or 30 issues a year. In none of these can he or she expect to 
have more than an infinitesimal chance of being the one who makes the 
outcome decisive. The cost of participation therefore outweighs the 
expected individual benefit, and following the logic of rational choice, the 
voter would stay at home. Indeed, if many deplore the low participation 
rates, it could be argued that a turnout of 45% is surprisingly high, given 
the time and effort required. Thus, there is no satisfactory criteria to judge 
whether 45% of participation is low or high. Nor can we say whether this 
participation rate is a bad or good sign for a sound democracy and a 
mature civic culture.
Nevertheless, there are other reasons for worrying about low turnout. 
As mentioned above, many abstainers are disappointed or feel unable to 
participate. Direct democracy does not provide guarantees against politi-
cal frustration or alienation. More importantly, international research 
(Kern and Hooghe 2018; Vatter et  al. 2019, 173f.) into participation 
reveals two main findings:
• The lower overall participation, the greater the difference in voter 
turnout between higher and lower socio-economic groups; and
• The more demanding the form of participation, the greater the dif-
ference in voter turnout between higher and lower socio- 
economic groups.
In Switzerland, both factors appear together. First, especially if partici-
pation is rather low, as in the example given in Table 4.5, the choir of Swiss 
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Table 4.5 Typical profile of a popular vote
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direct democracy sings in upper or middle-class tones.8 Post-vote analyses 
reveal that in such cases workers and lower-level employees participate less 
than high-level employees and independent professionals by a factor of up 
to three. As in other countries, well-educated people with higher income 
are more likely to vote than their less educated or working-class counter-
parts. Second, direct democracy is demanding. One should not underesti-
mate the general capacity of ordinary citizens to understand the questions 
they are voting upon. But besides their personal motivation and political 
interest, also their capacity to understand the issue at stake varies. If the 
issues of a vote are complex, some citizens feel unable to cope with it. In 
a sort of self-censure, they refrain from voting. The second issue in 
Table 4.5 for instance, the referendum against a new law on enterprise 
taxes, was difficult to understand because it involved many technicalities. 
And we notice that people with lower revenue and education participated 
considerably less, even though the other issue voted that day was consid-
ered to be easy to decide: to restrict gun ownership or not.
Source: Milic et al. (2019, 45f.)
Besides education and income, there are other socio-demographic 
characteristics that influence political participation: younger, female, 
unmarried and divorced citizens participate less. Moreover, some political 
characteristics make a difference: people with no party affinity and with no 
trust in the authorities participate considerably less, and the most impor-
tant single factor that determines participation is political interest 
(Heidelberger 2018).
From a normative perspective, however, the most important defect of 
direct democracy lies in the unequal participation of the social classes. 
Direct democracy, if its procedures and issues become too complex, turns 
out to be a ‘middle-class democracy’. To avoid this, direct democracy 
must be simple in its procedures and in the formulation of issues on 
the ballot.
8 See Schattschneider’s (1960, 35) earlier criticism of Dahl: ‘The flaw in the pluralist 
heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent’ (also Lutz 2006, 
114ff.).
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4.5  the people between knowledge, trust 
And propAgAndA
This section addresses further key questions about direct democracy: do 
citizens understand the issues they vote upon? What are their motives 
when saying yes or no to a proposal? What is the role of the political elites 
and their campaigns? And is it true that, given enough money and propa-
ganda, any votation can be won? When discussing these questions, we can 
draw upon a fast-growing number of scholarly studies of voting behaviour 
in Switzerland.9
4.5.1  Example of a Vote: Should There Be Tougher Restrictions 
on Refugees Seeking Asylum in Switzerland?
Immigration policy has been one of the most controversial issues of Swiss 
politics for over 50 years. Back in the 1980s, the number of refugees seek-
ing asylum in Switzerland grew drastically from about 3000 per year 
(1980) to more than 37,000 (1990), and federal and cantonal resources 
became strained. Many refugees had to wait several years for a decision on 
whether they were awarded refugee status. A negative decision meant 
expulsion, which was considered to be inhuman by many Swiss, who even 
tried to hide or protect refugees facing repatriation. On the other hand, 
there was a growing reluctance among a part of the population to allow 
too many refugees to stay in Switzerland, in addition to the more than one 
million other foreigners. In 1985, the federal parliament revised the asy-
lum law. It sought to process the growing number of demands for asylum 
more rapidly and to undertake expulsions more efficiently. The revision of 
the law was a compromise: right-wing and xenophobe forces were against 
encouraging a ‘growing mass of refugees’, who for them were mostly 
‘false asylum seekers’ coming for economic reasons and not because of 
political persecution. They proposed severe measures to keep refugees out 
of the country and a simplification of the legal procedure. Refugee organ-
isations, the Greens and the political left, on the other hand, were opposed 
to changes in the existing liberal law and its procedure, which offered refu-
gees many ways (and the time) for appealing against negative decisions. 
Parliament finally chose a middle way, restraining the procedure for asy-
lum, but leaving doors open to refugees according to the standards of 
9 For an excellent overview, see Milic et al. (2015).
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international law and the humanitarian tradition of Switzerland. The 
revised law was not to the taste of Swiss refugee organisations, which, 
together with the Greens and parts of the left, successfully launched a 
referendum challenge that was voted on 5 April 1987. The challenge 
failed: 1,180,082 citizens voted for the revised law, 572,330 against, 
giving it a majority of 67.3% (see Box 4.2). It was not the first of several 
referenda on Swiss refugee policy, and others followed, illustrating the 
salience of the issue up until today.
Box 4.2 Tougher Restrictions on Refugees: Cleavages, Motives, 
Interests and Voting Behaviour
A) Cleavages
According to the VOX post-vote survey (no. 32, July 1987), vot-
ing behaviour firstly mirrored the strong divide between the right 
and the left, each mobilised by the slogans of political parties. For 
instance, voters with affinity to the Swiss People’s Party (90% yes), 
the Radicals and Liberals (88%) and Christian-Democrats (70%) 
massively supported the law. On the other hand, voters with affinity 
to the Social-Democrats (41%), Greens (37%) and small left-wing 
parties (9%) were clearly opposed to asylum restrictions. The ratio 
between voters of the political right and left was about 2:1. Note, 
however, that voters with no party affinity constitute a good major-
ity of all voters. In the vote of April 1987, they supported the project 
with 72%. On questions such as this one where the traditional divi-
sion between right and left is decisive, the left has a chance to win 
only if it can sway voters with no party affinity.
Besides the right-left divide, the VOX survey also revealed a social 
divide. There was higher support for tougher restrictions among 
lower social strata. Education, particularly, had a strong effect: the 
higher the level of education, the more liberal the attitude towards 
refugees. Citizens with only basic education massively supported the 
law (88% yes), whereas voters with university degrees rejected it 
(41% yes).
(continued)
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B) Motives and Interests
Between 1970 and 2019, the Swiss voted 34 times on questions 
to do with migration and/or asylum (Swissvotes 2019). With 25% of 
non-Swiss among the resident population today, questions of inte-
gration and social conflict have persisted among the most salient and 
controversial political issues (Fischer et  al. 2002; Schneider and 
Holzer 2002; Linder 1991). In the many votations on migration 
and refugees, one can observe a constant pattern composed of three 
main groups, each with different motives and interests:
• Categorical opponents of (growing) immigration: protagonists of 
restrictions on immigration and asylum seekers share a variety of 
motives that range from feeling the necessity to set limits on the 
proportion of the foreign population, through wishing to protect 
traditional Swiss values, to fear of overpopulation and loss of 
Swiss identity. Unskilled Swiss workers feel disadvantaged by 
growing immigration of unqualified workforce, while taxpayers 
are reluctant to accept refugees who cannot be integrated into the 
labour market.
• Categorical defenders of liberal immigration: protagonists of free 
access for asylum seekers are mainly acting according to humani-
tarian and egalitarian beliefs, but they may have different reasons: 
congruence with political ideologies of the left and the Greens, or 
the fact that better educated people have been less exposed to the 
negative effects of immigration.
• Pragmatists: whereas the attitudes of categorical opponents and 
defenders rarely change and lead to a stable voting behaviour, 
pragmatists are more flexible. More than defending social values, 
the voting behaviour of pragmatists depends on utilitarian consid-
erations. In the vote on workforce immigration, pragmatists can 
embrace the position of Liberals because as professionals they 
take advantage of foreign workers or new consumers. In ques-
tions of refugee policy such as the referendum of 1987, however, 
they vote with the opponents of immigration because asylum 
seekers imply public expenditure with no immediate benefit. A 
pragmatic attitude is to be expected especially among occasional 
voters with no party affinity.
Box 4.2 (continued)
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The referendum case of restrictions on asylum seekers gives us some 
first insights into voters’ behaviour. First, we notice that the rationality of 
voting has different roots: social background and corresponding experi-
ence, moral values or political beliefs can be important for some groups of 
voters, while others behave in more pragmatic ways. Political scientists, for 
a long time, have led a debate on whether political behaviour depends on 
individually defined self-interest or shared social values. Evidence from 
other studies on direct democracy (e.g. Vatter 1994; Vatter and 
Heidelberger 2014, Mueller et al. 2016) confirms what is illustrated in our 
case: both models of behaviour, self-interest and shared social values up to 
solidarity, do exist. Second, voters’ behaviour is influenced by the voting 
campaign: to a large degree, they follow the recommendations and slo-
gans of political parties or other actors, but they may and do change their 
mind based on the different arguments (Colombo 2018, 799). This brings 
us to the next point: the campaign.
4.5.2  Shaping Opinions in a Voting Campaign: The Actors
Citizens cast their votes individually and secretly, but they make up their 
minds during public discussions. Votations are preceded by intense politi-
cal campaigns. Different actors provide information, try to convince, 
praise or denounce, to mobilise and attempt to lead voters to approve or 
reject. Even the most complex issues must in the end result in a simple yes 
or no. Therefore, especially at the end of a campaign, the issue has to be 
treated as a simple message. Let us first consider the actors involved in a 
voting campaign, and then, in Sect. 4.5.3, evaluate their impact on voting 
behaviour.
Citizens and their predispositions: In the political asylum case, many 
people would have had first-hand experience with the question on the bal-
lot. They might have had a job where their colleagues or customers were 
foreigners. Many may have liked foreigners and refugees because they 
were good customers or willing and cheap workers doing jobs the Swiss 
had refused. But even if people liked foreigners for these reasons, they may 
have said that there were already too many of them in Switzerland. They 
may have felt like strangers themselves because their colleagues at work all 
come from Portugal, Bosnia, Turkey or Germany. They may have feared 
that their children would learn less in school because the majority of their 
classmates were foreigners speaking perhaps seven different languages but 
only rudimentary German, French or Italian. In this case, people have firm 
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attitudes based on first-hand experience. If a popular vote on the issue 
comes up, they feel able to decide the question on the basis of their own, 
personal experience. The voting campaign may mobilise voters and con-
firm their own preference for a yes or no, but it does not change their 
minds because they are pre-dispositioned.
Yet there are other issues more difficult to decide. Tax reforms, for 
instance, may be complex affairs. In some cases, even specialists are not 
able to predict their consequences. Voters cannot infer from their first- 
hand experience if the proposed reform will improve or worsen their own 
or the general situation. They must rely on the information and recom-
mendations of campaign actors they trust. In this case, the campaign 
becomes very important because the issue is not pre-dispositioned. Good 
arguments, recommendations by political parties, clues and catchy propa-
ganda slogans are able to influence voters in shaping their opinion. The 
campaign, in such cases, may have a decisive effect on the outcome of 
the vote.
The Federal Council: The executive plays an important role. It decides 
the date and issues of each ballot. The Federal Council provides the offi-
cial information on the proposals at stake. In a booklet sent to every voter, 
it describes each proposition, gives an account on the arguments of parlia-
ment and repeats the official recommendation for the vote. Part of the 
booklet is reserved for the position of the opponents. This and the gener-
ally sober account of the issue at stake may be two reasons why voters pay 
much attention to the Federal Council’s booklet; it is one of the prime 
sources of information they consult when voting. The Federal Council 
also takes part in the campaign by promoting and defending the position 
of the parliamentary majority.
Political parties: Parties engage strongly during a campaign. Popular 
votations are an opportunity to highlight themselves, reflecting on con-
crete issue against the background of their basic ideologies and pro-
grammes, and pointing out the presumed interests of their voters and their 
affinity to interest groups. Thus, in their slogans and recommendations, 
parties often emphasise basic cleavages such as left vs. right, urban vs. 
rural, or ecology vs. economy on which they are permanently positioned 
to attract and keep their clientele. The ways political parties engage in the 
campaign have fundamentally changed over time. In earlier periods, local 
and cantonal party assemblies were at the centre of opinion-shaping and 
mobilisation. Today, parties mostly rely on the media and the web. Their 
politicians take part in public debates, organise rallies, try to have their 
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positions published in print, use social networks, seek face-to-face com-
munication in shopping areas, without however forgetting about some of 
the old instruments of political propaganda: posters and newspaper ads.
Pressure groups: Vested interests of industry, employers’ organisations 
and trade unions, social movements and other non-governmental organ-
isations become active if one of their core issues is at stake. Their means of 
campaigning vary to a great deal. Some of them, like trade unions or social 
movements, primarily try to mobilise their own members through their 
personal networks. Others, such as business associations, also launch pub-
lic propaganda campaigns, sometimes spending big money.
The media: Radio, television and print media strongly engage in the 
campaign. They explain and comment on the issue, provide platforms to 
politicians and political parties, give background information and under-
take fact-checking. Not only do they investigate people’s opinions and air 
the views of government and its opponents, they also present their own 
thoughts on the issue. There is a public TV and radio service in each lin-
guistic region, bound to observe a balance between pro- and contra-sides. 
In earlier times a great number of newspapers were affiliated to specific 
parties and therefore represented their views. These newspapers have 
largely disappeared. Today, the press has become as commercial as almost 
any other product—yet its positions are not ‘neutral’; instead they reflect 
the preference of editors or what is presumed to be the preferences of their 
readers. Since the 2000s, websites, blogs, e-mail lists and online multime-
dia have become new elements of voting campaigns (see also below, 
Sect. 4.6.3).
Producers of propaganda: Marketing and Public Relations (PR) agen-
cies are not independent actors in the process but offer their service to any 
actor willing to pay. This may be the organisation of an entire campaign 
for one side, or simple voting propaganda defined as information whose 
only objective is to forge the majority desired by those who pay for it. By 
its very nature, propaganda need not tell the whole truth about an issue, 
and sometimes it has little to do with the issue and nothing with the truth. 
Political advertisement in newspapers and on posters, propaganda flyers 
and pamphlets are dominated by slogans, photographs, images or car-
toons. Their message is aimed at mobilising good or bad feelings, emo-
tions and cues about the controversial issue. Campaigning has become 
highly professional, and short-term propaganda is not its only means. 
Today, actors with big interest and big money sometimes hire marketing 
agencies to launch long-term PR campaigns. The first example dates back 
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to the 1970s when, following a major scandal, the Social-Democrats 
launched a popular initiative for tougher restrictions on banks. To counter 
this proposition, one of the big Swiss banks began a PR campaign, regu-
larly taking out entire pages in newspapers to describe banking activities 
and their importance to Switzerland’s economy. Just occasionally there 
was a mention of the popular initiative. By 1984, the banks had succeeded 
in positively changing their image. In the last months of the campaign on 
the initiative, the banks even deemed it unnecessary to run a propaganda 
campaign on their own since their earlier PR-efforts had achieved its 
objective. The initiative failed (73% no).
Pollsters: When the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)’s popular initiative 
‘against mass immigration’ was narrowly accepted in February 2014, 
everybody was very surprised because the country’s leading—and in fact 
largely monopolistic—polling firm, gfs.bern, had predicted a clear ‘no’. 
The same had happened five years before, with the SVP’s anti-minaret 
initiative (e.g. Kovic 2014). The company subsequently lost the public 
contract for post-vote analyses, ending the VOX-series which had begun 
in 1977. The new post-vote analyses are called VOTO.10 More generally, 
the last decade has seen a number of new kids on the polling block, nota-
bly companies using online-only, opt-in surveys or betting markets.
4.5.3  Are Voters Capable to Decide on High Policy? Theory 
and Swiss Experience
Democratic theory is profoundly divided on whether ordinary citizens are 
capable of rationally deciding political issues. On the one hand, adherents 
of elitist, liberal or representative models of democracy argue that the mass 
citizenry is not qualified to decide about high politics. Therefore, their 
influence should be restricted to electing those who decide for them. 
Sartori (1987, 120), the Italian theorist, went so far as to say that direct 
democracy ‘would quickly and disastrously founder on the reefs of cogni-
tive incompetence’ (see also Budge 1996, 69). Adherents of the model of 
participatory or radical democracy, on the other hand, argue that direct- 
democratic choice is not only desirable from a normative point of view but 
also feasible. It is not necessary that all citizens decide all questions fully 
informed and on a systematic appreciation of all arguments. If capacities 
and motivation are lacking, they can resort to simplifying strategies. Using 
10 See https://www.voto.swiss/voto/ [1.5.2020].
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shortcuts and cues, they can delegate the search for information to others 
and accept recommendations by authorities they trust to be competent 
(Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Kriesi 2005, 9).
This notion of simplifying strategies is important and needs some expla-
nation. Just as in daily life, when we are at the limits of our knowledge, we 
begin to rely on trust. To drive a car safely we need some instructions on 
how to handle it, but we need not know how the engine works. Nobody 
knows precisely how all the complex components of a nuclear power plant 
operate. It is designed, built and run by specialists who each trust in the 
professional knowledge of others. In politics, we can make similar obser-
vations. MPs specialise in some preferred policy areas, and an expert on 
social policy, for example, may rely on the advice of colleagues when it 
comes to fiscal policy. She then decides based on cues or heuristics.
The same mechanism, substituting trust for knowledge, works with 
voters. They rely on recommendations from other people who are sup-
posed to know more about the tax or nuclear issues at stake. In fact, rely-
ing on the expertise of trusted professionals may even be more rational 
than trying to fully understand an issue oneself. So we should not blame 
voters for knowing too little about the subject of a vote; substituting trust 
in heuristics and cues from others for one’s own knowledge is not behav-
iour specific to direct democracy.
Thus, since Swiss direct democracy, after more than a century, has not 
‘disastrously foundered on the reefs of cognitive incompetence’, we may 
reject Sartori’s proposition and concentrate on another question: to which 
degree do voters rely on a systematic appreciation of arguments or on 
cues, using simplifying strategies?
Kriesi’s (2005) extensive study on direct democracy, using VOX survey 
data from 148 votes between 1981 and 1999, provides interesting empiri-
cal evidence and insights. First of all, voters’ capacity should not be under-
estimated. In their majority, voters decide based on a systematic evaluation 
of pro and contra arguments. As expected, these are mainly the well 
informed, motivated and politically interested voters. Moreover, voters 
decide on arguments if they have strong preferences for an issue, based on 
personal knowledge (cf. also Colombo 2018). In contrast, heuristic voting 
is prevalent among voters with weak opinions, ambivalent towards or 
ignorant of the issue at stake. But the study also shows that differences 
between systematic and heuristic voting are not absolute: Systematic vot-
ing strongly relies on arguments provided by the political elites, many of 
which do not differ very much from heuristics and cues. Furthermore, 
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voters seem to make intelligent use of heuristics; they do not take them 
mechanically but look at the context and actors who provide them. Cues 
as such do not work—they need to be credible. In sum, the study comes 
to the conclusion that voters do not exhibit the ‘rational ignorance’ 
advanced by elitist theory, and that heuristic voting in general does not 
lead to irrational choices (see also Steenbergen and Colombo 2018). 
These findings, though, depend on one essential other factor: the cam-
paign and the quality of arguments offered by the political elites.
4.5.4  The Role of Political Parties and Their Campaign
Political parties play a crucial role for the outcome of the vote. In the ideal 
referendum case, when all of them support the project unanimously, suc-
cess is practically guaranteed, and this is not surprising. The compromise 
proposed anticipates possible opposition and presents a Pareto-optimal 
solution in which nobody is losing compared to the status quo ante. 
Interest groups also back the proposition. Therefore, opposition in the 
campaign is weak and cannot convincingly propose a more attractive 
solution.
This ideal situation is relatively rare. More frequently, some groups feel 
as losers and the political elites are split: one or more of the four govern-
mental parties defects and plays the game of an issue-specific opposition. 
This may happen already during parliamentary proceedings, or later by 
decision of the party rank-and-file, which not always back the position of 
their parliamentary delegation. In all these cases the risk of defeat for the 
government increases considerably. In earlier times the centre-right coali-
tion, as a natural majority after all, was able to win two out of three vota-
tions against left-wing opposition (Papadopoulos 1994, 137). With the 
Swiss People’s Party seeking a stronger right-wing profile by way of issue- 
specific opposition, the centre-right coalition is often split, putting gov-
ernment projects at risk. If two parties leave the grand coalition, a defeat 
of the governmental project is highly probable.
Many votations are located somewhere between these highly predict-
able extremes of government success or failure. If the outcome is pre-
dicted to be tight, two factors play an important role: the composition of 
the party coalitions of government and opposition and their campaigning 
(Kriesi 2005, 82–3). This is astonishing, as campaign money comes largely 
from interest groups. Yet to make propaganda trustworthy, it must be 
embedded in the campaign strategies of parties. Moreover, the intensity of 
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campaigns itself—and the amount of money spent for propaganda—varies 
a lot, depending on the closeness of the vote as expected by the elites (see 
also Hermann 2012, 16).
In all these cases, the outcome of a popular vote is characterised by high 
uncertainty. The outcome of campaigns, as tennis matches between two 
equally strong players, cannot be predicted from the past. Actors adapt 
and learn from past failure. Models of scientific research are able to analyse 
outcomes ex post, but they cannot predict the outcome of upcoming vota-
tions—which may even be beneficial for direct democracy. The main con-
clusions, however, are the following: political elites, their coalitions and 
campaign efforts play an important role for the outcome of a popular vote. 
Even so, they do not control direct democracy. The government coalition 
sometimes loses, and opposition success sometimes comes as a big sur-
prise. The government and political parties have learned to live with it.
4.5.5  Can Money Buy Votes?
After a votation, the losing side often complains that the other side has 
won because it had more money to spend on propaganda. Indeed, it hap-
pens that the antipodes in a votation have vastly different resources at 
hand: the propaganda budget of one side may exceed that of its opponents 
by a factor of 20. The question whether money and propaganda can buy 
votes is therefore of practical importance. In an early study on the subject, 
Hertig (1983) found a strong statistical correlation between success and 
propaganda in all 41 federal votations between 1977 and 1981. An even 
stronger correlation was found in 20 cases where the propaganda effort 
was very lopsided; that is, when the propaganda of one side dominated the 
other by a ratio of at least three to one. Predominant ‘yes’-propaganda 
won in 12 out of 13 cases, whereas predominant ‘no’-propaganda was 
successful in all seven cases.
These statistical correlations, however, do not provide proof that votes 
can be bought. It is possible that some votations would also have been 
won without money being spent on propaganda, or that one-sided propa-
ganda expenditure results from existing one-sided preferences. But the 
study gave rise to a public debate. How much money should be allowed 
to be spent by a single actor on a campaign, and to which degree is it toler-
able that one side may spend a lot more than the other? Swiss law guaran-
tees voters a constitutional right for fair conditions to express their 
undistorted preferences. Critics have argued that fair conditions of voting 
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have become an illusion because of the influence of powerful private actors 
and unequal, largely opaque campaign budgets.11 Bourgeois parties, the 
main beneficiaries of campaign money, have been hostile to any idea of 
regulating political propaganda as it exists in US states such as California 
and Colorado (Cronin 1989, 99–113).
The Hertig study was not the last word on the question. Further stud-
ies showed that the effect of propaganda was not the same for all issues: it 
was weaker on pre-dispositioned issues and when voters were confronted 
with ‘simple’ questions such as abortion or speed limits, which they can 
evaluate against the background of their own experience. Non- 
dispositioned issues and complex questions, however, are like empty labels 
on which propaganda can inscribe its clues because voters cannot decide 
on the basis of their personal experience (Hirter 1989; Longchamp 1991).
Kriesi (2009, 83–106; see also Chap. 5) also demonstrates that there is 
no simple equation between propaganda and success. As already men-
tioned, the amount of propaganda money spent will depend on the expec-
tations of the outcome. If a tight outcome is expected, more money is 
spent, and in these cases money may indeed be the deciding factor. In 
other situations, propaganda is of less influence. Moreover, campaign 
money does not play the same role for the government and the opposition 
camps. In the hands of the latter, it is worth more. In the end, according 
to Kriesi, truth is in the middle: money buys votes neither ever nor never, 
but sometimes it can be decisive.
4.6  conclusIons
4.6.1  Semi-direct Democracy: An Exceptional System
The Swiss system is at odds with mainstream political thought. It contra-
dicts theories of representative democracy that consider the people’s 
capacity too limited for rational direct policy choices. The Swiss case pro-
vides evidence that intensive political participation beyond the occasional 
election of MPs is possible and, as a complement to the parliamentary 
process, can play an important role. It shows that a substantial share of the 
11 At the time of writing (end of 2019), a left-wing popular initiative on ‘more transpar-
ency’ is pending in parliament. In the cantons of Fribourg and Schwyz, similar initiatives 
were accepted some years ago, and Geneva, Neuchâtel and Ticino already require their par-
ties to make certain donations public.
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population is willing to discuss and express their political preferences 
regarding even the most complex issues. And if there are shortcomings in 
the system of semi-direct democracy, Switzerland has neither suffered 
anarchy, as some have feared from the nineteenth century up to our days, 
nor has it experienced the political revolutions others had dreamed of.
Direct democracy and the complexity of modern society are not mutu-
ally exclusive. On the contrary, direct democracy is an important device for 
social learning processes which make people politically aware and able to 
deal with political complexity. The federation, the cantons and the com-
munes fulfil their responsibilities and functions just as well as political 
authorities in other countries—optimists might even say they do a better 
job under the constant watch of their citizens.
Moreover, direct democracy has changed the entire political system. 
Use of the referendum was an important factor that has led to the institu-
tional system of Konkordanz or consensus democracy (Neidhart 1970). 
Chapter 5 describes this historical process in which the referendum became 
an institutional constraint that induced cooperation among all major polit-
ical parties and led to negotiated legislation and mutual adjustment among 
interest groups. In other words, power-sharing is an institutional arrange-
ment to reduce the risks of defeat of government policies by referendum. 
These indirect effects of the referendum on the legislation process have 
become as important as the direct impact on specific policies.
4.6.2  Direct Democracy Between Integration and Polarisation
Does direct democracy polarise or integrate the people? There are good 
arguments for both views. On the one hand, direct popular choice amounts 
to the final word in a political conflict. For a certain time, all quarrels have 
ended. As a verdict, the popular vote is respected by the authorities and 
losers alike. The Federal Council, if defeated, would never say that the 
people’s decision was wrong. On the other hand, the campaign before a 
vote heats up conflict. The articulation of social and economic antago-
nisms, sometimes in polemic and populist ways, are a reliable means of 
mobilising the voters.
An empirical study on direct democracy between 1874 and 2006 gives 
evidence on whether political parties tried to mobilise or attenuate the 
basic cleavages in Switzerland in every one of the 537 votations, and how 
the cleavages were perceived by the participating citizenry (Linder et al. 
2008). It reveals that in a historical perspective, two of the 
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cleavages—dealing with religion and language—have cooled out during 
the twentieth century also amongst citizens. Quite astonishingly, however, 
we observe a rising polarisation of the citizenry along the cleavages of 
urban-rural and labour-capital sides in the final four decades. Is this con-
clusive proof that power-sharing by the political elites is in vain?
Against this inference speaks the fact that the evolution of cleavages is 
itself dependent on the conflict-laden modernisation of economy and soci-
ety. Institutional politics can only fuel or attenuate them. In Switzerland’s 
semi-direct democracy, the political elites are forced to seek compromises 
and thus generally attenuate basic societal cleavages. Popular votations, 
however, are the arena of issue-specific opposition, and political parties use 
this arena not only for attenuation but also for fuelling basic cleavages. 
Thus, parliamentary and direct democracy represent two different arenas. 
This does not mean a clear distinction of a parliamentary theatre of inte-
gration and a direct-democratic domain of polarisation. But political par-
ties, in regularly bringing up cleavages and using them to position 
themselves in their campaigns, string up the underlying conflict rather 
than attenuate it.
Thus, the role of direct democracy for societal conflict is ambiguous. 
On the one hand, we find integration. The vanishing of religious and lin-
guistic cleavages is evident, and it corresponds with the fact that political 
parties are trying to bridge these divides not only ahead of popular votes 
but also in seeking electoral gains throughout the country. On the other 
hand, in Swiss society there is evidence of deepening cleavages between 
rural and urban areas as well as between capital and labour. On many 
issues, the salience of these basic societal conflicts is regularly emphasised. 
Over the last two decades, the Swiss People’s Party launched a series of 
popular initiatives on supposedly unresolved immigration problems. Two 
of them, the prohibition of constructing minarets (2009) and ‘against 
mass immigration’ (2014), even succeeded against all odds. Uneasy feel-
ings towards Muslim practices and fear of Islamic fundamentalism as well 
as job market related worries, respectively, are part of the explanation. The 
300,000 Muslims—some 35% of which are Swiss citizens—and foreign 
residents more generally, however, had reasons to feel discriminated 
against. As in other cases, it was also controversial whether or not the 
minaret initiative violated constitutional or international law.
The risk of direct democracy is therefore twofold. One, the popular 
initiative can be exploited for electoral purposes, which is nothing new. 
But it makes a difference whether this is done by a marginal or a 
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governmental party. In the latter case, it is detrimental for the functioning 
of the governmental coalition. Two, initiatives can be discriminating 
against minorities, especially if they become part of a permanent electoral 
campaign and cannot themselves vote (Christmann and Danaci 2012). 
Thus, in dealing with social conflict in direct democracy, the political elites 
have a great responsibility for the quality of campaigns, which corresponds 
with the findings of Kriesi mentioned above. Direct democracy, in the 
twentieth century, was able to deal with salient conflicts thanks to political 
parties that renounced populism and sought broadly acceptable solutions. 
The hope is that this will last into the twenty-first century as well (see 
however Papadopoulos 2009).
4.6.3  Digitalisation: Opportunity, Risk—Or Both?
Digitalisation has profoundly changed political processes. Politicians use 
personalised websites and social media as a most effective device to mobil-
ise voters and bring their intents and messages immediately to the public, 
and this not only before elections. Citizens, in turn, use Twitter, Facebook 
or Instagram as swift, cheap and reliable communication channels open to 
all. These tools permit even groups lacking financial resources to articulate 
and debate their claims without intermediaries, to mobilise supporters in 
great number and to address politicians in a direct, public way. Finally, a 
great number of independent online newspapers present alternative issues, 
viewpoints and opinions—even those you would not normally find in the 
mainstream media.
No wonder that enthusiasts have celebrated digitalisation as a demo-
cratic revolution. And in a way, it really is one. But meanwhile it has 
become clear that this disruption is not always beneficial for democracy. 
Online interaction, rather than stimulating mutual respect and under-
standing, can lead to growing polarisation (Bail et al. 2018). It can also 
involve automated bots and anonymous, even malicious trolls which 
deliberately undermine deliberative standards. Tech giants such as Apple, 
Alphabet, Facebook or Twitter as well as parties and campaigners increas-
ingly rely on algorithms to display targeted news and ads. This accelerates 
processes of individualisation, fosters so called ‘eco chambers’ of like- 
minded users and creates diffidence in the polity: if the virtual is the new 
real, the real must be fake.
Swiss politicians were, for a long time, fascinated by electronic voting, 
for elections as well as for votations in direct democracy. Their hope was 
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to boost participation and rely on a new channel of communication: 
e-communication which voters use in their daily life. Some 20 years ago, 
several cantons began to introduce e-voting on an experimental base, 
allowing part of the citizenry to cast their vote using computers or smart-
phones. The results, after 15 years of experience in 15 cantons in more 
than 300 votations, were mixed. A comparison of two groups, one using 
e-voting, the other conventional voting (in person or via post), showed no 
difference in voting behaviour. Thus a ‘digital divide’ which many feared 
did not occur. But neither was voting turnout higher, nor did e-voting 
attract new groups of voters. E-voting also proved more complicated for 
voters than conventional forms of voting (Germann and Serdült 2017).12
When the federal government decided to extend e-voting to the federal 
level, opposition arose from an unexpected side, namely from digitalisa-
tion experts. They showed that existing e-voting software could not com-
pletely exclude the risk of being hacked. While irregularities at a single 
conventional polling station are usually negligible, they warned of a sys-
temic risk in e-voting which could lead to the distortion of an entire elec-
tion or votation. The Federal Council was unwilling to accept this risk and 
stopped the whole e-voting project in 2019.13
But how about collecting signatures for a popular initiative or a refer-
endum, in which digital tools can play their strengths of quick and massive 
mobilisation? In contrast to e-voting, we do not have systematic evidence 
on the effects of e-collecting (Bisaz and Serdült 2017). Few experiences of 
private actors such as wecollect.ch show that e-collecting is promising: in 
several cases, they succeeded in collecting in shorter time a greater part of 
the required signatures for a referendum (50,000) or a popular initiative 
(100,000) than actors on the street. In its present form, e-collecting plat-
forms, on request, mail an official form which the voter has to print, sign 
by hand and then mail back (postage is covered).
This is an acceleration, but does not use all possibilities of digitalisation: 
using an app or electronic signature, the voter could just click a ‘like’ or 
‘dislike’ button to sign a referendum or popular initiative. Examples from 
US-States and the Netherlands show that in this way the required number 
of signatures can be collected in no time. As a consequence, authorities 
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think about restricting or even banning e-collecting (Nuspliger 2018). 
The same could happen in Switzerland’s semi-direct democracy. If parlia-
ment passes a law for higher gasoline prices, for instance, any well-known 
platform for used cars could easily play a key role. Since some platforms are 
visited 50,000 times a day, they could collect the 50,000 ‘dislikes’ almost 
instantly, which makes the existing time limit of 100  days completely 
obsolete. At the same time, the decision to sign up to a referendum by a 
simple ‘dislike’ button resembles more an emotional reaction than a delib-
erative weighing up of the pros and cons of a collective decision.
In sum, digitalisation seems to play an ambiguous role especially for 
direct democracy. Its many advantages of mobilisation and extension of 
participative opinion-formation stand in contrast to an uncontrollable 
concentration of power in the hands of internet giants and a loss of quality 
deliberation. While optimists still ask: how can we use the innovations of 
digitalisation for democracy? pessimists worry: how can we protect democ-
racy from being undermined by the digital disruption?’
4.6.4  The Political Culture of Direct Democracy: 
Particularities and Limits
Some Swiss may criticise their politicians, parliament, the courts, the 
Federal Council, federalism or power-sharing. There is one thing, how-
ever, which almost nobody would criticise: the political rights of citizens 
and the institutions of direct democracy. In surveys, direct democracy 
regularly shows up as the most precious element of political institutions, 
and only few interviewees agree with the idea of restricting it in favour of 
more parliamentary power. The fear that some of the people’s political 
rights may be lost if Switzerland joins the EU is one of the most important 
obstacles for those few who are advocating membership. For many Swiss, 
‘democracy’ simply means ‘direct democracy’, and some even find it dif-
ficult to accept decisions of parliament or the Federal Council as truly 
democratic.
Against the background of the high esteem for such ‘self-rule’, one 
would expect the Swiss to be particularly participative in economic and 
social life. An unbiased outside observer, however, would probably be 
astonished that the values of direct democracy have not had more impact 
on Swiss society beyond politics. He would find no evidence that Swiss 
schools are more participative than those in the Netherlands or Italy. 
Moreover, our observer might be stunned to realise that workers and 
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employees in Switzerland have fewer formal rights of codetermination at 
the workplace than their colleagues in Germany or Sweden, despite the 
fact that Swiss employers and unions have been practising social partner-
ship for over 80 years, since 1937.
We may conclude that direct political participation has had little influ-
ence on Swiss economic and social life. Rather it is conceived as the spe-
cific Swiss culture of institutional democracy. With such a perspective, we 
can better understand the popularity of people’s political rights. They are 
valued as embodying the self-rule of citizens and ensuring control over the 
political elite. At the same time, direct democracy is considered to be one 
of the most important particularities distinguishing Switzerland from 
other countries.
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CHAPTER 5
Consensus Democracy: The Swiss System 
of Power-Sharing
5.1  The DevelopmenT of SwiSS 
ConSenSuS DemoCraCy
In earlier chapters, we have already mentioned some elements of power- 
sharing, consociational or consensus democracy, which the Swiss call 
‘system of concordance’. Its two main characteristics are the following: 
first, the executive is composed of a grand coalition. The goal is to let all 
important political forces participate in governmental politics, and to share 
the political responsibility with all these forces. Second, political behaviour 
within this grand coalition is geared towards permanent negotiation and 
compromise.
Power-sharing or consensus democracy is not unique to Switzerland. 
Variants of it can also be found in countries as different as Belgium, The 
Netherlands, India or South Africa. Power-sharing democracy is usually 
contrasted to the predominant, Anglo-American model of majoritarian 
democracy, in which the government is composed of a simple majority, 
holds all political power and can impose its decisions onto the minority. 
We return to this topic in Chap. 6. Here, we describe the Swiss power- 
sharing institutions, their development and functioning, and their strong 
points and weak spots.
If you ask the Swiss today why they like power-sharing, a typical answer 
is: ‘I find it fair that all languages, regions and political parties are represented 
in the government. This is better for our country because Switzerland 
needs political compromises rather than majority decisions’. History tells 
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us, however, that in 1848 the Swiss Constitution was partly conceived as a 
majoritarian democracy. For several decades a single party, the Radicals, 
held all the power in a majoritarian regime. The development of power-
sharing institutions and practice came only later. Three factors favoured 
the institutional conversion of the majoritarian regime into a power-
sharing system.
The first is federalism. The small, rural, mostly Catholic cantons had a 
veto position in federal decision-making right from the beginning. In a 
coalition with the French-speaking cantons, they were able to block a cen-
tralising project of a fully revised Constitution in 1872. This forced the 
ruling Radicals to seek political compromises for the successfully revised 
Constitution in 1874 (Linder et al. 2010; Swissvotes 2019). The second 
is the switch to a proportional electoral system in 1918/1919, which was 
the success of an alliance of Catholic-Conservatives and Social-Democrats 
fighting Radical predominance. As a consequence, the latter lost their par-
liamentary majority and the party system became increasingly fragmented. 
The third and most important factor is direct democracy. We have already 
mentioned, in Chap. 4, that the referendum is a strong incentive, even a 
constraint, to cooperate in the form of an oversized coalition because the 
risk of defeat in a popular vote is too high otherwise. This indirect, insti-
tutional effect of the referendum is as important as the direct effect of 
popular votes.
5.1.1  The Impact of the Referendum on the Composition 
of the Government
The reader is reminded of the period following the introduction of the 
optional referendum in 1874 (see Chap. 4), when the Catholic- 
Conservative minority used the device like a machine gun to shoot down 
important projects of the Radical majority (Aubert 1974, 43–4). The 
governing party could see no other possibility than to come to an arrange-
ment with the opposition. To integrate the Catholic minority, in 1891 the 
Radicals offered them one seat in their hitherto one-party government. 
The Conservatives accepted and henceforth had a voice in the Federal 
Council. But this also meant sharing political responsibility for the 
solutions proposed by the collegiate council. So, behind this ‘amicable 
agreement’ (Steiner 1974) there was coercive pressure to cooperate. 
The Radicals saw their large majority in parliament becoming useless if 
referendum challenges by the Catholic minority were not curbed. On the 
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other hand, the Catholic minority, who were unlikely ever to obtain a 
parliamentary majority, could win more through partial cooperation with 
federal government projects than through systematic opposition.
Motivations for a similar integration of other important political forces 
led to ever wider power-sharing in the Federal Council. First, the Catholic- 
Conservatives obtained a second seat in 1908. In 1928, the farmers and 
burghers, who ten years before had split off from the liberal Radicals, were 
(re-)integrated through their own seat in the government. In 1935, the 
Social-Democrats became the largest political force in the National 
Council (27% of seats). Some cities even had left-wing majorities. But 
Social-Democratic claims for inclusion in the federal government were 
turned down by the bourgeois parties because of the prevailing class strug-
gle. Only in 1943, when during World War II political integration and 
unity were needed more than ever, were the Socialists given their first seat. 
In 1959, following a short period with no Social-Democrat participation, 
the ‘magic formula’ was born: until 2003, the Federal Council comprised 
two Radicals, two Christian-Democrats (formerly Catholic-Conservatives), 
two Social-Democrats and one member of the Swiss People’s Party 
(Schweizerische Volkspartei [SVP], formerly the Farmers’ and Burghers’ 
Party). After the 2003 elections, when the SVP became the largest party 
in the National Council (28% of seats) at the expense of other bourgeois 
parties, it received a second seat—at the cost of the Christian-Democrats, 
which corresponded to the logic of ‘arithmetic’ power-sharing in the gov-
ernment (e.g. Altermatt 2009; Vatter 2018, 218ff.). Except for 2008–2015 
(see below, Sect. 5.5.1), this adjusted magic formula has remained intact 
(Table 5.1).
5.1.2  Impacts on the Legislative Process
Integrating the main political parties into a governmental coalition was 
important; co-optation gave the newly represented parties in government 
a feeling of being recognised as equal. Co-optation, however, was not a 
free lunch but a deal: the parties of the more inclusive government coali-
tion were expected to cooperate in parliament, supporting legislative com-
promises strong enough to survive a referendum. This was not always the 
case, and the lack of appropriate procedures for parliamentary compro-
mise even led to a crisis of the Swiss political system.
In the period of worldwide economic depression in the 1930s, the 
bourgeois coalition not only came under pressure from the political left, 
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but also from their ‘own’ interest groups who challenged bills put forth in 
parliament. Moreover, extremist forces, impressed by Nazi and fascist pro-
paganda in Germany and Italy, tried to undermine trust in democracy and 
parliamentary institutions. Their so-called ‘Frontist Initiative’, which pro-
posed a radically new political order, was overwhelmingly rejected in a 
popular vote, but legislation became blocked by referenda challenges from 
all sides.
The Swiss political authorities had to learn that the referendum could 
also be successfully used by relatively small groups, and that it was difficult 
to obtain a sufficient majority even with the support of interest groups and 
parties. In the years before World War II, the Federal Assembly began to 
rely on the ‘urgency clause’ of Article 89 of the Constitution (now Art. 
165), which authorises parliament to pass laws without a referendum 
when rapid decisions are required. Bypassing the ordinary legislative pro-
cedure in this way helped Switzerland to overcome the economic crisis of 
the 1930s. Democratic movements, however, criticised the utilisation of 
this clause, and a popular initiative in 1949 successfully restricted its scope 
(Box 5.1).
Table 5.1 Results of the government elections of 11 December 2019




Ueli Maurer SVP German Zurich Male 2008 213 votes
Simonetta 
Sommaruga
SPS German Bern Female 2010 192 votes
Alain Berset SPS French Fribourg Male 2011 214 votes
Guy Parmelin SVP French Vaud Male 2015 191 votes
Ignazio Cassis FDP Italian Ticino Male 2017 145 votes
Viola Amherd CVP German Valais Female 2018 218 votes
Karin Keller-Sutter FDP German St. Gall Female 2018 169 votes
Walter Thurnherra CVP German Aargau Male 2015 219 votes
aFederal Chancellor (=secretary general of the Federal Council)
bTotal votes possible: 246
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Box 5.1 Direct Democracy in Situations of Urgency and War1
Decision-making under direct democracy takes time, and its results 
can remain uncertain. How can the Swiss government cope with 
these difficulties in times of economic, security or public health cri-
ses, when rapid decision-making is necessary? We have to distinguish 
between two different mechanisms:
First, there is an ‘urgency (or emergency) clause’ in the Federal 
Constitution (Art. 165). It authorises parliament, if immediate 
action is necessary, to adopt laws without a referendum (dringlich 
erklärte Bundesgesetze). After excessive use in the 1930s, the urgency 
clause was revised twice. A first amendment, introduced in 1939, 
restricted the terms of ‘urgency’ and required an absolute majority 
of members in each chamber. In 1949, a second amendment stipu-
lated time limits. Under these rules, laws enter into force immedi-
ately but are limited in time. If a law has a constitutional base, it 
becomes subject to an optional and ‘abrogative referendum’. This 
means that the law is repealed after one year unless it is approved by 
the people. The Federal Assembly can even adopt urgent laws that 
are not based on the Constitution. Such an urgent federal act ‘must 
be repealed one year after being passed by the Federal Assembly if it 
has not in the meantime been approved by the People and the 
Cantons’ (Art. 165.3 FC 1999). Since 1949, therefore, direct 
democracy is no longer bypassed by the urgency clause, merely sus-
pended for maximum one year.
In practice, the Federal Assembly still has a large interpretation of 
‘urgency’. The old critique of Auer (1976) that the actual regula-
tions still provide too much power to the Federal Assembly is thus 
justified. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that legislation 
under direct democracy needs too much time if parliamentary deci-
sions have to be made in urgent situations such as natural catastro-
phes or—more recently—economic and public health disasters.
In addition to the urgency clause used by the Federal Assembly, 
the Swiss parliament delegated or recognised an urgency power of 
(continued)
1 Largely based on Aubert (1982, 1122ff.).
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The authorities also developed mechanisms for a better integration of 
political parties, interest groups and the cantons into the law-making pro-
cess. This pre-parliamentary process consists of two major stages. First, the 
Federal Council, when confronted with the need for new legislation, nom-
inates a study group or committee of experts to evaluate the necessity and 
various options for new rules. The composition of these committees is 
worth mentioning. Some members may simply be experts, but most of 
them combine knowledge and power. The Federal Council strives to 
appoint members who represent the standpoints of the different groups 
eventually affected by the proposed legislation. Individual members may 
well have a reputation as experts on an issue, but the composition of the 
committee is made as representative as possible in order to cover all posi-
tions that could prove divisive during later discussions. On the basis of 
these expert deliberations, the ministry or office in charge of a project 
writes a first draft of the bill.
Second, there is a ‘consultation procedure’ (Vernehmlassung), open in 
principle to anyone. In practice, the federal administration circulates the 
first draft to all cantonal governments, political parties, the most impor-
tant economic associations and other affected interest groups. However, it 
the Federal Council in times of World Wars I and II. These ‘full powers’—
not mentioned in the Constitution of 1874 but given to the Federal 
Council in 1914 and 1939—comprised all measures necessary to 
ensure the survival of the population, notably regarding food supply. 
Using its ‘full powers’ during World War II, the Federal Council 
issued some 1800 emergency ordinances, whereas the Federal 
Assembly, in the same period from 1939 to 1945, adopted merely 
220 laws and ordinances. The emergency ordinances of the Federal 
Council were subject to some control by parliament, but not to ref-
erenda. Today, Article 185 of the Constitution explicitly allows the 
Federal Council to ‘issue ordinances and rulings in order to counter 
existing or imminent threats of serious disruption to public order or 
internal or external security’. During the coronavirus pandemic, for 
instance, the Federal Council first relied on a special provision in the 
Epidemics Act but then also on Art. 185.
Box 5.1 (continued)
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is the authorities who decide who is affected by a particular project, and 
the right to be consulted does not mean that the authorities accept the 
views put forth. Only after evaluating the responses from this procedure 
does the Federal Council decide whether to continue with the project. If 
the decision is made to go ahead, it is next sent to parliament.
Both elements of the pre-parliamentary process pursue the same goal: 
to reduce the risk of a referendum challenge or, in the case of the obliga-
tory constitutional referendum, to reduce the chances of failure in the 
ensuing popular vote (Neidhart 1970; Papadopoulos 1999, 69–96; 
Blaser 2003).
5.2  The SySTem of power-Sharing: aCTorS 
anD The poliTiCal proCeSS
5.2.1  Actors and Their Functions
While in parliamentary democracies decision-making is concentrated in 
the parliamentary majority and the executive, the Swiss system of power- 
sharing is somewhat more complex: more actors are engaged who all, 
albeit with different functions, possess considerable influence. These actors 
have to cooperate, and we cannot find one sole centre of power. Figure 5.1 
shows the main actors and illustrates the legislation process as a ‘policy 
cycle’. Let us start with the actors.
Parliament: According to the ideas of the fathers of the Constitution of 
1848, the two chambers of parliament were the ‘highest authority’ of the 
federation. Indeed, until today parliament has a lot of power. Besides its 
main function of law-making, it elects the members of the Federal Council 
and the Federal Supreme Court, supervises the administration and can 
intervene in many ways. As there is no vote of confidence to bring down 
the government, parliament is free to criticise the projects of the Federal 
Council or even to reject them. Even so, the parliament has lost its insti-
tutional ‘supremacy’. Its freedom of action is restricted by direct democ-
racy, by the interest groups who intervene in the pre-parliamentary process 
and by the Federal Council who largely controls the agenda in foreign 
policy and prepares most draft bills. Although on paper, the Swiss parlia-
ment is one of the most powerful comparatively, in practice it has only few 
resources to compete with the government and its administration, on the 
one hand, and business interests and civil society groups, on the other 
(Vatter 2018, 312ff.).
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Direct democracy: Direct democracy began to play an important role 
when the people’s rights, originally restricted to the constitutional refer-
endum, were extended to the optional referendum (1874) and then the 
popular initiative (1891). In Chap. 4 we discussed their influence at large.
Interest groups: Their prime arena of influence is the pre-parliamentary 
procedure, which was institutionally formalised after World War II. Note 
that participation in expert committees and the pre-parliamentary consul-
tation is open not only to economic associations such as employer’s and 
trade unions, but also to other organisations, the cantons and even private 
individuals. We have already shown why in Switzerland interest groups 
have more influence in the pre-parliamentary phase than elsewhere: their 
additional bargaining power lies in the fact that they can use the referen-
dum threat as a pawn. Moreover, interest groups often play an important 
role in implementation: the ‘social partnership’ between labour and capi-
tal, or public-private partnerships once determined the design and execu-
tion of economic and social policies and remain important (see Box 5.2).
Cantons: In Switzerland, the 26 cantons are not only largely autono-
mous, more or less self-contained polities. They also, and increasingly, try 
to influence the federal government to act or refrain from acting in a cer-
tain way (e.g. Cappelletti et  al. 2014; Schnabel and Mueller 2017). In 
doing so they profit from their strong position as part of the federal sys-
tem, but also from the popular legitimacy of their governments and parlia-
ments. The self-organisation of the cantonal governments in the form of a 
‘Conference of Cantonal Governments’ has become an influential actor in 
Swiss politics. Cantonal representatives are regularly asked to sit on expert 
committees or attend parliamentary hearings. They can also directly peti-
tion the federal parliament using the cantonal initiative (e.g. Mueller and 
Mazzoleni 2016).
The federal administration: With the growth of the social and economic 
activities of the federation after World War II, the federal administration 
has acquired greater political influence, for two reasons. First, it has its 
own experts, who often direct the pre-parliamentary process. Second, it 
has all the feedback knowledge of implementation and evaluation, which 
in turn stimulates proposals for further legislative reform. In this way, the 
bureaucracy can also define its own interests.
The Federal Council: The main function of the Federal Council is the steer-
ing of the entire political process. Giving the go-ahead for most formal steps of 
decision-making, setting priorities in substance and time, the Federal Council 
has a great influence on the political agenda. It disposes of all the professional 
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resources of the administration, which allow it to prepare its own policy 
projects. Political leadership of the Federal Council is limited, however, 
for two main reasons: consensus in an all-party government is difficult to 
achieve and often minimal in scope, while parliament, not obliged to sup-
port the government because there is no vote of confidence, can always 
turn down the propositions of the Federal Council. In foreign policy, 
however, the leadership of the Federal Council is more pronounced.
5.2.2  The Policy Cycle
The policy cycle in Fig. 5.1 shows all the phases of the legislation process. 
It is conceived as an ongoing process of political problem-solving which 
starts with the first proposals for a new piece of legislation and provision-
ally ends with its implementation and evaluation. At every stage of the 
process, negotiations and the appropriate decisions may result in modifica-
tions, radical changes or even the abandonment of the project. If the pro-
gramme enters its final phase, this is not the end: sooner or later the 
experiences with implementation will lead to new propositions for a 
reform, and the policy cycle begins anew.
The pre-parliamentary procedure: The cycle starts with propositions for 
a new law or a constitutional amendment. This can happen through a 
popular initiative, parliamentary instruments or by the administration, 
which is the informal gateway for pressure groups seeking reform. If the 
Federal Council initiates the process, it also organises the whole pre- 
parliamentary stage of the process. Depending on the issue, it charges the 
administration or mandates an expert committee to draft a first project. As 
most committee experts are also representatives of interest groups, this 
gives them a first chance to announce their position and voice opposition. 
The actors declare under which conditions they would support or fight 
the bill. This leads to mutual adjustments, for instance, between employ-
ers and trade unions on a social-security reform. The administration will 
defend its own views and interests but will also exercise a mediating role in 
conflicts not directly negotiable between antagonistic interests.
The subsequent consultation process involves further organisations, 
each formulating a position that represents the view of their members. 
When evaluating the results of this procedure, the administration seeks to 
maintain only those aspects of the reform that have found sufficient sup-
port and to avoid leaving actors worse off than before. If the (modified) 
draft fulfils these conditions, the Federal Council has good reasons to 
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believe that the participating actors will support a constitutional amend-
ment in the obligatory vote or refrain from an optional referendum in the 
much more frequent case of an ordinary legislative proposal. In the form 
of a ‘Message of the Federal Council’, the draft then enters the parliamen-
tary procedure.
The parliamentary procedure: Each project has to find a majority in 
both chambers. If proceedings in the Council of State and the National 
Council end up with a difference in substance, negotiation procedures 
between the chambers are organised to align on the same solution. If this 
is not possible, the project has failed. For a long time in the twentieth 
century, the federal chambers had the reputation of being a weak parlia-
ment, accepting all too often and easily the compromises found between 
the vested interests in the pre-parliamentary phase. Today, such an appre-
ciation is certainly wrong (cf. Sciarini et al. 2015, 34ff.). In the 1990s, 
parliament has greatly reformed its own organisation and procedures 
which led, among others, to a strengthening of its legislative committees. 
These now standing committees have become the centres of intense delib-
eration and negotiation. Empirical studies show that today, parliament 
modifies the projects of the Federal Council much more than it did before 
(Lüthi 1997; Jegher 1999; Vatter 2018, 302). Parliament also realises its 
own projects by means of a parliamentary initiative, which bypass some 
aspects of the pre-parliamentary process.2
As mentioned earlier (Chap. 4), less than 7% of law projects passed by 
parliament are challenged by an optional referendum. This means that the 
chambers seem to have a good flair for avoiding the referendum risk. This 
is due to several factors. The draft coming from the pre-parliamentary 
procedures has a story to tell: parliament knows which issues were contro-
versial and which were accepted unanimously, and they are familiar with 
the positions of all-important actors, including the Federal Council. Many 
members of parliament have intense relations to interest groups whose 
points they support. The modifications of all phases of the procedure are 
documented for every article of the new bill. Thus, the members of parlia-
ment and its political groups know all about the difficulties and fragilities 
of any compromise that has been reached and can thus assess the 
2 The parliamentary initiative is to be distinguished from the popular initiative, which ema-
nates from outside parliament—although frequently used by political parties to mobilise 
their followers (Leemann 2015).
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robustness of a solution. The different parliamentary groups equally try to 
lower the risk of a referendum being called and look for a compromise that 
is supported by as many parties as possible.
The direct-democratic procedure: Our description of referenda campaign 
in Chap. 4 left one question open (Sciarini and Trechsel 1996): how come 
that a seemingly well-balanced project gives rise to opposition, and that 
opponents take the chance of an optional referendum? There are several 
answers to this question.
First, the referendum may be called by a governmental party. As already 
mentioned, consensus amongst the four of them is not always reached 
(Traber 2015). One or in rare cases two parties articulate their opposition 
in parliament, and a narrow majority, not giving in to the claims of the 
opposition, takes the risk or even accepts the challenge that its bill is tested 
in a popular vote. Sometimes the referendum is triggered by a cantonal 
branch of a political party despite the support of the governmental project 
by its national counterpart. This is because political parties are as ‘federal’ 
as the political system, and deviant positions of cantonal parties cannot be 
impeded by the national party. In similar situations and ways, the referen-
dum is called by strong interest groups.
Second, also small political parties or even grass-roots movements are 
able to launch a referendum, and in rare cases they may even be successful. 
In 1969, for example, the students of the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology called a referendum against a new law on their university—
and won (APS 1969). Even though the success of a small party or an 
outsider group is rare, they sometimes mobilise a considerable part of the 
electorate. This means that the compromise among political elites is not 
always accepted by ordinary people.
Third, if the consensus among political elites is fragile, a small outsider 
can initiate a chain reaction in which other actors or even governmental 
parties defect and join the referendum. This resembles a cargo ship loaded 
with barrels barely fastened. If one of the barrels gets loose and rolls from 
one board side to the other, many barrels will follow, and the ship keels 
over. These cases are hard to predict. Even though referendum cases make 
for less than 7% (one in about 15) of all legislative projects, they some-
times come as a surprise to the political elites.
The verdict of the people is binding and has immediate effect. In cases 
of referenda, the project is enacted or has failed. In cases of an accepted 
amendment to the Constitution, implementation may take more time if it 
needs an executing federal law, which has to pass a new policy cycle. This 
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will be especially cumbersome if the amendment is due to a popular 
initiative accepted against a (large) majority among the political elites.
The administrative procedure: Once a project has received parliament’s 
assent and gotten the required majority in a popular vote, it enters into 
force. The implementation is an important part of the policy cycle (e.g. 
Varone 2007; Kissling-Näf and Wälti 2007; Sager et al. 2018). In many 
cases, policy programmes for proper implementation have to be developed 
or revised. As most programmes are implemented in close cooperation 
with the cantons, negotiations with their administrations take place. It is 
one of the characteristics of Swiss federalism that the national authorities 
have little means of coercion and greatly respect the autonomy and prefer-
ences of cantonal authorities in the implementation process. Resistance 
Box 5.2 Social Partnership and Public-Private Partnerships—The 
Second Arenas of Power-Sharing
A) Social partnership
In the first decades of the twentieth century, industrial relations 
between labour and capital were characterised by class struggle, 
strikes and lockouts. This ended on the eve of World War II, when 
the Federal Council urged leaders of employers’ and labour organ-
isations in the mechanical-engineering industry to resolve their con-
flicts by ways of negotiation and cooperation, which would better 
help to overcome the economic crisis. This marked the beginning of 
a new era: the ‘Labour Peace Convention’ (Arbeitsfrieden) of 1937 
invited employers and unions to resolve all their conflicts through 
negotiation and to renounce on strike and lockouts. In the following 
decades, similar conventions were concluded in most other indus-
tries. Thus, industrial relations are characterised as ‘social partner-
ship’ (Sozialpartnerschaft), leading to a typical pattern of social 
policy. Social policy was developed contractually between employers 
and unions, the circle of beneficiaries was restricted to the workforce 
in the respective industries. Both sides relied on the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’: state intervention should be the exception, restricted 
to those problems which social partnership was unable to resolve. 
This pattern of a ‘liberal welfare state’ has gradually changed in the 
(continued)
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last decades. As elsewhere, globalisation somewhat reduced the 
bargaining power of trade unions. As the contractual way became 
unfavourable for them, they changed their strategy and began to rely 
on legislation instead. The passage from contract to public law trans-
formed Switzerland into a ‘normal’ welfare state, more and more 
responsible for all sorts of social policy. The unions were successful 
because their strategy of legislation let all people, not only those 
working in the industries, benefit from welfare and defend its bene-
fits also by popular votations (Trampusch 2010). So far, employers 
and unions have kept social partnership in their own hands while 
the EU wants to gain control on Swiss industrial relations. This is 
presently one of the major issues of discussion in the negotiations 
between Switzerland and the EU, who both seek to put their coop-
eration on firmer grounds.
B) Public-private partnerships
Intensive cooperation between government and private actors is 
known in most economically developed democracies. It has a long 
tradition in Switzerland. As early as the late nineteenth century, pri-
vate organisations, especially in agriculture, fulfilled certain func-
tions for the federal government, which at the time lacked its own 
professional administration (Vatter 2018, 174). Indeed, Swiss gov-
ernments at all levels sought to avoid building up a large bureau-
cracy. Whenever possible, the authorities preferred to use private 
organisations or create semi-private (parastatal) organisations to 
implement public policies. In agriculture, dozens of parastatal organ-
isations proposed and policed regulations and organised the pricing, 
distribution and marketing of products (Jörin and Rieder 1985). 
The intensive cooperation between private organisations and the 
state is also known as ‘neo-corporatism’. We doubt, however, 
whether one can speak of neo-corporatism in the case of Switzerland 
(see also Vatter 2018, 203ff.). Elsewhere, the term denotes tripartite 
arrangements between labour, capital and the state to regulate eco-
nomic conflicts by concerted action. The Swiss case differs in many 
Box 5.2 (continued)
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from the cantons may impede implementation. Conversely, negotiation 
and compromises may lead to intense cooperation, which in turn facili-
tates the implementation of federal policies. Thus, we may speak of a form 
of vertical power-sharing also at that stage. Evaluations, finally, may 
kickstart new policy cycles (cf. Sager et al. 2017).
5.3  The feaTureS of power-Sharing
5.3.1  The Main Characteristics of Political Compromise: No 
Single Winner Takes All, Everybody Wins Something
The entire political process aims at reaching a political compromise. 
Instead of a (small) majority that imposes its solution onto a (large) minor-
ity, we find mutual adjustment: no single winner takes all, everybody wins 
something. Some people attribute this behaviour to a specifically ‘Swiss’ 
respects. First, there is no equilibrium of power between employers 
and unions: the latter are weaker. Second, concerted action is often 
avoided because arrangements are decentralised and vary consider-
ably from sector to sector. Third, arrangements between private 
actors and the state also comprise social, cultural or environmental 
policies and are not always tripartite, but sometimes bilateral and 
competitive as in pluralism. It is thus more appropriate to speak of 
public-private partnerships.
Since the 1990s, public-private partnerships have changed con-
siderably. With liberalisation and globalisation, many semi-public or 
parastatal organisations have disappeared or been privatised. This is 
particularly the case with agriculture, a domain where World Trade 
Organization (WTO) regulations forced Switzerland to abandon 
great parts of its traditional protectionism. While many public- 
private partnerships still exist or expand into new domains, liberalisa-
tion generally leads to a more restricted role of the ‘public’ and to 
the exposure of the ‘private’ to competition from both within and 
outside the country (Mach 2007, 2014).
Box 5.2 (continued)
5 CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY: THE SWISS SYSTEM OF POWER-SHARING 
182
culture. Indeed, there are some studies that show such differences: German 
economic elites, for instance, seek less compromise in conflict and use 
hierarchical power more than their Swiss counterparts (Kopper 1993). 
From a political science perspective, however, the effect of institutions 
seems to be paramount. The referendum challenge, the strong influence 
of cantons and interest groups as well as the multiparty system amount to 
formidable veto points that simply do not allow for majority decisions and 
compel political actors to cooperation and compromise. This means that 
every actor must renounce on some of their expectations, which is not 
always easy (Box 5.3).
Box 5.3 ‘No single winner takes all, everybody wins something’: 
Conditions of Good or Poor Compromise
Context
The idea that ‘no single winner takes all, everybody wins some-
thing’ has not always worked out. Mutual adjustments were most 
successful in the period leading up to the 1970s, when economic 
growth allowed the distribution of more public goods. In the after-
math of World War II—an experience that unified the small coun-
try—many old antagonisms between ideologies had disappeared. 
Optional referenda were few and the success rate of obligatory 
ones high.
Consensus became more difficult to achieve after the recession of 
the 1970s. With lower economic growth after the first oil crisis, 
there was less surplus to distribute. Political redistribution in social 
security and the health system became a zero-sum game: what one 
actor won another lost. Ecological sustainability became a political 
issue and prompted new conflicts and actors. The party system frag-
mented and new social movements arose. In conflicts over industrial 
and post-industrial values, and with the rise of neo-liberalism and 
neo-conservatism, part of the basic Swiss consensus melted away. At 
the end of the 1980s, important legislation failed or remained 
incomplete. In the last three decades, globalisation functioned as 
pressure from the outside, leading to quicker and larger steps of 
political innovation, but also to higher polarisation, the demarcation 
of winners and losers of internationalisation, and to the deepening of 
old cleavages such as that between cities and countryside.
(continued)




The feasibility of ‘no single winner takes all, everybody wins 
something’, then, greatly depends on the specific issue. As long as 
money is involved, and as long as there is plenty available, compro-
mises easily can be reached. But conflicts can also involve ‘indivisi-
ble’ goods. For example, in 1977 the Federal Council proposed to 
introduce daylight saving time in line with many West-European 
countries. Farmers refused to put their clocks one hour forward in 
spring and then back again in autumn, claiming their cows would 
produce less milk. The typical Swiss compromise was not feasible 
here: advancing the clock half an hour would have helped nobody. It 
was easy for the well-organised farmers to call for a referendum, and 
their challenge was successful. However, living on a ‘time isle’ in the 
centre of Europe was not very practical. Two years later, parliament 
passed a new bill and the farmers gave in. Similarly, compromise can 
be very difficult if an issue involves moral values such as abortion or 
same-sex marriage. Such topics are considered by many people to be 
a question of principle. Contrary to daylight saving time, pragmatic 
experience would not change preferences because interpretations 
will go both ways. In Switzerland, the abortion issue has led to sev-
eral popular votations triggered by both sides. Neither proponents 
of liberalisation nor conservative opponents finding the status quo 
too liberal, however, could win a majority. Even the federalist idea of 
letting the cantons decide was rejected: while liberals accepted that 
cantons could practice different solutions, conservatives insisted that 
in no canton any liberalisation should be permitted. In other coun-
tries, such deadlocks are often solved when elections bring new 
majorities and a new government. Not so in Switzerland, where the 
government coalition rests the same. The deadlock lasted for more 
than 20 years before a solution was found. The example shows that 
mutual adjustment has its limits in Swiss politics, too.
What is a good compromise?
Obviously, there are compromises and compromises. A key 
distinction between good and bad compromises is not so much 
how many persons or groups can live with it, but rather who pays 
the price. Good compromises in this sense are those whose costs are 
shouldered by the actors participating in its forging. If employees 
(continued)
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5.3.2  The Technique of Political Compromise: Compensations 
That Transform Conflict from Zero-Sum into Positive-Sum Games
Consensus, theoretically, requires a Pareto optimal solution in which no 
actor is left with losses. As illustrated in Box 5.3, it can be difficult or even 
impossible to meet this condition. In times of general budget cuts, for 
instance, compromises must distribute losses, and one of the few possibili-
ties to reach consensus is a ‘symmetry of sacrifices’, whereby each actor 
thinks that others agree to bear similar losses as she is willing to pay. But 
even under normal conditions, Pareto optimal solutions are not always at 
hand. Similar to residents around airports or along busy roads who are 
sometimes remunerated for their sacrifices in favour of others, actors in the 
political process receive compensation. Compensation is facilitated if the 
agenda of the issues to be negotiated is widened or the number of partici-
pants increased. The compromise reached under these circumstances may 
suffer from little effectiveness, though, if it violates the famous Tinbergen 
Rule: the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen stated that ‘to successfully 
achieve n independent policy targets, at least the same number of indepen-
dent policy instruments are required’ (Schaeffer 2019).
5.3.3  Cooperation, Trust and the Deliberative 
Learning Processes
Game theory shows that in a single game, self-interested actors defect 
from cooperation when it offers them an extra profit. This risk is consider-
ably reduced if the same actors play many games. In this case, players may 
agree to work more for the same pay but receive an extra week of 
holidays in exchange, both the costs and the benefits of the compro-
mise accrue to them. If, however, their extra holiday is funded 
entirely by lower social benefits provided for future employees, the 
costs of the compromise are shifted onto groups without any repre-
sentation and influence. That is one of the reasons why the Swiss 
consultation procedure foresees feedback from all affected sides, 
even if that is often difficult to achieve. It also means that to be 
heard, interests must organise politically.
Box 5.3 (continued)
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mutually sanction defection, which then becomes less attractive. This is 
exactly the case in a steady power-sharing arrangement, as it allows actors 
to develop mutual trust. An additional advantage for cooperation is found 
if politics involves different cleavages for which the opposed camps, for 
instance the left or the young, are not the same. This leads to different 
coalitions from issue to issue, cementing an important aspect of the ongo-
ing process of power-sharing: political actors opposed today on a particu-
lar issue may find themselves as coalition partners tomorrow on a different 
issue. Mutual respect and amicable relations even with the opponent (of 
today) are the result.
Indeed, studies on deliberation provide empirical evidence that under 
conditions of power-sharing, political opponents have more respect for 
each other and listen more to the arguments of the other side than in 
majoritarian settings (Bächtiger et al. 2005; see also Bernauer and Vatter 
2019). Thus, power-sharing allows for deliberative learning processes. 
The weak spot is, however, that conditions for changing coalitions are not 
always given. In the 1980s, for instance, the three parties of the centre- 
right regularly overruled the smaller green-left parties on major issues of 
public finance, energy and the environment. Behind the screen of all-party 
power-sharing, informal majoritarian politics were practised. This is a bad 
constellation—instead of combining advantages, informal majoritarian 
and formal power-sharing politics combine the disadvantages: the ruling 
majority refuses to compromise and is not exposed to the risk of losing 
power through competitive elections as would be the case in a majoritarian 
system. In such a position, the ‘eternal’ majority can afford not to learn—
for Deutsch (1967) a pathological use of power.
5.3.4  Political Elitism and Its Limits
Power-sharing produces strong formal and informal contacts amongst the 
entire political elite. Lijphart’s (1969) early theory of ‘consociationalism’ 
proposes that power-sharing also leads to the development of common 
values and attitudes.3 Elites develop a common way of understanding 
problems which must be solved, and they learn to adopt perspectives that 
go beyond their specific group interests. Does this mean that power- 
sharing leads to a cartel of ‘the establishment’, neutralising electoral 
3 For a recent special issue devoted to consociationalism entirely, see Bogaards and 
Helms (2019).
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competition and abolishing democratic accountability? In the Swiss case, 
it may be argued that indeed elections do not lead to a change of roles 
between government and opposition and therefore play a minor role for 
democratic control. Direct democracy, however, is a strong corrective to 
elitist consociationalism. Every political party and its leaders have to 
regularly defend their decisions before a people’s vote. This imposes both 
procedural and substantive limits to elitism.
5.4  The CriTiCS of SwiSS ConSenSuS DemoCraCy
5.4.1  The Referendum as an Instrument of Vested Interests
We already showed that the referendum is a pawn in the hands of interest 
groups, giving them additional influence in all matters of legislation. Thus 
direct democracy, instead of being the voice of the people, has partly 
become the instrument of vested interests. Indeed, this critique has some 
traction, especially for the long period of time during which the Swiss 
parliament was weak and often adopted the pre-parliamentary compro-
mise struck by interest groups without much modification. A famous con-
stitutionalist went as far as to say that the law is no longer the result of 
parliamentary proceedings but of negotiating non-democratic, vested 
interests (Huber 1971).
Today, the image of a Verbandsstaat, that is, a state of vested interests 
that dominates parliament, corresponds much less to political reality. Not 
only has parliament become more vocal in shaping legislation (Sciarini 
et al. 2015; Sciarini 2007), but due to globalisation some of the strongest 
interest groups in the domestic market, namely those of agriculture and 
industry, have lost some influence. Also, many traditional coalitions, such 
as those in industry or between employers and unions, are split into trade- 
oriented versus protectionist, often neutralising each other.
5.4.2  Inequalities of Influence
The weak spot of democratic pluralism is that it cannot guarantee fair 
competition in the sense that all interest groups and parties have the same 
chances of political influence. According to the theory of collective action 
(Olson 1965), the negotiating power of a group depends on two factors: 
its organisational ability (e.g. to mobilise members) and its capacity to 
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deny contributions that other actors need. This leads to stark inequalities 
of influence. In negotiations and law-making by mutual adjustment, the 
‘haves’ are better off than the ‘have-nots’, whose refusal to compromise 
remain without effect. Moreover, organisations which defend specific 
short-term benefits for their members are likely to be stronger than those 
promoting general and long-term interests.
Big companies, for instance, can easily mobilise against new regulations 
on their market. Their threat to leave Switzerland is a strong argument for 
parliament not to pass such a bill. Consumer organisations, on the other 
hand, have more difficulties. They constitute much larger but probably 
less powerful groups. Their interests may conflict, as can be shown in the 
case of genetic engineering: part of the consumers may favour genetically 
modified products, so only the other part will mobilise against them. The 
consumer organisations’ only means is the consumer boycott, rarely effi-
cient in the short run. Therefore, they do not wield a plausible threat and 
possess no trade-in in negotiations. Environmental groups in particular 
face the problem of having to fight for a long-term public good from 
which nobody can be excluded, such as clean air and rivers. They are pop-
ular and outnumber the biggest political parties in membership. Faced 
with vested business interests, however, they are not able to articulate 
comparable threats.
On the whole, negotiations do not necessarily eliminate the twofold 
objections to political pluralism: the ‘haves’ retain their advantage over the 
‘have-nots’, and negotiations amongst interest groups favour particular 
short-term benefits at the expense of general long-term interests (Scharpf 
1970; Huber 1971, 589–630). One may object that these inequalities are 
not peculiar to Swiss semi-direct democracy but apply to all pluralist sys-
tems. What is more, negotiating in the shadow of direct democracy offers 
even weaker actors defending diffuse interests a chance to use the referen-
dum as a last resort.
5.4.3  Lack of Innovation?
Negotiation and compromise seem to have provided important advan-
tages. In the absence of electoral change, there are no abrupt discontinui-
ties in federal policy. The sobering effect of negotiation cools down 
ideological intransigence and promotes pragmatic solutions. Cooperation 
in committees, government and parliament leads to mutual adjustments 
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where learning processes occur over the substantive issues of legislation. 
Reaching a satisfactory compromise may take more time than a majority 
decision, but once the agreement becomes law most actors are prepared to 
accept it. This increases the chances of new laws and programmes being 
implemented (Abromeit and Pommerehne 1992; Armingeon 2003; 
Abromeit 1993; Poitry 1989) and makes for sustainable policy decisions 
(Hirschi et al. 2002).
Yet, criticism of consensus democracy is as old as its praise. Political 
scientists have noted that consociationalism renders a strong opposition 
impossible. Elections do not provide an opportunity for government and 
opposition to alter places as they do in pure majority democracies. 
Therefore, the Swiss system lacks the larger innovatory and social learning 
processes that are brought about by complete changes of power—it is not 
the country of revolutions but evolutions.
Two scholars proposed radical modifications to stimulate innovation. 
The political scientist Raimund Germann (1975) proposed scenarios for a 
comprehensive institutional transformation into a majoritarian parliamen-
tary system. He focused on the problem of incrementalism in domestic 
politics and later European integration. In his view, the Swiss had to adapt 
to the much faster pace of decision-making in the EU (Germann 1990). 
The economist Silvio Borner (Borner et  al. 1990, 153ff. and 169ff.; 
Borner and Rentsch 1997), in turn, focused on the negative economic 
impact of negotiation practices. In this view, the strong position of interest 
groups in the legislative process led Swiss enterprises towards seeking state 
rents instead of taking their chance on the market. Industries, getting 
short-term benefits from protectionism, would in the long run lose their 
capacity to innovate and compete on the international markets.
The proposition of both Germann and Borner was clear: more compe-
tition is necessary for Swiss politics and for the Swiss economy as well. 
Their message was appreciated neither by politicians nor the public. The 
reason was simple: both were honest enough to name the price of more 
political competition. Installing a bi-polar competitive system would 
require not only less direct democracy but also more centralisation and 
less bicameralism. Direct democracy and federalism, however, are sacro-
sanct in the eyes of both citizens and politicians. So, the Swiss stay with 
their consensus democracy.
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5.5  ConSenSuS DemoCraCy unDer STreSS
5.5.1  The ‘Konkordanz’ Crisis of 2008
The last three decades have brought increasing volatility in elections. 
Between 1991 and 2007, the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische 
Volkspartei [SVP]) more than doubled its share of the electorate, became 
the biggest political party nationwide and was given a second seat in the 
Federal Council in 2003. Their success came at the cost of the political 
centre, Radicals (Freisinnig Demokratische Partei [FDP]) and Christian- 
Democrats (Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei [CVP]), while the left 
with Social-Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz [SPS]) and 
Greens gained initially, then stagnated for a long time and eventually 
gained again at the 2019 elections (Fig. 5.2).
Many of the smaller parties did not survive, disappeared from the politi-
cal arena or merged with others, such as the Liberals with the Radicals 
(FDP). Higher electoral volatility is nothing extraordinary as such, but it 
was accompanied by increasing political polarisation. The SVP, in taking 
over the old xenophobe parties, moved to the right and in many issues 
attacked not only the left but also the centre. This considerably changed 
the Swiss party system. The bourgeois alliance is partly broken, leading to 
a tri-polar system of political forces: a populist right, a green-socialist left 




























































Right (SVP) Centre (FDP+CVP) Left (SPS+Greens)
Fig. 5.2 Seats in the National Council of the five main political parties, 
1919–2019. (Source: own figure based on data from Bundesamt für Statistik 
[BFS; 2019])
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The rise of the SVP began in 1992 when its de facto leader, Christoph 
Blocher, successfully mobilised against the European Economic Area 
(EEA) Treaty. It became the party of Eurosceptics and later systematically 
opposed the Konkordanz also on issues of immigration, social policy, and 
institutional reform. Originally confined to an electorate in the Protestant 
German-speaking cantons, the SVP went on to win new voters all over 
Switzerland and from all social strata. The party is much more profession-
alised in its organisation and has many resources for costly campaigns. It 
fosters its nationalist-conservative profile in an aggressive, often populist 
style (Mazzoleni 2003), thus becoming the political agenda setter in 
the media.
This began to amount to much more than ‘just’ issue-specific opposi-
tion. The other parties accordingly accused the SVP of betraying the spirit 
and workings of the Konkordanz. This was a blame levied particularly 
against Blocher. Elected in 2003 as the second representative of his party 
to the Federal Council (see above, Sect. 5.1.1), Blocher continued to act 
as an informal leader of the SVP.  In late 2007, a coalition of Social- 
Democrats, Christian-Democrats and Greens successfully plotted his 
replacement by a more moderate SVP member. The reaction of the party 
was furious. It declared that it felt no longer represented in the Federal 
Council, excluded the two serving federal councillors elected as SVP 
members from its parliamentary group and declared ‘fundamental opposi-
tion’ to the government.
This incident developed into a real crisis of the Konkordanz, even if 
only for a rather short period.4 The SVP’s ‘fundamental opposition’ itself 
lasted only a year (Church and Vatter 2009). Its leaders realised that a 
single party alone could not break up the system of power-sharing: the 
institutional constraint for cooperation among the rest of the governmen-
tal parties was stronger. Thus, when one of the two (former) SVP minis-
ters resigned in late 2008, the party was quick to claim his seat and even 
re-proposed Blocher, to whom most other parties still strongly objected. 
4 As Widmer & Häusermann (2018) rightly observe, the willingness of political parties to 
compromise varies greatly from year to year. Years of low agreement, notably between 2003 
and 2015, have been called ‘discordance’ (Widmer 2013, 234; Widmer 2015, 294). We 
doubt, however, if this concept is of analytical value because we cannot see significant cor-
relations with the political events leading to a crisis of the consensus system. More impor-
tantly, ‘concordance’ is an institutional arrangement. None of its elements—with the 
exception of one or two partisan seats on the Federal Council—have ever been seriously put 
into question (cf. also Vatter 2016, 72; O’Leary 2019, 570).
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The result was a compromise in that not Blocher but the former leader of 
the party was elected—even if only just, with 122 votes against 121 for a 
more moderate SVP member (APS 2008).
The final step of the governmental reintegration of the largest political 
party occurred in late 2015, when the other former SVP member resigned. 
This time, Blocher signalled no interest at all and the party put forth three 
official candidates, one from each linguistic region. Eventually, the French- 
speaking Guy Parmelin was chosen, thus becoming the first SVP Federal 
Councillor speaking that language (APS 2015). Thus was restored the 
(adjusted) magic formula of 2003: two SVP, two SPS, two FDP and one 
CVP member. All government elections since then (in 2018 and 2019) 
have confirmed this distribution of seats.
5.5.2  Power-Sharing in a Polarised Parliament
Growing political polarisation raises the question whether parliamentary 
compromise is still possible. Indeed, until the end of the 1980s, a relatively 
stable block of the three bourgeois parties had few difficulties to find a 
majority in cases of opposition from the left. With the partial disintegra-







































































































Bourgeois success against left-green Success against isolated SVP
Centre-left success against right-bourgeois camp Right-bourgeois success against centre-left
Fig. 5.3 Most frequent winning coalitions in the National Council, 1996–2019 
[%]. (Source: own figure based on data from Smartmonitor [2019]. Note: shown 
are the shares of different winning coalitions. Bourgeois parties = CVP, FDP and 
SVP; Centre-left = SPS [and Greens] and SVP; right-bourgeois = FDP and SVP)
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acts as an issue-specific opposition almost as often as the Social-Democrats 
(Smartmonitor 2019), so the government coalition is exposed to opposi-
tion from both sides. No wonder that the media today often blame parlia-
ment for being incapable to reach a consensus.
An exhaustive analysis of about 8000 decisions of the National Council 
from 1995–2004, however, reveals a slightly different picture (Schwarz 
and Linder 2007). Blocked situations in which parliament cannot decide 
on a governmental proposition are, at least statistically, very rare, and par-
liamentary decisions are still characterised by manifold winning coalitions 
that vary from issue to issue. Particularly Christian-Democrats sometimes 
vote with the Social-Democrats and Greens, which means that the National 
Council is practising the game of power-sharing in a more open way than 
in the 1980s. In the long run, issue specific coalitions also change, an indi-
cation that political trends are more important than stark ideologies. 
Finally, the study shows that the political centre—the Christian-Democrats 
and the Radicals—is the most important policy shaping actor in the parlia-
mentary arena. Their coalition is most successful in forging winning coali-
tions (Fig. 5.3). The centre also benefits from situations found in many 
controversial issues in which propositions from the left and from the con-
servative right cancel each other out. These findings contrast with public 
opinion, which perceives the SVP as the strongest force and agenda setter. 
The SVP has electorally benefitted from polarisation but in some way pays 
for its strategy of fierce and sometimes populist opposition with less influ-
ence in the parliamentary arena.
Foreign observers sometimes designate the SVP as the prototype of 
European populist parties. Indeed, the SVP was one of the first to be anti- 
elitist, and to denounce its political antagonists with a blunt rhetoric, 
claiming to be the only legitimate voice of the people. Constant funda-
mental opposition and sometimes radical proposals against European inte-
gration and immigration were key to its political success. The SVP became 
the favourite political party of all segments of society which were the real 
or imagined losers of modernisation or threatened by the process of glo-
balisation. All of these elements resemble the populism of right-wing par-
ties in other European countries.
Yet there are also substantial differences. The SVP has been part of the 
Swiss government for several decades, remaining bound and integrated 
into the ‘grand coalition’ with the other main parties. Also, the party does 
not have to call for more direct democracy to better reflect the will of the 
people. Instead, it used the instruments of direct democracy and in fact 
 W. LINDER AND S. MUELLER
193
made the experience that it does not always represent ‘the will of the 
people’. Other parties complain about the populism and radical proposals 
of the SVP, but no one would try to exclude them from the pluralist 
discourse as we can observe in other countries. Instead, the other parties 
have learned to live with a ‘tamed’ form of populism, which is not only 
the privilege of the SVP. In that sense, the SVP is both emblematic and 
antinomic of populist parties elsewhere.
5.5.3  The Pressure of Globalisation
Globalisation opens national economies, reduces economic protectionism, 
and stimulates market competition, liberalisation and privatisation. 
Politically, international authorities and supranational organisations 
become important regulators. The sharp distinction between domestic 
and foreign policy fades away, the national state loses autonomy and sees 
its own sphere of influence vanishing. Switzerland is exposed to all these 
general effects. In Chap. 3, we presented the particular situation of 
Switzerland in the process of Europeanisation. Good relations with the 
EU are paramount for the Swiss economy. In not being a member of the 
EU, the Swiss government tries to develop them by the way of ‘bilateral 
treaties’. It pays a high price for the bilateral way. Equal treatment of 
Switzerland with regard to its member states is a legitimate interest of the 
EU. This means that Brussels influences regulation much beyond the 
bilateral treaties, without the Swiss having any influence on the content 
and development of the EU’s acquis communautaire. Therefore, 
Switzerland today is highly integrated into the European market and has 
little chance not to do so. Globalisation in Switzerland, to a high degree, 
means Europeanisation. This has also changed the political structures and 
processes of power-sharing (Fischer 2007, 2014):
• The dynamics of EU economic integration put Swiss politics under 
permanent pressure. This may be one of the reasons why power- 
sharing, despite polarisation, is working.
• The agenda of Brussels is conceived in Swiss politics as an imperative 
for liberalisation, privatisation and economic reform. Europeanisation 
has changed the balance of powers. Export industries and parts of 
the consumer interests use ‘Brussels’ as their ally and have become 
stronger. In contrast, unions, farmers, artisan industries and other 
actors of the domestic market have lost a considerable part of their 
influence.
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• Internationalised regulation in Switzerland exceeds domestic law in 
volume and growth. It is the government and its diplomacy which 
control the agenda in international relations and who are the actors 
of treaty making. Parliament is involved in early consultations but in 
cases of a treaty can only reject or accept the government’s proposi-
tion. Thus, it loses influence in many issues.
These developments have led to kind of a two-pace regime. Decision- 
making in globalised affairs has become different to conventional patterns 
of power-sharing. In the ‘globalised regime’, the executive is much more 
in the centre of the process. Some of the classical veto positions are weak-
ened: pre-parliamentary consultation is more selective, vested interests of 
domestic policies have less bargaining power and the policy-shaping role 
of parliament is reduced. Federalism, the strongest veto position besides 
the referendum, can be overruled, as was illustrated in Sect. 3.5.3 of Chap. 
3. In contrast to the incremental process in domestic issues, policy- shaping 
and -making in Europeanised affairs are developing a different pattern 
(Mach et al. 2003): innovation passes more quickly and makes bigger steps.
However, the shortcuts of this process, which bypass or reduce the veto 
power of many actors, have their price. Europeanisation and globalisation 
(re)produce many salient issues fuelling polarisation among the political 
elites and sometimes also between them and ‘ordinary’ people. Moreover, 
also the cleavages between urban and rural areas as well as between differ-
ent social strata have become stronger, both in the perception of citizens 
as well as during certain popular votations (Linder et al. 2008; Seitz 2014; 
Swissvotes 2019).
5.6  ConCluSionS
5.6.1  Swiss Democracy: An Exceptional System
Thus far, we have discussed three main features of Swiss democracy: fed-
eralism, direct democracy and power-sharing. At first sight, these three are 
anything but Swiss particularities: worldwide, we count about 30 federal 
systems. Direct democracy is practised also in the individual states of the 
US, and power-sharing can be found in the Netherlands and Belgium as 
well. Moreover, direct democracy can combine with majoritarian democ-
racy, and consensus democracy with a representative system (Table 5.2).
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It is the combination of power-sharing and direct democracy that puts 
the Swiss system at odds with much political theory and mainstream politi-
cal thought. In contrast to other countries like The Netherlands, for 
instance, Swiss consensus democracy is not the result of negotiations 
among the political parties after elections but a permanent institutional 
constraint due to the referendum. In the US, direct democracy is not prac-
tised at the national level as in Switzerland, nor has it led to power-sharing 
in its individual States. And while elections to parliament are the decisive 
element in the competition between government and opposition in the 
UK and New Zealand, they have no such effect in Switzerland. Thus, the 
same institutional elements may function differently in different contexts, 
which is why it is important to look at them as a whole.
Let us compare the most different countries of Table 5.2: the UK and 
Switzerland (Table 5.3). In the former, which provides an almost ideal 
example of a majoritarian and representative system, political power is 
concentrated in the hands of the political party that wins a majority.5 
Intense election campaigns are linked to fierce interparty competition, and 
the winner ‘takes it all’. The electoral system is designed to bring about 
strong and stable parliamentary majorities, formed of usually just one 
party. The elected government sets out to implement the programme it 
had laid before the electorate, but if it fails to carry its programme through 
the opposition has a chance to hold it accountable and form a new govern-
ment in turn. Strong innovation is possible, also against the opposition. 
The influence of voters can be described as programmatic, since it is they 
5 We are aware that at the time of writing (October 2019), these statements need some 
qualification. Yet it is probably not by coincidence that the current chaos is due to three ‘un-
British’ elements, namely direct democracy (the Brexit vote of summer 2016), lack of a 
parliamentary majority (the so-called hung parliaments returned in both 2010 and 2017) 
and the Fixed-Terms Parliament’s Act of 2011, which curbs the power of the prime minister 
to call an early election.
Table 5.2 Different types of democracy: some examples
Type of democracy Representative Semi-direct
Majoritarian The UK
New Zealand
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who choose among the programmes of the major parties and thus define 
the political agenda for four to five years. Sometimes party manifestos 
propose major policy changes, so elections provide popular legitimacy, 
policy innovation and political change at the same time.
In a semi-direct consensus democracy, on the other hand, party compe-
tition is low because elections cannot lead to a change of roles between 
government and opposition. The system places its trust in the final control 
by the people over all important issues. Legitimacy comes from the most 
important decisions being taken by the people directly. Proportionality in 
elections and mutual adjustment in legislative decision-making favour the 
idea of ‘no single winner takes everything, everybody wins something’. In 
direct democracy, voting is on a single issue at a time, and each case pro-
duces different winning coalitions, which are barely foreseeable by the 
political elites. A popular vote, even when settling a fundamental issue, 
involves just one clear decision independent from the others. The Swiss 
government, free from the fear of not being re-elected, will not spend 
much time on programmatic strategy. The narrow limits of manoeuvre 
imposed by an all-party government and the permanent risk of a referen-
dum defeat drastically curtail any effort to design comprehensive 





Strong competition between parties
Winner takes it all
Weak party competition
Proportional representation
Salient elections lead to periodical 
alternation of power
Low salience of elections; power-sharing 
amongst political parties prevents alternation of 
power
Enactment of the political programme 
of the government, backed by a 
parliamentary single-party majority
Integration of cultural minorities and 
conflicting group interests; changing coalitions 
for different issues
Big innovation possible Incremental innovation only
Political legitimacy through changes in 
power or re-election of a government 
satisfying voters’ expectations
Institutional legitimacy through different forms 
of participation: the most important decisions 
are taken by the people, important ones by 
parliament and the rest by the government
Underlying idea: politics for the people Underlying idea: politics through the people
Participation as a form of general and 
programmatic influence: voters elect a 
government and its programme for the 
entire legislative period
Direct participation as ‘single-issue’ influence: 
people vote on specific questions. No strategic 
government policy, no influence of voters on a 
specific government programme
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programmes and, at least in domestic policies, allow for incremental prog-
ress only.
Both countries, in their particularities, are unique. But while the UK and 
its Westminster system have become a mainstream model for democracy all 
over the world, the Swiss polity with its combination of direct democracy 
and power-sharing has remained exceptional. Swiss democracy is at odds 
with the prevailing idea of democracy as just a competition among elites.
5.6.2  Who Has More Influence: The British or the Swiss  
Voter?—The Trade-off Between Elections  
and Direct Participation
The comparison between the UK and Switzerland has revealed fundamen-
tal differences in the way the idea of democracy as ‘rule by the people’ is 
realised. These are not only differences of ‘systems’ but also differences of 
how citizens can influence politics. A British voter chooses—by means of 
her ballot for a single candidate—which political party, its leader and its 
programme should be confirmed or voted out of office. The electoral 
choice of every British voter is of utmost importance. Victory or defeat of 
a party in parliamentary elections determines the political future of the 
country, and even London stock markets react by going up or down. 
Between two elections, however, the British voter has little to say, and the 
ruling government is not too much impressed by bad records of popular-
ity in surveys. The prime minister, as long as her majority in parliament is 
not put at risk by a vote of no confidence, has little to fear from the polls. 
That should provide ample time to implement what she promised before 
the elections.
In contrast, the Swiss voter knows that after the elections there will 
most probably be the same four-party government as before. Electoral 
swings may lead to some changes in the relative influence of parties in 
parliament and even minor adjustments in the composition of govern-
ment. But looking back at the last 60 years, the voter can rest assured that 
an all-party government, composed proportionally to the relative strength 
of the biggest parties, will be in power. The Swiss stock market is not 
impressed either. Between two elections, however, the Swiss voter addi-
tionally exercises her rights of direct participation: saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’, she 
has the last word on many important decisions prepared by parliament. 
Obviously, British citizens have maximal electoral influence, but no say 
through direct-democratic choice. For Swiss citizens the reverse is true. 
This raises two questions.
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The first is, could we have it both ways, that is: having a maximum of 
influence through elections as well as by direct participation? The answer 
is no. While the idea of more democratic influence by both elections 
and direct democracy is tempting, it simply cannot be realised within 
the same political system. In Switzerland, an institutional change to 
more electoral competition is possible only by reducing the import of 
direct democracy, notably the referendum which requires parliamentary 
and governmental power-sharing. Similarly, regular referenda in Great 
Britain would destroy the basic idea of its political system, namely to 
concentrate power in the hands of a strong government which, based 
on its parliamentary majority, can realise its programme also against the 
will of the opposition. There is a trade-off between influence by elec-
tions and direct participation: the more a political system realises high 
voter influence by elections, the less it can grant influence by direct 
participation, and vice versa (Linder 1991, 49). Figure  5.4 visualises 
this trade-off and locates some exemplary polities.
At the either end of the spectrum ranging from representative and 
majoritarian to direct and consensus democracy, we locate the UK and 
Switzerland, each of which maximises influence through one of the 
Citizens’…
…influence by elections …influence by votations
Representative & majoritarian democracy Direct & consensus democracy
UK US states Swiss cantons Swiss federation
high
low
Fig. 5.4 Citizens’ influence in majoritarian parliamentary and semi-direct con-
sensus democracies: a theoretical model
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two forms of participation—elections or votations—while offering the 
least influence through the other. Between these two there are some inter-
mediate types. Swiss cantons differ in their extent of direct democracy. Yet all 
of them offer a higher degree of influence through elections than the 
federal level because also the executive branch—the cantonal govern-
ments—is elected by the people. The US states are situated more on the 
side of representative-majoritarian democracy. As in the UK, the competi-
tive and majoritarian election of state legislatures and governors provide 
an opportunity for complete political change, yet in many US states we 
also find a frequent use of the initiative and referendum.
The hypothesis of an institutional trade-off between elections and 
direct democracy is in contrast to arguments of US political scientists 
Tolbert and Smith (2005), who argue that the political culture of direct 
democracy has a positive effect on electoral participation. However, 
Stadelmann-Steffen and Freitag (2009), in their exhaustive analyses of the 
Swiss cantons, confirm this trade-off: the more open a canton to direct 
democracy, the lower electoral participation.6
The trade-off means that voters cannot have the maximum of political 
influence by both elections and direct participation. This leads us to the 
second question: which combination of the two is ‘best’ in terms of maxi-
mum voter influence? This is not easily answered because we would have 
to know how citizens themselves evaluate these two forms of influence. 
The fact that social movements in many European countries seek some 
forms of direct democracy may be a sign that majoritarian parliamentary 
systems today need some complement to their purely electoral democ-
racy. It is obvious, however, that regular referenda in Britain, for instance, 
would weaken not only the ability of government to achieve its pro-
grammes, but also depress the importance of elections, which would be a 
disenchantment for the British voter. Similarly, competitive elections in 
Switzerland could give more influence to the electorate, but the same 
electorate would not accept cut-backs in direct democracy. There is no 
6 A comparison of all 26 cantons makes sense because although both government and 
parliament are popularly elected everywhere, there is a wide difference in the extent of direct 
democracy. For instance, Glarus and Appenzell Inner-Rhodes still practice the Landsgemeinde, 
an annual citizen assembly comparable to US town meetings. In turn, notably in the French-
speaking cantons the representative element is much stronger (cf. Bühlmann et al. 2014).
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panacea, and all we can do therefore is to look for ‘optimal’ voter influ-
ence, which depends on further particularities of a polity. In other words: 
finding combinations of single-issue direct participation and program-
matic elections that in the eyes of the electorate best serve them to shape 
their own democracy.
5.6.3  Consensus Democracy: Its Past and Its Future
Looking at the past, we can distinguish three different features of con-
sensus democracy. The first is integration, which in the twentieth cen-
tury had different meanings. In earliest times, power-sharing helped 
overcome the religious divide and prevented the linguistic minorities 
to be dominated by the German-speaking majority. Later, the social 
partnership and governmental inclusion of the political left helped 
reduce class conflicts. In the most crucial period before World War II, 
a high national consensus helped overcome threats to the country’s 
independence.
The second feature is political stability and efficiency. The perfection of 
power-sharing after World War II was undoubtedly beneficial. Switzerland 
passed smoothly through growing wealth to societal modernisation: the 
stability of its political system was an advantage for its economy in many 
respects. Whereas some West-European democracies went from liberalism 
to socialism and back, Swiss politics held its middle course. The policy of 
integration and prudent adaptation rather than risky innovation proved 
effective.
The third one is the development of a specific political culture. 
British scholar Clive Church, already mentioned as a life-long observer 
from the outside, provides a definition that goes well beyond the scope 
of conventional surveys (see Box 5.4). Many of these items are closely 
related to power-sharing. We may leave open the question whether this 
political culture was influenced by Swiss institutions or vice versa. The 
important point is that the functioning of power-sharing also depends 
on the cultural attitudes and political willingness of political elites and 
citizens alike.
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It would be wrong, however, to overlook the shadows of consensus 
democracy which began to grow longer since the 1990s. Economic reces-
sion made political consensus more difficult. In such periods the lack of 
innovation and coherent government policies was particularly felt. Political 
power-sharing does not include foreign residents who represent 25% of 
the population, and efforts at social integration were insufficient. 
Moreover, new social movements—progressive as well as conservative (cf. 
Kriesi 1995)—indicated a loss of the Swiss system’s capacity to integrate 
all parts of society. The basic consensus among the political elite vanished, 
and the defeat of the government in the vote of 1992 on joining the 
European Economic Area left a divided nation.
Box 5.4 Swiss Political Culture, as Defined by a British Scholar







Affective Desire for decisions to be made directly
Enthusiastic support for federal and other institutions
Multiple loyalties
Positive belief in compromise and cooperation
Strong sense of patriotism and independence
Tolerance of domestic differences
Willingness to accept adverse decisions
Judgemental Acceptance of the obligation to take part in politics
Agreement that nation depends on acts of will
Belief that the country is fragile
Cautious attitude to policy change
High levels of satisfaction with outcomes
Positive evaluation of Swiss democracy and neutrality
Trust in authorities
Source: Church (2004, 183)
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Since the 1990s, pressure from the outside in the form of globalisation 
and Europeanisation has stimulated innovation. Power-sharing, despite 
growing polarisation and the crisis of 2008, is still working. The grand 
government coalition is sometimes defeated in referenda, but not more 
often than in earlier times. In parliament, growing antagonisms between 
the national-conservative right and the progressive-interventionist left are 
compensated by changing issue-specific coalitions in which the political 
centre plays an important role. The partial break-up of the bourgeois 
camp has made this possible. Under the conditions of a tripartite system 
of the right, the centre and the left, consensus democracy has the chance 
to work even better than in the 1980s, when the bourgeois majority made 
the left a permanent loser.
Informal rules play a prominent role for Swiss consensus democracy. 
The spirit of these rules is more important than their strict application. So 
in a short period of time, namely in 2003 and 2007, parliament twice 
broke with the unwritten rule that serving ministers are re-elected if they 
so wish. In both instances it meant saving one of the most important ele-
ments of Swiss democracy, namely a functioning and inclusive govern-
ment. In 2003, parliament adjusted the magic formula to match the 
respective parties’ electoral strength. In 2007, it affirmed that Swiss gov-
ernment members are elected to practice collective leadership, not to 
implement their party’s electoral pledges. The electoral success of the 
Greens in 2019 did not lead to personal changes of the Federal Council—
with the effect that at present, the principle of proportional representation 
is not fully respected.
Problems for the future remain. There are strong indications that 
decision- making on issues exposed to globalisation follows a different 
pace. Europeanisation, especially, leads to quicker and bigger innovations 
but bypasses many of the veto positions and interests relevant in domestic 
politics. This could lead to further polarisation between winners and losers 
of globalisation. Another problem is governmental reform. In a globalised 
world, the Federal Council and its administration have become key play-
ers, but the collegiate structure of the council—seven members with equal 
competencies—is still the same as in 1848.
Institutionally, consensus democracy has proven its worth in stormy 
weather. Surveys show that consensus democracy gets rising popularity 
and is even more appreciated by ordinary citizens than by the Swiss elites 
(MIS Trend 2008; Credit Suisse 2018). Here, however, we may identify 
the real weak spot of Swiss consensus democracy today. Polarisation, 
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stimulated by the political parties of the right and of the left, leaves its 
traces in political culture. Pluralism, belief in compromise and coopera-
tion, tolerance towards differences and willingness to accept adverse deci-
sions are declining among parts of the political elite, and parts of the 
electorate as well.
With good reason, adherents of the Swiss Konkordanz worry about the 
loss of the ‘spirit of accommodation’. It could paralyse power-sharing in 
the long run. As a strategy towards majoritarian politics, however, the 
politics of confrontation would not be enough. A gradual transformation 
towards majoritarian politics seems feasible only given electoral change 
which sees a leading party, capable to formulate a convincing political pro-
gramme but also to carry out the necessary institutional reforms. And the 
trade-off mentioned earlier will impose limits to such a transformation: in 
the near future, one should not expect the Swiss to be willing to abandon 
consensus democracy in favour of a majoritarian system with less direct 
democracy.
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6.1  Direct Democracy
6.1.1  Experiences of Direct Democracy Compared
The first worldwide comparative study on direct democracy in 1978 pro-
duced some astonishing results: its authors, Butler and Ranney (1978, 7), 
counted more than 500 nationwide referenda in countries all over the 
world. Their distribution, though, was uneven. They counted 300 refer-
enda for Switzerland, 39 for Australia, 20 for France and 13 for Denmark. 
In all other countries the number was below ten. Forty years later, 
Qvortrup (2018, 264) counted already 331 nationwide referendums in 
democratic polities between 1900 and 2017 without Switzerland’s 556 
votes in the same period. Table 6.1 provides an overview over the past 
70 years.
Concerning the issues of votes, one can distinguish three general cate-
gories. The first one comprises the establishment or secession of a state, of 
a new constitutional order or regime. In these cases, the principle of self- 
determination of a people, and the attempt to provide legitimation for 
fundamental changes in the political order are important motives. Some 
historical examples are the separation of Norway from Sweden in 1905, 
the vote of English Togo (under UN supervision) to join Ghana and of 
French Togo to become independent in 1965, or the case of the Philippines 
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where, in 1986 after the end of the Marcos regime, President Corazon 
Aquino allowed the people to ratify the new Constitution. At the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the transformation of communist regimes to democra-
cies in Eastern Europe saw many referenda in Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan and in the Baltic states. In the reunion of Eastern and 
Western Germany, however, the peoples were not granted a say.
A second category, relatively new, comprises decisions on membership 
in transnational organisations or changes in the status of such member-
ship. In both cases, votes are held because the member states agree to 
share part of their sovereignty with the trans or supranational organisa-
tion. Spanish citizens, for instance, voted to remain in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1986. On EU issues, Denmark has so far 
held eight and Ireland nine referenda. In 2005, the people of France and 
the Netherlands famously voted against the adoption of the European 
Constitution. Before the EU enlargement of 2004, referenda were held in 
nine out of ten candidate countries (Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Malta; Szczerbiak and 
Taggard 2004; C2D 2019). The most recent example, of course, is Brexit: 
in June 2016, a majority of UK voters decided to leave the EU.
A third category deals with important national policy decisions for 
which a government wants to be given additional legitimacy. Chapter 3 
already mentioned French President de Gaulle’s plebiscite on Algerian 
independence in 1961, which put an end not only to the colonial regime 
but also to the deep divide of the French nation on this question. In some 
East-European countries, plebiscites were used from the very beginning of 
the liberalisation process. Whereas the Polish authorities failed to obtain 
the support of the people when trying to pass early reforms for economic 
liberalisation, the Hungarian opposition in 1989 won a referendum on the 




Europe (excl. Switzerland) 552 30%
Switzerland 479 26%
Australasia and Asia 265 15%
Africa and Middle East 259 14%
Americas 256 14%
Total 1811 100%
Including post-colonial independence votes if success-
ful. Data from www.sudd.ch, 19.12.2019
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question of election procedure against the wishes of the still communist- 
controlled government.
These examples illustrate the vast variety of occasions on which people 
are able to express their preferences. For a better understanding of the dif-
ferent uses made of the devices of direct democracy, a classification accord-
ing to the following criteria is useful:
 A. Binding versus non-binding referenda: It is obvious that binding ref-
erenda have a higher impact than non-binding ones which are 
merely consultative or advisory (cf. also Cheneval and el-Wakil 
2018, 300). In New Zealand, for instance, the referendum is non-
binding and it is left to the government or legislature to interpret 
the results. For binding referenda, the consequences depend much 
on the type of the popular vote.
 B. The authority empowered to call a popular vote: With regards to who 
has the authority to demand that a popular vote be held, we can 
distinguish four basic types:
 (1) Government-controlled: The majority of parliament or the 
president have the sole power to decide whether or not a refer-
endum is held. They decide the subject matter and the wording 
of the proposition to be voted upon. This type is often referred 
to as a plebiscite.
 (2) Constitutionally required: The Constitution requires that cer-
tain decisions (constitutional amendments, ordinary laws, deci-
sions on financial or international issues) be approved by the 
voters before they take effect. The government might still have 
a free hand in formulating the proposition, but is legally bound 
to a direct- democratic procedure.
 (3) Referenda called by the people: A certain number of voters are 
authorised to demand a popular vote be held on specific gov-
ernment decisions, either before or after these have taken effect. 
Thus, it depends on a group of citizens to decide whether a 
government decision has to be ratified by the people. A similar 
device is the recall, which allows a certain number of voters to 
demand the removal of an authority or a single person 
from office.
 (4) Popular initiatives: A certain number of voters are authorised to 
demand a popular vote on broad statements of intent or specific 
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measures which they themselves have proposed. Thus, it is a 
group of people who, acting as ‘lawmakers’, decide the subject 
matter and the wording of the proposition to be voted on.1
Most countries know only the first type, the plebiscite. Under such an 
institutional arrangement, direct democracy is limited in use and purpose. 
If it is left to the discretion of the government to put issues before its vot-
ers, the referendum tends to serve as an occasional device to obtain wider 
support for a presidential or parliamentary policy. This is especially the 
case with non-binding plebiscites, in which the government can realise its 
projects also if defeated in the vote. A special case is the UK’s vote on its 
continued EU membership held in 2016 (Brexit), which although merely 
advisory the government had promised to honour whatever the outcome.
Types (2)–(4) are fundamentally different from plebiscites. In those 
cases, a pre-defined class of government decision is always subject to a 
constitutionally required (mandatory) referendum; and citizens can, by 
petition, challenge government decisions (optional referenda) or even 
hand in their own proposals for constitutional or legislative reform (popu-
lar initiatives). The difference is that all these devices sanction or correct 
government policies and politics even when the government might not 
wish for popular interference. Under these institutional arrangements, 
direct democracy thus gives citizens an independent voice in politics and 
policies. This may be in accord with governmental policies, especially in 
the case of constitutionally required referenda. But the voice of the citi-
zens can be, and often is, also raised against the government. To challenge 
government decisions in a selective way is the ‘natural’ use of popular 
referenda. The idea of ‘correcting’ representative democracy is further 
developed by the popular initiative, which allows the people to not only 
approve or reject government decisions, but also offers a group of citizens 
the chance to have their own propositions put to a popular vote.
The list of countries where direct democracy is used to challenge or 
correct the parliamentary process is short. In Australia national referenda, 
which are required for certain constitutional amendments, are held quite 
frequently. The Italian Constitution provides for referenda with the pro-
viso that citizens can challenge a parliamentary law only sometime after its 
1 Separate aspects to consider are the existence of a quorum and/or the type of majority 
required. In fact, all four types may exist with or without a quorum and necessitate simple, 
qualified or compound majorities (cf. Altman 2019, 8).
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introduction and application. This unique ‘abrogative referendum’ was 
used in the divorce issue for instance, when part of the Catholic popula-
tion wanted to abolish the secular and liberal divorce law. The Philippine 
Constitution of 1986 has institutionalised both the initiative and the ref-
erendum. Recently, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania and some South- 
Caucasian states have introduced referenda on constitutional reforms.
A final distinction separates national from sub-national referenda. While 
in Switzerland direct democracy is known on all three federal levels, other 
countries practice direct participation only on the sub-national levels. This 
is the case, for instance, in Germany were votes are held in some 
Bundesländer and their communes. A prominent case are the US States, 
where direct democracy is as widely institutionalised and used as it is in 
Switzerland. In all US States with the exception of Delaware, any amend-
ment to the State constitution requires a popular vote. In about half the 
States we find one or another type of referendum for parliamentary laws, 
often complemented by a financial referendum. Moreover, citizens in 
many States can propose legislation by means of the popular initiative, or 
initiate a ‘recall’, which allows voters to remove or discharge a public offi-
cial from office. In no other part of the world but California have citizens 
had so much opportunity to express their political preferences: from 1884 
to 2018, Californians voted on more than 2000 issues.2
6.1.2  The Practice of Direct Democracy in US States 
and Switzerland: Similarities and Differences
US direct democracy is fundamentally different from Switzerland’s in one 
point: it is limited to the sub-national level. Populist forces in the late 
1970s demanded nationwide referenda without success. They had no real 
chance to change the tradition of republican belief in the system of ‘checks 
and balances’, which is opposed to any form of plebiscite at national level. 
Yet, the US States’ and Switzerland’s experience of direct democracy are 
the richest: the instruments of the referendum and the popular initiative 
are practically the same, and one can find many similarities in their use. For 
an assessment of direct democracy, it may thus be most useful to compare 
their experiences.
In his overall appraisal of direct democracy in US States, Cronin (1989, 
222) comes to the following conclusion:
2 See https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures [10.12.2020].
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In sum, direct democracy devices have not been a cure-all for most political, 
social, or economic ills, yet they have been an occasional remedy, and 
 generally a moderate remedy, for legislative lethargy and the misuse of legis-
lative power. It was long feared that these devices would dull legislators’ 
sense of responsibility without in fact quickening the people to the exercise 
of any real control in public affairs. Little evidence exists for those fears 
today. When popular demands for reasonable change are repeatedly ignored 
by elected officials and when legislators or other officials ignore valid inter-
ests and criticism, the initiative, referendum and recall can be a means by 
which the people may protect themselves in the grand tradition of 
self-government.
This assessment could also be largely subscribed to in the case of 
Switzerland, whose ideas of popular control of representative government 
in fact influenced the development of direct democracy in the US between 
1890 and 1920 (Auer 1989). Another common conclusion can be drawn: 
historically speaking, critics as well as proponents of direct democracy 
overestimated the power of the referendum and the initiative, whether for 
ill or good. Finally, even if voters in the US and Switzerland are aware of 
its limited effects and deficiencies, direct democracy constitutes an ele-
ment of political culture that citizens are unwilling to relinquish.
Further similarities show up when comparing a number of Cronin’s 
(1989, 224–32) points on the ‘general effects of direct democracy devices’:
 1. Uncertainty on the question if ‘direct democracy can enhance govern-
ment responsiveness and accountability’. For Switzerland, we have 
noted several characteristics of the public sector (the small budget of 
central government, limited public administration, the modification 
of a proposed policy programme after its defeat in the first popular 
vote, etc.) that indicate a high level of responsiveness to the ‘will of 
the people’. On the other hand, the power-sharing coalition of an 
all-party government can also work as a political cartel and thus 
reduce responsiveness. Valid comparisons, though, cannot be made. 
In the US, where comparison with purely representative States is 
possible, Cronin notes that ‘few initiative, referendum and recall 
States are known for corruption and discrimination. Still, it is diffi-
cult to single them out and argue persuasively that they are decid-
edly more responsive than those without the initiative, referendum, 
and recall’.
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 2. As in Switzerland, ‘direct democratic processes have not brought about 
rule by the common people’. In both systems, more than 90% of 
important parliamentary decisions are not challenged. Popular ini-
tiatives alter and influence the political agenda, but do not call into 
question the role of parliament as the chief lawmaker. At more than 
45%, the rate of successful initiatives is higher in the American States 
than in the Swiss federation (10%) and its cantons (30%) (Linder 
and Mueller 2017, 328). But in both countries direct democracy is 
fraught with inequalities in participation. It is the better educated, 
older and financially better- off citizen who engages and participates 
significantly more in direct democracy. Empirical data indicate that 
the more complicated the procedure and the issues at stake, the 
more direct participation is socially discriminatory. This selective 
bias affects the devices of direct democracy, whose specific policy 
ramifications can be much harder to grasp than simply casting a vote 
for a person or party based on sympathy or habit (see Chap. 4 and 
Cronin 1989, 76). Finally, direct democracy requires citizens to get 
organised. Cronin states that ‘direct democracy devices occasionally 
permit those who are motivated and interested in public policy 
issues to have a direct personal input by recording their vote, but 
this is a long way from claiming that direct democracy gives a signifi-
cant voice to ordinary citizens on a regular basis’.
 3. ‘Direct legislation does not produce unsound legislation and unwise or 
bad policy’. There are strong arguments for this value judgement, 
despite empirical evidence in both countries that citizens are not 
always well informed about the issues on which they vote. For the 
Swiss case, Kriesi’s (2005) analyses show that simplifying strategies 
such as heuristic voting based on cues or party recommendations do 
not lead to irrational choices. For the US case, Cronin states that the 
contributions of direct democracy do not essentially differ from 
those of parliament. As with every procedure based on majority rule, 
minorities can lose, and this risk, according to Cronin, may even be 
slightly greater under direct than representative democracy. The 
same can be said for Switzerland, where recently three popular ini-
tiatives gave rise to questions about their compatibility with the 
Constitution and fundamental rights (cf. also Christmann and 
Danaci 2012). But voters in direct democracies ‘have also shown 
that most of the time they too will reject measures that would dimin-
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ish rights, liberties, and freedoms for the less well-represented or 
less-organized segments of society’ (Cronin 1989, 123).
Kriesi’s and Cronin’s arguments, however, compare only direct 
and parliamentary legislation. How about the fundamental ques-
tion: does direct participation lead to more or less democratic stabil-
ity? The quality of direct democracy will depend on the consolidation 
and quality of democracy as a whole. Even for the consolidated case 
of Switzerland, there is empirical evidence that direct democracy is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, it has integrating effects. On the 
other, it allows political elites to use fundamental societal cleavages 
for mobilising voters. The latter effect may be detrimental for an 
unstable, not-yet-consolidated democracy. Germany’s regression 
from a democracy to an authoritarian regime was ‘legitimated’ by 
three plebiscites in 1933–1938, and Austria too approved its 
Anschluss in a popular vote. If Switzerland at that time rejected the 
popular initiatives of the Frontist movement, an important reason 
for this was that besides the people, a clear majority of the political 
elite was also hostile to the idea of fascism (Neidhart 1970, 238–43). 
These historical examples illustrate that direct democracy is vulner-
able: instead of contributing to political integration, it may be a 
factor of de-stabilisation in deeply divided societies and unconsoli-
dated democracies (Linder et al. 2008).
 4. ‘Direct democracy can influence the political agenda in favour of 
issues important to less well-organized interests’. Environmentalists 
provide a good example of this for California and Switzerland. The 
popular initiative widens the political agenda and the horizon in 
respect of what is politically conceivable. We have to note, however, 
that these innovative effects may become unwelcome. In California, 
for instance, there is criticism that direct democracy is part of the 
reason why the state has become ‘ungovernable’: an abundant num-
ber of popular initiatives is launched by a professional campaigning 
industry that promotes special vested interests rather than those of 
the ordinary citizens (The Economist 2009). In Switzerland, the 
smaller ‘political market’ and lower success rates of popular initiative 
may have set closer limits to a professional referenda industry.
 5. ‘Direct democracy tends to strengthen single issue and interest groups 
rather than political parties with larger, general interest, programmes’. 
Popular democratic rule partially loses or changes its meaning when 
devices of direct democracy, originally used by social movements, 
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pass into the hands of interest groups (Hofstadter 1955, Croly 
1914; also Bühlmann and Kriesi 2007, Schneider and Hess 1995, 
and Schneider and Weitsman 1996). The ‘normal’ form and func-
tion of direct democracy are not what they were at the beginning. 
This statement for Switzerland can be complemented by the US 
experience that ‘Initial achievements or victories were won by the 
populists and progressives, but the very bosses or interests against 
whom these devices were aimed soon learn to adapt to the new 
rules, deflect them, or use them to advance their strategic interests’ 
(cit. in Cronin 1989, 231). Yet Cronin, who partially agrees with 
this critique made by both Croly and Hofstadter, also emphases that 
special interest and single-issue groups regularly take part in both 
direct as well as representative democracy. If the US has become a 
nation of interest groups, it is the very task of politics to blend diver-
gent interests into great governing coalitions. This, in Cronin’s 
view, parliament is best placed to achieve.
 6. ‘Money is, other things being equal, the single most important factor 
determining direct legislation outcomes’. It costs money to collect 
signatures for a referendum or initiative, to create and maintain an 
effective campaign organisation, to formulate and pass a political 
message on to voters by direct mail, to finance propaganda and 
attract the attention of the mass media. The frequent use of the 
devices of direct democracy has led to the professionalisation of 
campaigns, an evolution well known in the US and observable also 
in Switzerland, albeit with a time lag. Unequal distribution of money 
leads to unequal campaign spending, sometimes up to ratios of 1:20 
or 1:50. In Switzerland as in the US States, the high-spending side 
wins in many cases, yet only in the US do strict rules on financial 
transparency exist (Garret & Smith 2005). It is exceptional for 
underdogs to win against ‘big money’. Some American scholars 
speak of campaign money as the single most powerful predictor of 
who wins and who loses (Zisk 1987, 90–137; Loewenstein 1982, 
505–641). In the Swiss case, there is evidence that money cannot 
play the same role with all votations (Kriesi 2009). In the case of 
pre-dispositioned issues, where citizens’ preferences are related to 
first- hand experience and their own values, campaigns have less 
effect than on non-pre-dispositioned, mostly complex and abstract 
issues. Moreover, money is absorbed into political parties’ campaign 
strategies, which include not only propaganda but also ‘argument 
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based’ reasoning to convince voters. Votations cannot generally be 
bought. But on highly controversial questions with heavy campaign-
ing because of an expected tight vote, money can be the decisive 
factor (see Sect. 4.5.5).To a certain extent, money can be substi-
tuted by voluntary work of political activists. Together with socially 
unequal participation, however, the distorting effect of money 
remains probably one of the most serious deficiencies of direct 
democracy. First, unbalanced campaign spending devaluates the 
fundamental idea of a democracy based on ‘one person, one vote’. 
We could draw an analogy with a town meeting or a television 
debate where one side gets to speak twice, five or 20 times more 
often than the other side. Second, the risk of deceptive advertising 
can be greater if there is no counterbalance. Citizens can be pre-
vented from making a fair judgement of the real issue. These defi-
ciencies, however, are not specific to direct democracy. The distorting 
influence of money (and the media more generally) can also be 
observed during elections in representative systems, as regular dis-
cussions in the US show. The money question is as unresolved in 
Switzerland as in the US, where attempts to regulate the financing 
of direct-democratic campaigns have been thwarted in the courts.
After all these similarities, there are three main differences:
 1. In the US States, direct democracy is not an element of political power- 
sharing. With their two-party systems, winner-take-all elections and 
relatively homogeneous majorities installed by a white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant hegemony, the referendum has not become a device to 
permit cultural minorities—African Americans or indigenous peo-
ples, for instance—to gain better access to power or achieve propor-
tional representation. Nor do we know about negotiation processes 
carried out in the shadow of the referendum challenge, which so 
much characterise Swiss decision-making. One reason for this might 
be that US interest groups find it much easier to exert their influ-
ence through parliamentary bargaining. Lobbyists in the US legisla-
tive tradition can try to get their interests to appear in many bills by 
attaching their desires as ‘riders’ (non-germane amendments). This 
leads to bills that are sometimes a conglomerate of matters such as 
money for agriculture, schools, highway construction and so on. 
Non-germane amendments facilitate the finding of ‘constructive 
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majorities’ between interest groups. In Switzerland—as in other 
European legislative traditions—these deals would not be possible 
because different matters must be regulated by different bills. In the 
US, however, they allow interest groups to influence legislation in a 
direct way without the ‘referendum threat’, which anyway is riskier. 
US States’ direct democracy, therefore, is neither an incentive for 
cooperation and power-sharing as in Switzerland, nor does it have 
the institutional function of political integration. In turn, because of 
the strong two-party system, US direct democracy has not devalued 
elections as the mechanism of government-selection as much as in 
Switzerland.
 2. Direct democracy in the US complements the representative polity, 
while in Switzerland it has transformed the entire political system. 
With the introduction of the referendum in 1874, Swiss political 
institutions—which originally followed both representative and 
majoritarian ideas—were completely restructured. Majoritarian 
democracy was transformed into a system of consensus democracy. 
Negotiated legislation, compromises and permanent power-sharing 
became necessary if the government was to avoid defeat in refer-
enda. This institutional transformation has not happened in the 
US. Especially the idea of proportional representation seems to con-
tradict American political culture, which favours competitive elec-
tions and ‘clear’, that is, majority decision.3 To the Swiss observer it 
seems as if representative and direct democracy in the American 
States were much more independent of each other. In terms of 
political culture, the predominant ideas in Switzerland are participa-
tion and voice, while in the US they are competition and victory.
 3. In one respect direct democracy is of much greater consequence in 
Switzerland than in the US. The referendum and the popular initia-
tive are also used at national level. This distinction is important. In 
Switzerland, not only national but also foreign policy issues can 
become the object of direct democracy. The latter is even more 
astonishing as the Swiss Constitution was influenced by nineteenth 
century doctrines which put foreign policy firmly into the hands of 
the executive so that it has complete autonomy in its dealings with 
3 Even if, due to the winner-take-all rule within States, twice in the last 20 years a president 
got elected with less popular votes than his direct rival (George W. Bush in 2000 and Donald 
J. Trump in 2016).
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other nations. In practice, the Federal Council is under much less 
parliamentary control for its foreign policy than for domestic affairs 
(Kälin 1986). Three constitutional amendments, passed in 1920, 
1977 and 2003, introduced and further extended the people’s rights 
in foreign policy. Today, membership in international organisations 
and all international treaties implying substantial unifications of law 
are subject to mandatory referenda (Aubert and Mahon 2003, 
1102–20; Häfelin et  al. 2016). If the government should want 
Switzerland to become a member of a supranational organisation 
such as the EU or a system of collective security such as NATO, a 
referendum is obligatory. The Swiss polity thus empowers the peo-
ple to participate in matters which used to be the sovereign right of 
the monarch in earlier times and which have largely remained the 
prerogative of the executive in most other states (Delley 1999).
6.1.3  The Theory of Direct Democracy: Between Ideal 
and Reality
6.1.3.1  Direct Versus Representative Democracy
In the US, where the development of modern democracy was accompa-
nied by theoretical debates among the Fathers of the Constitution, the 
two different strands of direct and representative democracy were present 
right from the start. On one side were Benjamin Franklin and Thomas 
Jefferson, suspicious of government but confident of the common sense of 
the people. Jefferson, especially, held that the will of the people was the 
only legitimate foundation of government, and ‘wished to see the repub-
lican principle of popular control pushed to its fullest exercise’ (Cronin 
1989, 13). On the other side, John Adams and James Madison, advocates 
of informed, wise and responsible decision-making by elected representa-
tives, were sceptical about possible abuses of democracy by an ill-informed, 
irrational general public. The US Constitution, as a purely representative 
system with its checks and balances and filters such as the—nowadays 
purely formal—indirect election of the president, much resembles this 
model of prudence. Representative government, besides having become 
the standard all over the world, serves as a normative reference point in 
much democratic theory of today. And many of the arguments against 
direct democracy have not changed much since Madison’s times: 
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participation beyond elections transcends the horizon and competence of 
most people, who are not willing to engage in or spend much time on the 
study and discussion of complex public affairs. The building of consensus, 
they say, should be left to political elites.
The case for direct democracy in modern theory, as represented by 
Benjamin Barber (1984) and others, can be made on two grounds. The 
first argument is a critique of the representative model: if representative 
government is more than an elitist power arrangement, its elected officials 
must somehow be responsive to their constituency. But on this point the 
theory of representative democracy was never clear. The debate between 
‘mandate’ (elected representatives have to present their voters’ views as 
faithfully as possible) and ‘independent’ theorists (the representative’s 
duty is to deliberate free from particular interests and in the general inter-
est of all) is still unresolved. The ambiguity and weakness of the represen-
tative model—‘thin democracy’—can be remedied only through the direct 
participation of the people to produce a ‘strong democracy’ (Barber 1984).
The second argument concerns the role of democracy in and for soci-
ety. Whereas part of modern theory—especially economic theory, begin-
ning with Joseph Schumpeter (1942) and Anthony Downs 
(1957)—considers democracy merely as an instrument for choosing the 
governing elites, populist-plebiscitary proponents share the unbroken tra-
dition of a broader normative concept: democracy has to liberate women 
and men alike. Democracy as citizens’ deliberative involvement and par-
ticipation in public affairs becomes part of an individual’s social and indi-
vidual self-development and creates citizenship and political community 
(Barber 1984, 179ff.; Rosenberg 2007; Dryzek 2002).
6.1.3.2  ‘Sensible’ or ‘Semi-Direct’ Democracy: A Third Model?
The sharp contrast between models of direct and representative democ-
racy disappears when looking at actual practice. Despite the many weak-
nesses in the theoretical model, representative government has become 
the predominant type of democracy. Competitive elections with the real 
possibility for a change in power seem to be responsive enough, at least in 
economically developed countries, to work satisfactorily for most citizens. 
Democratic government ‘for’ the people is realistic in the sense that a large 
majority of citizens are not, and probably will never want to be, political 
activists—or ‘vulcans’, as Brennan (2016) calls the ‘ideal-type’ voter.
But in some democracies, such as in the US States and in the Swiss 
federation and its cantons, citizens wanted more. It was the deficiencies of 
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representative government as well as the citizens’ claim for personal 
expression and political participation that gave populist movements their 
successes when introducing the devices of direct democracy into initially 
representative systems. The experiences of this amalgam have dashed the 
original hopes of populists and contradicted most of the fears of elitists—
at least in practice. Regarding the debate between proponents of direct 
and indirect democracy, the predictive value of democratic theory has 
been rather disappointing, except for one important point: direct democ-
racy, by giving people the power to define when and on which issue to take 
things into their own hands, has always acted as a corrective to representa-
tive government.
In the view of Thomas Cronin, this amalgam of representative govern-
ment and corrective direct democracy constitutes a third model, sensible 
democracy or ‘semi-direct democracy’ in the case of Switzerland. This 
model is realistic in a double sense. It reminds us that on a large scale, 
direct democracy is only feasible in combination with representative gov-
ernment. And, as a supplementing element, its effects on policies and 
political processes should not be overestimated:
Sensible democracy, with its referenda, initiatives and the recalls:
 1. Values representative institutions and wants legislators and other 
elected officials to make the vast majority of laws;
 2. Values majority rule yet understands the need to protect minority 
rights most of the time;
 3. Wants to improve legislative processes;
 4. Wants occasionally to vote on public policy issues;
 5. Wants safety-valve recall or vote-of no-confidence procedures as a last 
resort for inept and irresponsible public officials—but is willing to 
make these options difficult to use;
 6. Wants to improve the ability of the ordinary person both to run for 
office and to use direct democracy procedures;
 7. Wants to lessen the influence of secrecy, money, and single-interest 
groups in public decision-making processes;
 8. Trusts representatives most of the time, yet distrusts the concentration 
of power in any one institution;
 9. Trusts the general public’s decision some of the time, yet distrusts 
majority opinion some of the time;
 10. Is indifferent to most initiatives and referenda except when it comes to 
its own pet initiative issue;
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 11. Agrees with the central arguments of both the proponents and oppo-
nents of populist democracy, hence favours a number of regulating 
safeguards for direct democracy devices;
 12. Is fundamentally ambivalent toward popular democracy—favouring it 
in theory and holding a more sceptical attitude toward it as it is prac-
ticed in states and localities. (Cronin 1989, 249–51)
Taking into account the slightly different experiences of Swiss semi- 
direct democracy, four points deserve closer scrutiny. All are based on the 
central argument that relations between direct democracy and representa-
tive government can also develop in a less harmonious way than argued 
by Cronin:
 1. Participation and the problem of social equality: As mentioned ear-
lier, direct democracy is particularly sensible to the unequal partici-
pation of citizens, and to the inequality between different groups in 
gaining the attention of the public at large and in influencing public 
opinion. Under these conditions, point 7 of Cronin’s list may be too 
optimistic. As Macpherson (1977) mentions, it is hard to escape a 
vicious circle of the sort that better participation first needs more 
social equality—and that more social equality in turn requires better 
participation. Whenever democratic theory makes its normative 
point about equality in society (Dahl 1989, 323ff.), it rests mostly 
on a moral appeal that is unconvincing because of its essential point 
that democratic procedures by themselves have an equalising effect. 
In practice, sometimes they do, sometimes they don’t. Neither the 
model of direct nor that of sensible democracy provides a convinc-
ing answer.
 2. Normative orientation: Cronin’s model of sensible democracy does 
not imply that certain subject matters be excluded from the people’s 
vote. In his concluding remarks, however, he opposes national ref-
erenda and initiatives being held in the US, among other reasons on 
the ground that ‘too many issues at the national level involve 
national security or international economic relations’ (Cronin 1989, 
251). We encounter here one of the discrepancies (nr. 12 of his 
model) between theory and practice. In practice, Cronin makes a 
good point: military power and negotiation of global terms of trade, 
on which the ‘way of life’ of US people depend, may be better left 
in the hands of a strong presidency and Congress. Thus US citizens, 
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renouncing on direct participation at the national level, may make a 
rational choice as long as they prefer benefitting from international 
strength and supremacy. Theoretically, however, there is no reason 
why the model of ‘sensible democracy’ should not also apply at 
national level—at least in domestic affairs.
 3. Optimal influence of citizen preferences: The term ‘sensible democ-
racy’ suggests that institutional arrangements are such that the pref-
erences of citizens have the utmost influence on government politics 
and policies. Sensible democracy, complementing representative 
decisions with occasional popular votes, seems to fulfil this criterion. 
But it depends on additional specificities of the institutions whether 
the optimum influence of citizens can be achieved, and sensible 
democracy has many forms. Taking first the Swiss case, we observe 
a high interdependence between representative and direct-demo-
cratic procedures. Because direct democracy is also a means for the 
political opposition, the referendum challenge enforces legislation 
by negotiation and power- sharing. As discussed in Chap. 5, propor-
tional representation can devalue elections, however. As to the 
responsiveness and sensibility of government, there is a clear trade-
off between elections and voting: Swiss citizens lose in ‘program-
matic control’ through elections what they win in ‘issue control’ 
through direct democracy. Thus, empirical evidence casts some 
doubts on whether any combination of direct democracy and repre-
sentative government can always give citizens optimal influence. 
Second, there may be other models. Fritz Scharpf, in his Democratic 
Theory (1970, 54ff.), provides some strong arguments in support of 
the idea that enhancing participation in practice leads to a group 
pluralism that favours the status quo of ‘haves’ and which eliminates 
basic reform issues that ‘have-nots’ need most. He therefore pro-
poses a model that maximises voters’ preferences through elections, 
the simplest and socially least discriminatory mechanism. According 
to Scharpf, the system most responsive to voters’ preferences for 
structural reform is given by a two-party parliamentary democracy 
sensitive to small electoral changes, with enough power to overrule 
resistance by pluralist interest groups. Consequently, Scharpf puts 
priority for enhancing participation not in the field of political insti-
tutions but with society and the economy.
 4. Population size—a limiting factor for sensible democracy? Historical 
experience provides evidence that semi-direct democracy may work 
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not only in a small, 8.6 million country like Switzerland but also in 
California with a population of some 40 million. But could the prac-
tice of referenda and initiatives also work nationwide for the US 
with over 300 million, or India with 1.3 billion inhabitants? The 
idea is regarded by many with scepticism, yet the reasons remain 
vague. Is direct democracy the most vulnerable part of democracy in 
large countries because of increasing manipulation by big money 
and the mass media? Or is direct democracy an appropriate way to 
make central government more responsive? Nobody knows, but one 
point seems clear: the political culture of direct participation is a col-
lective learning process that needs time to develop, as well as possi-
bilities to correct errors. From this perspective, a bottom-up 
development from the local via the regional to the national level 
seems more appropriate than top-down imposition, both in respect 
of democracy and direct participation.
6.1.3.3  Perspectives of Direct Participation
Sensible or semi-direct democracy, the amalgam of parliamentary decision- 
making by way of referenda and popular initiatives, is not the only way to 
give people a say beyond elections. In the last decades, direct participation 
has made its way in different forms from the local up to the national level. 
If in European countries nationwide plebiscites and votes on EU-affairs 
have become more and more frequent, this may be seen as the result of 
strong grass-roots movements that started half a century ago. Civil rights 
movements in the US, and students and many other populist movements 
in European countries were dissatisfied with the lack of government 
responsiveness, challenged elitist politics and claimed more political par-
ticipation. New social movements, grassroots politics and non- 
governmental organisations have made civil society more active in daily 
politics. Instruments of direct participation, especially at the local and 
regional levels, have developed in many forms, including advocacy plan-
ning, citizens forums, participatory budgeting, panels or citizens net-
works, to mention just a few (e.g. Ekman and Amnå 2012). With the 
development of the internet, the range of mobilisation has drastically 
increased. The local and the global are more and more interconnected 
(Tarrow and della Porta 2005).
Direct participation also plays a role for young democracies. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, we find experiences with direct democracy despite a 
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difficult situation: having to walk the arduous path of developing a civic 
culture, democratic institutions and a market economy all at the same 
time. In Brazil or South Africa, landless workers’ and farmers’ movements 
are claiming their rights through combinations of direct confrontation 
and negotiation with government. Decentralisation projects in sub- 
Saharan countries often go hand in hand with the direct participation of 
locals in planning and budgeting, including procedures allowing even illit-
erates to participate. In these cases, direct participation allows for more 
than people expressing their needs—it is also a device to make people 
familiar with the functioning of the local state and democracy (Linder 2010).
All these experiences of direct participation, made in completely differ-
ent contexts, have some characteristics in common. They are still at an 
experimental stage, punctual if not exceptional, and they are able to influ-
ence institutional politics only in a modest way. Even so, they all are driven 
by the motives of people to have better voice for their values, interests and 
rights, which may lead to sustainable forms of participative democracy 
eventually.
It would be wrong, however, to see more participation as the only 
means of improving democracy, or to hope that direct democracy will 
provide the answer to all problems of governance. Governing also always 
implies making decisions for groups and interests which cannot be demo-
cratically represented, and which cannot adequately participate. Decisions 
about the education system, for instance, mostly affect young people who 
cannot vote yet but are made by adults. Many social reforms, such as of 
criminal law or psychiatry, need the advocacy of professionals, journalists 
and other members of an ‘active public’. Most importantly, all societies 
have to take account of future generations. Especially people living in 
highly industrialised democracies are consuming in a few decades natural 
resources that took millions of years to develop. Ever-increasing energy 
consumption and CO2-emissions have become a threat to the climate 
itself. Such long-term effects of industrial activity are neither integrated 
into the price system of the market nor taken care of in today’s democratic 
procedure. Can we think of finding democratic majorities for decisions 
renouncing on the short-term advantages of most voters in favour of long- 
term gains for future generations? Under what kind of political structures 
dare we hope to see such communitarian and enlightened behaviour? 
Democratic theory and practice have to face up to such issues (Peters 2019).
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6.2  FeDeralism
6.2.1  Basics of Federal Institutions
We have considered Swiss federalism as an institutional arrangement that 
has enabled national unity while maintaining cantonal and regional auton-
omy. This amounts to a first approximation of most existing federations. 
Duchacek (1985, 42) put it thus: ‘What water is for fish, the federal system 
is for the territorial communities that desire to manage their affairs inde-
pendently (near sovereignly) yet within the confines of an all-inclusive 
national whole’. Federalism is therefore a political answer to provide a 
common biosphere for segmented parts of a larger population. Yet it is 
only an answer to the territorial segmentation of society, responsive to the 
cultural autonomy of language, ethnicity, and so on merely to the degree 
that these cultures overlap with territorial communities. The carp swim-
ming in a school of pike is not protected against being eaten. There is, 
therefore, a fundamental difference between federalism and plural democ-
racy. While political pluralism also aims at respecting societal diversity and 
cultural segmentation, it has no connotation for territorial boundaries.
What characterises federations in the universe of nation-states, where 
we find a large spectrum ranging from unitary systems like that of France 
to loose confederations or treaty-like federacies (the US–Puerto Rico) and 
leagues (e.g. the Arab League)? On the basis of his comparative work on 
federalism, Duchacek (ibid. 44) finds the following six yardsticks to be the 
most important:
 1. Indestructible identity and autonomy of the territorial components;
 2. Their residual and significant power;
 3. Equal or favourably weighted representation of unequal units;
 4. Their decisive participation in amending the constitution;
 5. Independent sphere of central authority;
 6. Immunity against secession, that is a permanent commitment to 
build and maintain a federal ‘union’ in contrast to a confederal sys-
tem which lacks such a commitment.
Commonly, the first five criteria may be realised as part of the constitu-
tional framework. The sixth yardstick, however, tells us that federalism is 
more than a constitutional tool used to divide up governmental powers. It 
refers to the political culture and indeed the political will of a society to 
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constitute and remain a single nation or state. Secessions of the Yugoslav 
regions and the republics of the Soviet Union show that this political com-
mitment can evaporate if a central government loses its control over cen-
trifugal forces.
Federalism is thus usually adopted by societies where territorial seg-
mentation has led to a political division between forces preferring either 
centralisation or decentralisation. All federations practise different forms 
and degrees of shared rule and self-rule (Watts 2008, 35ff.; Hooghe et al. 
2016). But this definition is not as clear and distinctive as it seems. A first 
ambiguity lies in the very word ‘federalism’, which is sometimes associated 
with ‘centralisation’, as in Anglo-American parlance, but sometimes a 
password for decentralising forces, as in Germany or Switzerland. However, 
this is not just a question of semantics—federalism itself is fundamentally 
ambiguous. When at least two territorial entities create a new, common 
government, they give up part of their sovereignty. This process is not 
only unifying but also centralising. Once the central government is cre-
ated, the problem of living federalism may well be to guarantee the territo-
rial autonomy of the components, their differences and therefore their 
relative independence from each other. As Elazar (1985, 23) put it: 
‘Federalizing does involve both the creation and maintenance of unity and 
the diffusion of power in the name of diversity’.
Amongst the 193 member states of the UN, some 25 are known as 
federations, representing about 40% of the world’s population. We find 
many other countries which have strong regional authorities, governments 
and even elected parliaments, such as Italy, Japan, Columbia, France, 
Peru, the UK (Anderson 2008; Hooghe et al. 2016). Despite consider-
able devolution of powers and autonomy of the regional governments, 
these states are not federations but unitary states that—for different rea-
sons—have undergone a process of decentralisation.4 What is the differ-
ence between a federation and a decentralised unitary state? Looking at 
Duchacek’s definitions, we find that decentralised unitary states may well 
meet yardsticks no. 1, 2, 5 and 6. The decisive difference lies in yardsticks 
no. 3 and 4: only federations let sub-national units participate substantially 
in national affairs to the extent of amending the constitution (shared rule), 
and this under the rule of a favourably weighted representation of unequal 
units (‘one region, one vote’).
4 Alternatively called ‘regionalization’ or ‘devolution’.
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6.2.2  Structure, Processes and Political Culture
So far, we have considered federalism mainly as an institutional structure, 
or even as a constitutional framework. Scholars comparing different fed-
eral systems all over the world found this institutional scheme useful. But 
there are limits: ‘Many polities with federal structures were not at all fed-
eral in practice—the structures masked a centralised concentration of 
power that stood in direct contradiction to the federal principle’ (Elazar 
1985, 22).
Evidently federalism can be ‘strong’ or ‘weak’, and it is more than a 
structure. Besides varying structural types of shared rule and self-rule, the 
political process, too, can be federal to different degrees: a strong veto 
power of sub-national units leads to processes of co-decision in which the 
central government must respect sub-national interests also in its own 
fields of competency. Conversely, weak fiscal powers of sub-national units 
can lead to financial dependency and processes in which the central gov-
ernment controls the use of resources despite formal regional autonomy. 
Different equilibria of power imply a different appropriate behaviour, 
which may crystallise into political cultures, too: high veto power of sub- 
national units favours power-sharing, negotiations on a par and respectful 
dealing with sub-national units from the side of the central government. 
In the opposite case, processes between the central government and sub- 
national units are characterised by hierarchic subordination and major-
ity rule.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the position of a series of countries on two of 
these dimensions, constitutional structure and political process. The spec-
trum ranges from the most federal (upper right) to the most unitary sys-
tems (lower left). It presents the situation of the 1980s and is a historical 
document of the time before the breakdown of the Soviet Union. It shows 
that some elements of federalism can be found not only in liberal democ-
racies but also in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the document helps to 
understand the nature of federalism under a strong central authority: the 
institutional structures of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were 
federalist, but central governments monopolised all decisions over 
resources, controlling the economic activities by way of highly centralised 
government planning. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia ended 
in implosion or civil war or both. Whereas the extreme concentration of 
power in these one-party regimes was well known, most observers under-
estimated the fact that their centralised power also kept together different 
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Fig. 6.1 Structure and process in selected polities. (Source: Elazar 1985)
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territorial units with different histories and cultures—artificially, we may 
say in retrospect, but under structures that were as ‘federal’ in name and 
structure as those of liberal democracies.
The US and Switzerland are similar cases, being federal in both struc-
ture and process. These two oldest federations developed by a bottom-up 
process, with sub-national units keeping much of their ‘sovereign’ rights 
as formerly independent states. The veto power of the sub-national units 
is high, especially in Switzerland where subsidiarity can ally with direct 
democracy (Mueller 2020). We have already seen that the cantons possess 
a high financial autonomy and are mandated with the implementation of 
federal policies (also Vatter 2018). Federal law-making is accompanied by 
a process of consultation with the cantons. If their reaction to a proposed 
bill is negative, the federal authorities drop the project or modify it until a 
solution satisfactory to the cantons is found.
And although the Federal Supreme Court has extensive constitutional 
power to review cantonal and local legislation, it is reluctant to intervene 
if sub-national autonomy would thereby be restricted. The federal author-
ities often do not exercise all the powers they have and, when dealing with 
the cantons and communes, use their competences with caution. Instead 
of deciding unilaterally, federal authorities negotiate and respect the can-
tons or communes as equivalent partners. These non-hierarchical proce-
dures also stem from the need to cooperate. The process of accommodation 
by the federal authorities of the sub-national units is an appropriate behav-
iour to find solutions under the conditions of the cantons’ high veto 
power. It has become an element of political culture, mostly informal, and 
just occasionally prescribed as a legal procedure. Intergovernmental struc-
tures have further stimulated horizontal accommodation among the can-
tons; they do not compete as much with each other as they could, for 
instance regarding taxes (Gilardi and Wasserfallen 2016; Wasserfallen 2015).
Taking the two dimensions of process and structure into consideration 
provides a preliminary picture of the variety of federations and decentral-
ised polities. Elazar’s comparative work showed that there are additional 
dimensions—such as the coincidence of social and political unity and 
diversity—which can further describe and explain the operation of federal-
ism. This coincides with the observation of cultural differences that exist 
between the US and Switzerland, even though both figure at the high end 
of federalism with regard to structure and processes. Already Chap. 3 
mentioned that Swiss federalism aims at creating equal opportunities in all 
regions and at equalising policies among the municipalities. US 
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federalism, in turn, stresses territorial competition of state governments, 
which gives citizens the choice of ‘voting with the feet’. Another cultural 
difference can be found in the fact that Swiss federalism was conceived to 
protect territorially entrenched cultural minorities—US federalism was 
not. This explains why there is not a single federal model, but a rich variety 
of different types. They depend not only on political structures and pro-
cesses but also on the history, the specific political culture and the socio- 
economic challenges and cleavages present in a polity.
6.2.3  Modern Meanings of Federalism
6.2.3.1  Cultural Autonomy and Difference
The case of Switzerland is instructive for the realisation of political unity 
whilst maintaining cultural diversity: the 26 cantons, with their different 
traditions, histories, languages and religions, most of them having enjoyed 
centuries of political autonomy, were able to create a modern territorial 
state as early as in 1848. Without federalism and its principle of dividing 
power between the new central government and the ‘old’ cantonal author-
ities, and without the federal promise to maintain and even safeguard 
regional differences, this historical process of the nineteenth century 
would not have resulted in successful nation-building.
Meanwhile, religious differences have faded. And even if we can still 
distinguish German-, French- and Italian-speaking cantons, the language 
boundaries, which never coincided entirely with cantonal ones, have been 
penetrated by print, electronic and social media and thus become more 
fluid. Switzerland today is a comparatively homogeneous society. But the 
Swiss would never contemplate giving up federalism. Despite complaints 
about federal particularities that may sometimes become obsolete or trou-
blesome, the Swiss like the formal autonomy of their 26 cantons and ca. 
2200 municipalities, which in many respects may be fictive and appear to 
the foreign observer as an institutional luxury in a country of only 8.6 mil-
lion inhabitants.
Bottom-up state-building and the (con)federal experience are a histori-
cal legacy that has shaped a strong preference for ‘small government’ up 
to our days and helped to develop the idea of subsidiarity: central govern-
ment should not meddle in things that the cantons are capable of doing 
themselves, and the cantons should not bother with problems that the 
municipalities can handle. However, subsidiarity can lead to too small 
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solutions, because the lowest federal level defines what the problem is. If 
the refusal of necessary centralisation is sometimes deplored, it offers 
opportunities for living ‘differently’. Decentralised trial-and-error pro-
cesses allow for political innovation, and successful experience can be 
transferred to upper levels in the sense of ‘best practice’.
Political institutions are not only rooted in and adapted to specific cul-
tural needs, they are part of the social culture. Some say the Swiss feel 
Swiss only when abroad—when at home they are Genevois, Thurgauer or 
Ticinesi. Nationalism in the sense of exaggerated pride in the one and only, 
the chosen people, its language and superiority is thus not possible: 
between regional cultures and awareness of four linguistic groups, the 
Swiss are part of a greater, international culture of French-, German- and 
Italian-speakers. Thus, the Swiss federal structures have remained intact, 
even though many of their original rationales have disappeared over the 
last 170 years.
Are these connotations of a federal structure and its associated way of 
living just a styled reminiscence of the past or are they meaningful also 
beyond the case of Switzerland and in today’s world? The following pro-
vides some answers by illustrating a few of the many facets of federalism.
6.2.3.2  Federalism in Times of Globalisation
Today, the nation-state seems to be too small to handle problems of 
national security and climate change, to guarantee human rights or to find 
answers with respect to growing inequalities between industrially advanced 
and developing countries. With globalisation, international organisations 
have multiplied, and nation-states have transferred more and more powers 
to the inter and supranational level. To some extent, supranational organ-
isations resemble ideas of federalism: they decide certain affairs by majority 
but respect Duchacek’s yardstick no. 3 of ‘equally or favourably weighed 
representation of unequal members’.
In the UN General Assembly, for instance, China, Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland are represented equally, each by one single seat. This gives 
small countries an over-proportional influence on decisions. But we also 
see that this advantage should not be overestimated: five big powers are 
permanent members of the Security Council and each has a veto. Closer 
to the ideas of federalism comes the EU. Besides favourably weighed rep-
resentation of its unequal members in most of its institutions, the EU 
Commission, EU Parliament and the Council of Ministers allow members 
to influence decisions in different ways, and on matters requiring 
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unanimity every member has the right to veto the decision. We may say, 
therefore, that the development of the international community is to a 
lesser or stronger degree influenced by structural and procedural ideas of 
federalism. This is part of the solution to the problem of the nation-state 
having become too small.
Globalisation and internalisation, however, are contested on different 
grounds: that they widen inequalities between the first and the third 
world, that global capitalism tramples on the environment, that policies of 
the international community lack democratic legitimacy or destroy 
national structures and cultural identities—including the state itself, which 
in the high times of neoliberalism was often reduced to a ‘minimal state’. 
After the financial crisis of 2008/2009, however, the state had to inter-
vene as ‘last resort’ in order to save the whole economy from a total col-
lapse. All this could lead to a re-affirmation of the role of the nation-state—all 
the more so since despite worldwide capitalism the redistribution of wealth 
(social security) and the production of important collective goods (educa-
tion and health) are still undertaken by the nation-state. Nothing showed 
this clearer than the coronavirus pandemic in 2020, with states suddenly 
outbidding each other for essential equipment.
If the nation-state is brought back in, what will be its future structure? 
While some scholars doubt that federalism can survive in a globalised 
world, others see modest impacts or even countervailing developments 
(e.g. Kelemen 2002). Indeed, in many European countries and beyond we 
observe some important and long lasting trends (Hooghe et  al. 2016; 
Ladner et  al. 2019): decentralisation, the rising salience of local and 
regional politics, social and political movements claiming greater territo-
rial autonomy and the growing awareness of linguistic, ethnic or cultural 
minorities to defend their identity and to claim new, collective rights. For 
the protagonists of all these phenomena, the state is not too small but 
rather too big, incapable of dealing with societal diversity at nation-state 
level. Decentralisation or even federalisation are institutional answers to 
that problem. Spain, the UK and Belgium, once unitary-centralised sys-
tems, are examples where regionalisation took place in reaction to claims 
for greater regional autonomy. Others may follow.
6.2.3.3  Federalism in Developing Countries
The process of international development and modernisation is, in the first 
instance, a clash between the worldwide penetration by capitalist enter-
prises seeking new markets, on the one hand, and self-sufficient local 
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economies and cultures, on the other. In many developing countries, the 
structures of government that ought to mediate this encounter have not 
found solutions for dealing with the inevitably arising conflicts. Above all, 
young democratic regimes, often seduced by short-term gains of centrali-
sation or a charismatic concentration of power, fail to combine selective 
economic modernisation with targeted backing of indigenous traditions 
and cultures.
There are structural reasons for this. Many states were created by 
colonial powers, artificially uniting different ethnicities under one 
common roof, a problem returned to in the next paragraph. Countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast to many in Asia, lack the cultural 
heritage of a state overarching familial and clan structures (e.g. Wimmer 
2018). Top-down state- and nation-building after the end of European 
colonisation was a moderate success: central governments not pene-
trating their peripheries, abuse of political power and widespread cor-
ruption are keywords associated with the phenomenon of unsuccessful 
or even ‘failed states’. Failed states, however, may be the wrong term 
and just an episode. European countries needed centuries for their 
nation-building and were not exposed to the global stress of ever faster 
socio-economic modernisation. Seeking to improve the political struc-
tures of developing countries in the long run, decentralisation and fed-
eralisation have become important concepts for developing agencies 
(Kälin 1999; Litvack et al. 1998; Linder 2002).
Decentralisation is said to bring the state ‘closer to the people’, giving 
them a better voice for their needs. But overcoming clientelism and clan 
politics is possible only if a ‘neutral’, non-familial institution like the state 
is trusted by citizens. People have to learn that public goods are not gifts 
from a Big Man but the return of their own fiscal contribution. And they 
must have the confidence that this return will be fair, effective and corre-
sponding to their needs, which implies learning processes also for the 
political elites. Local autonomy, fiscal decentralisation or even federalism 
can increase the chances for this learning process to occur compared to 
unitary-centralised government (Oluvu and Wunsch 2004; Linder 2009). 
They represent a promising alternative to the mainstream politics of post- 
colonial period, namely bottom-up state- and nation-building.
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6.2.3.4  Federalism as a Guarantee for Cultural Difference 
and Diversity
While federalism in Belgium, Switzerland and Canada serves to unite the 
diversity of only a small number of cultural groups, Nigeria or India are 
much more complex. In these cases, federalism must unite the cultural 
diversity of dozens of ethnic groups or hundreds of different languages. 
Thus, federalism is sometimes used as a synonym of the guarantee for cul-
tural difference and diversity, regardless of history or socio-economic cir-
cumstances. But is this true, and to what degree can cultural minorities be 
effectively protected?
First, we have to note that not all federations were designed to ensure 
cultural diversity. Indigenous peoples in the US, for instance, are pro-
tected through reservation areas but do not benefit from political auton-
omy in the form of their own state. As a nation of immigrants, the US still 
favours the ‘melting pot’ concept: it trusts the idea that the dominating 
white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant culture will assimilate all immigrants. 
The more important question, however, is whether federalism is really 
capable of protecting cultural difference and diversity, if that is the goal.
The experience is mixed. In South Africa, federalism seems to play an 
important role for the consolidation of a deeply divided society 
(Lemarchand 1997). But under the common roof of India’s or Nigeria’s 
immense cultural diversity, some shadows exist: there is evidence that in 
situations of serious crisis, federal structures in both countries are not used 
to solve conflicts (Iff 2009). In Canada, federalism could not prevent the 
French-speaking province of Quebec from twice calling a plebiscite on 
independence, in 1980 and 1995. In Belgium, which grants its two seg-
ments of French- and Dutch-speakers the utmost autonomy, national 
unity is said to be fading (Deschouwer 2012), held together only just by 
common symbols such as the monarchy, football, chocolate and beer.
This reminds us that federalism, giving either too little or too much way 
to minorities, runs the double risk of paving the way for unitary systems or 
breaking apart. One should not confound effects and cause, however. 
Modest success is partly due to the fact that it is primarily divided societies 
trying to integrate minorities through federalism (e.g. Walsh 2018). Such 
is the case with the most recent projects of federalisation in Nepal, 
Myanmar or Syria.
It may be useful to look at both the potential and limits of minority 
protection from a theoretical perspective (Kälin 1997; Linder 1997). The 
following conditions seem pertinent:
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 1. Minorities not too small in size but sufficient in number: Evidently a 
20% minority has greater chances to benefit from federal autonomy 
than a minority of 2%. For a single minority group, however, size 
alone may be of little help: it is always the same (regional) conflict 
which is at stake, and despite federalism, the same majority will have 
the last word. Conflicts may accumulate, as for instance in the for-
mer Czechoslovakia, which dissolved in 1993. If instead regional 
autonomy is claimed by several and different kinds of minorities, 
chances of protection are better: the problem becomes more ‘objec-
tive’, coalitions change, and compensations between different actors 
and issues are possible. Too great a number of minorities divided up 
into many units, however, may become a disadvantage. Nigeria, for 
instance, started with three regions, in 1960; today, not less than 36 
ethnic groups each have their own territory. While this may be rea-
sonable from the point of view of a single ethnic group, it lessens the 
influence of sub-national units over the central government, which 
can resort to a strategy of ‘divide and rule’.
 2. Cross-cutting cleavages: A single region may be characterised by sev-
eral political characteristics, for example, belonging to both a reli-
gious and linguistic minority whilst also being relatively poor. In this 
case, conflicts accumulate, as we have seen in the case of the Jura 
region, whose predominantly Catholic and French-speaking popu-
lation also felt neglected economically by Protestant, German-
speaking Bern (see Chap. 3), and chances of minority protection are 
less propitious than in situations of cross-cutting cleavages. If a 
minority region is not poorer but wealthier than others—as for 
instance the Basque Country in Spain—chances of its autonomy 
being respected are much more favourable.
 3. Effective political majority in a sub-national unit: Federalism only 
protects territorially segmented minorities, as in a pond which is 
divided into two parts, one for pikes and the other carp. But a carp 
swimming in the pikes’ part is not protected against being eaten. 
Similarly, even a large minority cannot benefit from federalism if 
does not constitute a political majority within the boundaries of at 
least one sub-national unit. For example, in Switzerland Muslims 
exceed the population of an average Swiss canton but are dis-
persed all over.
 4. No complete geographical division of ethno-cultural groups along the 
borders of sub-national units: In situations of serious conflict, feder-
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alisation is sometimes used to separate hostile ethnic groups. This 
was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when the Dayton Agreement 
of 1995 drew the borders of the sub-national units along the geo-
graphical borders of the Bosniak, Serb and Croatian communities. 
This helped foster peace at that time but inadvertently continued 
the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’. It led to ethnic regions with the risk 
of creating their own, internal minority problems. With ethnic polit-
ical parties, the ethnic cleavage and its conflicts may remain the cen-
tral concern of all politics. To a certain extent, this point thus seems 
to contradict point no. 3: minorities should be able to constitute a 
majority in, but not be able to exclusively dominate, a sub-national 
unit. Yet, this is not a contradiction, rather an unresolvable paradox: 
every minority protection through federalism creates a new minority 
problem. After each opening of a  Russian nested doll, a smaller 
Matryoshka becomes the biggest one. Under inversed roles, the 
minority in a country having become the majority of a sub-national 
unit has to find a new way to protect its own minority.
Looking at these four points, we notice that in Switzerland minority 
protection has benefitted from favourable conditions: the number and size 
of minorities was neither too small nor too large. Religious, cultural and 
economic cleavages were cross-cutting; this facilitated the development of 
national political parties which are not confined to language or ethnicity. 
Cross-cutting cleavages had the side effect that every member of the polit-
ical elite is somewhat part of a minority and a majority. A Radical, Catholic 
and French-speaking candidate from Valais has the advantage of belong-
ing to the linguistic and religious majority of her canton, but the handicap 
of politically representing a minority in a Christian-Democratic strong-
hold. Once elected to the National Council, however, she belongs to the 
bourgeois majority but the linguistic minority. Being in the majority and 
the minority at the same time is the experience of most Swiss politicians 
and citizens.
If these favourable conditions have aided a successful dealing with 
minority problems, it should be noted that federalism alone would prob-
ably not have helped much in the Swiss case. Federalism is only one part 
of the solution for minority integration, in Switzerland as much as else-
where. To achieve minority protection, federalism must be embedded in 
other institutional devices such as a non-religious, non-ethnic concept of 
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the state, a strong and effective tradition of human rights and institutional 
elements of political power-sharing (Fleiner et al. 2003).
6.2.3.5  Federalism and Democracy
Democracy is basically majority rule founded on the number of votes cast, 
each voter having an equal weight, whereas federalism implies equal or 
favourably weighted representation of uneven units. A common pattern of 
institutionally combining the two modes is bicameralism: government 
proposals have to be voted on in two parliamentary chambers, one repre-
senting the people, the other the member states. Yet, there are many ways 
to proceed. While taking part in the deliberation of all federal laws, 
Germany’s Bundesrat has full decision-making powers only in matters 
with consequences for the Länder. The chamber itself is composed of 
government representatives of the member states. Switzerland requires 
double majorities in parliament and a popular vote for any amendment to 
the Constitution, whereas the ratification of amendments to the US 
Constitution proposed by two-thirds majorities of Congress relies on indi-
vidually organised procedures of the states, where a majority of three 
quarters is required. In all these cases important government proposals 
have to find a double—or ‘compound’—majority.
Inevitably, the federal protection of territorial groups leads to a distor-
tion of the democratic principle of equal representation. The votes of indi-
viduals or representatives of member states with a small population are 
weighted more heavily than those of large member states. They can orga-
nise a veto to block democratic majorities. For Switzerland, where can-
tonal population size varies at a ratio of 1:42, we have already discussed 
the implications of the theoretical veto power of the smallest member 
states, who represent just 21% of the population (see Chap. 3). In other 
countries, such as the US, with similar population differences between its 
units, the consequences may be less important because a divide between 
large and small states is unlikely to happen. But there is no doubt that 
federalism, with its compound majorities, implies an infringement on the 
democratic principle of equally weighted votes (see also Mueller 2020).
Federalism has, however, two main advantages that can compensate for 
this cost. First, when conflicts arise, federalism is a constraint that ‘forces’ 
democratic majorities to bargain with federal minorities. In general, this 
favours the status quo. In practice, however, the reverse has applied in 
Switzerland too. Minorities of cantons may introduce innovations within 
their boundaries for which majorities at the national level are not found. 
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Later, when the innovation proves successful at cantonal level, the innova-
tion is accepted throughout. Federalism is therefore not only an institu-
tion ‘forcing’ negotiation to take place, but one that provides opportunities 
for social learning by trial, error and innovation.5
Second, the democratic costs of federalism at national level can be com-
pensated for by democratic gains in the regions. In fact, democratic fed-
erations are mostly conceived as multi-level democracies whose 
constitutions prescribe the same standards of liberal democracy for mem-
ber states and local governments. In such multi-level democracies, the 
political rights of citizens—the election of government officials, parlia-
mentary members and so on—have a much greater significance. Not only 
can voters participate more often, but they can also vote for different par-
ties and persons at different levels. A voter can express different prefer-
ences in local, regional and national politics. The frequency of elections 
provides citizens as well as authorities with permanent information on the 
popularity of ruling majorities. This phenomenon can be particularly well 
observed in Germany, where 16 Länder governments are elected during 
one term of the federal government. Changes of power in parliamentary 
democracies often make their way up and down the federal escalator. In a 
federation, not only the state but also democracy is closer to the people.
6.2.3.6  The Question of Secession
At a congress of East-European and Swiss constitutional lawyers held in 
Lausanne in 1990, one unforeseen issue dominated the discussions: how 
may a canton secede from the Swiss federation? Participants from 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Croatia and other places, eager to obtain advice on 
the then emerging desire for national independence, were somewhat dis-
appointed to hear that neither the Swiss Constitution nor legal scholars 
had thought much about the question of secession. Meanwhile, the his-
tory of Yugoslavia has given a series of answers: the de jure recognition of 
the first de facto secession of Croatia through West-European countries, 
the breakdown of the federation in an atrocious and destructive civil war, 
the secession of what is now North Macedonia by popular vote and, in the 
5 See the many scholarly contributions analysing subnational policy diffusion and/or inter-
cantonal cooperation, for example, Bochsler (2009), Fischer and Jager (2020), Füglister 
(2012), Füglister and Wasserfallen (2014), Gilardi and Füglister (2008), Sager and Rielle 
(2013), Schaltegger (2004), Schnabel and Mueller (2017), Stadter (2018), Strebel (2011), 
Strebel and Widmer (2012).
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case of Kosovo, again the de jure recognition of a de facto secession by 
several other countries and the international community. While civil war is 
to be rejected without discussion, the other answers leave many doubts. 
Should federations regulate secession? Can we think of a ‘right’ to secede, 
and if so, what should be the procedure and what would be its 
consequences?
International law provides only some general, fragmentary answers 
(Thürer and Burri 2009). Secession is lawful under the narrow circum-
stances of severe violation of human rights and in cases of de-colonisation. 
Nothing is said about federations and their paradoxical particularity: the 
federal polity gives its components ‘indestructible identity and autonomy’, 
which makes it more vulnerable to secession. At the same time, a federa-
tion is conceived as a permanent union—in contradistinction to a confed-
eral system which lacks such commitment. From this perspective, a 
secession clause seems to be needless: federalism, in historical perspective, 
is successful when it transforms a constitutional arrangement into a com-
mitment felt and accepted by all regions and their citizens, thus rendering 
the question of secession obsolete.
But this historical process can fail. Cultural segments may recall ancient 
dreams of independence well beyond federal autonomy. There may be ter-
ritorial segments that are systematically discriminated against. Instead of 
shaping the collective memory of a respectful pluralist experience, the 
passing of time then provides undeniable ‘proof’ of discrimination, creat-
ing alienation and justifying hatred among different groups (Esman 1990, 
14). Behind many ethnic conflicts we find the economic question of redis-
tribution. One region is unwilling to share the wealth coming from its 
natural resources with others, or inequalities of productivity and wealth 
are growing instead of diminishing. Another part of the country may feel 
to be the permanent loser. Conflicts on questions of the economy, lan-
guage, religion and culture may escalate and end up in deep divides. Once 
secession becomes unavoidable, a ‘peaceful divorce’ like the one in 
Czechoslovakia, where both parts in 1992 agreed to go separate ways, is 
unfortunately the rare exception. Rather we find a territorial minority 
seeking self-determination and secession against a majority of citizens who 
find it justified—and may even demand—that their national government 
defends the integrity of the state.
The case of Catalonia is highly instructive in this regard: as a reaction to 
the growing assertiveness of Catalan independentists in the 2010s, the far- 
right party VOX, which aims to defend Spanish unity and integrity, became 
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suddenly very popular. In the name of national unity, the conservative 
government of Spain was intransigent, even oppressive against the regional 
movement and its political leaders. As it refused to propose procedures 
designed to bring about a peaceful solution, the conflict is not overcome 
but stalled. The left-wing government of Pedro Sánchez, installed in 
January 2020, has at least agreed to a dialogue with the Catalan regional 
government.6 But at the same time it must be careful not to lose its politi-
cal support in the rest of the country.
Thus, it may not be absurd to formulate future secession rules. Two 
questions would have to be answered. First, under what circumstances 
should a federation be obliged to let one of its members go? If any mem-
ber is able to quit any time, the federation cannot function. If the decision 
has to be made unanimously by all members, the rules may be irrelevant 
because secession may become impossible. Therefore, the answer must lie 
somewhere in between. Second, who should have the right to claim seces-
sion? This question may be crucial because within the boundaries of a 
secessionist member state, we may find a (large) minority who would like 
to stay within the federation.
The case of the Jura region separating from the canton of Bern is 
instructive in this regard. As described in Chap. 3, first the people of every 
district and then also of every border municipality were given the right to 
decide on whether to stay with Bern or secede into the new canton of Jura. 
Thus, it was the popular majority in each district or even commune that 
defined the territorial boundaries of secession. The region was cut in 
two—one remaining with the old canton, the other founding its own. 
Although some political forces on both sides of the new border ended up 
unhappy, the division at least prevented the creation of a new minority 
problem: the minority that wanted to stay with the old canton was not 
overruled and was given the same right to self-determination as the sepa-
ratist majority. Yet even here, fragments of the conflict linger on: in 2017, 
the city of Moutier voted anew and decided to join Jura, but the result was 
later cancelled by the courts because of anomalies during the campaign 
and voting process. At the time of writing, when the vote will be repeated 
is unclear.
This leads us to the following conclusion: in most cases, territorial 
secession gives rise to as many new minority problems as it claims to 
6 See, for instance, https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2020/01/07/ineng-
lish/1578391109_970993.html. Accessed 1 April 2020.
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resolve. This is inevitable where territorial segmentation is not perfect. In 
the Czechoslovak ‘divorce’, for instance, the Slovak minority wished to 
free itself of Czech majority rule. But on Slovak territory today we find a 
minority of about 9% Hungarians among the 5.5 million Slovaks, as well 
as other important minorities such as Romani, Czechs, Russians, 
Ukrainians, Romanians, and so on—we are reminded again of the matry-
oshka allegory mentioned above. Therefore, the once popular idea of a 
nation-state based on one language or culture—still claimed by many 
secessionist movements—is ill-founded.
International law may inadvertently promote this problematic idea. 
The right to a ‘people’s self-determination’ is increasingly used as an argu-
ment for secession also by ethnic groups. The difficulties in defining the 
‘people’ that should be granted ‘self-determination’ may lead to inconsis-
tent interpretation and opportunistic intervention by the international 
community. In this respect, a comparative look at the secession of Serbia’s 
Kosovo, Georgia’s Abkhazia and South-Ossetia and Ukraine’s Crimea is 
revealing (Hehir 2009, Nielsen 2009, Paech 2019, 93).
Federations, all other things being equal, are more vulnerable to seces-
sion than unitary states. Two policies may help safeguarding their unity: 
one, to find solutions other than secession; two, to find these solutions 
without interference from the outside. As to the first policy, giving prob-
lematic regions special autonomy status is a reasonable alternative to even-
tual secession. It is a compromise that may ease tensions and leave both 
parts better off, as with Spain’s Basque Country. Special arrangements 
with particular sub-national units are known as ‘asymmetric federalism’ in 
the constitutions of India, Malaysia, Belgium, Canada and others (Brown 
2005; Watts 2008).
Second, rules for secession should serve the one and only objective of 
preventing future secession. This seems paradoxical at first but is not. 
Rules of secession may change the balance of power: openly and clearly 
specifying the conditions of eventual secession may strengthen the posi-
tion of sensitive territorial minorities and give them more bargaining 
power against the central government. If installed well before a conflict 
breaks out, such rules may lead to more cooperative processes in the fed-
eral polity and reduce the risk of secession. Two young federations, both 
with considerable potentials of conflict, Ethiopia and Sudan, have installed 
rules for secession. While in the latter case the South seceded in 2011, 
time will tell whether in the former the provision works as proposed here.
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6.2.4  Non-Territorial Federalism
The idea of a territorial state that has exclusive power over all the people 
living within its borders is relatively recent. The older concept of political 
power was based more on the idea of personality. For instance, following 
the Germanic invasions of various provinces of the Roman Empire, there 
lived—side by side and under the sway of the same ‘barbarian’ ruler—ex- 
Roman citizens and members of one of the Germanic tribal confedera-
tions (such as Goths, Vandals, Burgundians, Franks and Lombards). Yet in 
most cases, and over a considerable period of time, the two groups 
remained distinct entities, and what mattered before the law was who the 
defendant was, not where he was living. Romans were judged by Roman 
law, the new Germanic settlers by their old Germanic customary law. Both 
groups regarded this practice as proper and, indeed, as ‘a precious safe-
guard of their respective rights and privileges’ (Ra’anan 1990, 14).
With industrialisation and the development of bureaucratic statehood, 
West-European countries led the way in becoming territorial states. Under 
the principle of ius soli, the territorial state claims full jurisdiction over its 
citizens—whatever their origin. Earlier we described part of this evolution 
for Switzerland. In its religiously segmented society of the nineteenth cen-
tury, marriage and education were regulated and organised separately for 
Protestants and Catholics by their churches. Whereas the label ‘State 
Church’ has not completely disappeared, churches have by now mostly 
lost their status as actors in public affairs in favour of the confessionally 
indifferent state which provides for Protestant and Catholic citizens alike 
and under the same laws.
Yet, the principle of ius sanguinis has not completely disappeared. In 
the last days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Karl Renner and Otto 
Bauer proposed forms of non-territorial or corporate federalism to resolve 
the nationalities problem: ‘Within each region of self-government, the 
national minorities shall form corporate entities with public judicial status, 
enjoying full autonomy in caring for the education of the national minor-
ity concerned, as well as in extending legal assistance to their co-nationals 
vis-à-vis the bureaucracy and the courts’ (cit. in Ra’anan 1990). Such cor-
porate federalism was introduced for cultural minorities in Estonia in 
1925, in Cyprus under the 1960 Constitution and lately for Burmese 
minorities (Coakley 2017).
The most prominent example, however, is Belgium where federalisa-
tion since 1970 has taken both territorial and non-territorial forms. The 
country is divided into the regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. But 
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Belgium is also divided into a Flemish- (comprising both the territorially 
defined area of Flanders and the corporately defined group of Flemish- 
speakers in Brussels), a French- (comprising both the region of Wallonia 
and francophone Bruxellois) and a German-speaking community (Eupen/
Malmédy located within Wallonia) (Jans 2000; Deschouwer 2012).
Corporate federalism allows a minority to maintain its own public insti-
tutions without territorial segmentation. This raises two questions. The 
first is: what are the limits of cultural minorities’ right to run their own 
public institutions? This eventually depends on the concept of the state, 
the constitution and a society’s ideas of pluralism. Therefore, we find dif-
ferent answers even for the same issue. In Switzerland’s public education, 
for instance, French-speaking schools in the German part of the country 
are well accepted as an element of multilingualism. Religious schools, 
however, were declared non-constitutional by the laic majority of the 
nineteenth century because in its view these schools violated the separa-
tion of state and church. Today, schools of religious and other communi-
ties are tolerated under certain conditions but at any rate must respect 
constitutional freedoms, such as gender equality or freedom of speech. 
Constitutional law sets the principles which are to be respected by all seg-
ments of a pluralist society. But these principles and concepts of pluralism 
vary considerably.
The second question deals with consequences: can non-territorial fed-
eralism keep the balance of unity and diversity, or do parallel institutions, 
exclusively reserved to cultural minorities, lead to ever deeper social divi-
sions undermining unity? In the literature, the question remains contro-
versial. While some observers of the Belgian case fear the latter, others see 
non-territorial federalism as a promising approach to ‘identity politics’ 
(White 2000; Deschouwer 2012).
6.3  Power-sharing anD consensus Democracy
6.3.1  Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy: A Comparison
If there is one continuous thread in Swiss political history, it is probably 
the desire to prevent winners from taking all, leaving losers with noth-
ing—or, in other words, power-sharing. It is found in the Constitution, in 
the federal bargain between Protestants and Catholics, in the compromise 
between centralists and partisans of cantonal autonomy, and in the devel-
opment of proportional representation—first for the election of parlia-
ment, then for the Federal Council, and later for the bureaucracy, expert 
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committees and even the courts. All this gives minorities the opportunity 
to participate. The law-making political elites, in order to minimise refer-
enda risks, try to arrive at a political compromise that includes all impor-
tant political groups. Power-sharing provided the solution to the problem 
of integrating a heterogeneous, multicultural society by political means. It 
has led to a type of democracy different from others.
The combination of these elements through the Swiss Konkordanz, 
which avoids alternating government and opposition forces, may be 
unique but power-sharing, as a mode of democracy different from major-
ity rule, is not. Arend Lijphart (1969, 1977, 1984, 1999, 2012), a promi-
nent scholar comparing political institutions, has called this ‘consociational’, 
‘power-sharing’ or ‘consensus’ democracy, a type of democracy different 
from the ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ model of democracy (Table 6.2).7
7 See also Steiner (1974). For a recent comparative discussion of consociationalism, see the 
December 2019 special issue of the Swiss Political Science Review: ‘Half A Century of 
Consociationalism—Cases and Comparisons’ (Bogaards and Helms 2019).
Table 6.2 Lijphart’s types of majoritarian and consensus democracy
Majoritarian democracy Consensus democracy
1. Executive Concentration of power in 
one-party and bare-majority 
cabinet
Power-sharing in broad 
coalition cabinet
2. Relations between 
government and 
parliament
Cabinet dominance Balance of power
3. Political parties Two-party system Multi-party system
4. Electoral system Majoritarian and disproportional Proportional 
representation
5. System of interest 
groups influence
Pluralism Corporatism
6. Government structure Unitary and centralised Federal and decentralised
7. Parliament Concentration of legislative power 
in unicameral legislature
Strong bicameralism
8. Type of Constitution Flexibility, simple procedure of 





9. Judicial review Absent or weak Strong
10. Central bank Controlled by executive High degree of 
autonomy
Source: Lijphart (2012)
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These two types of democracy represent coherent and therefore ideal 
polities maximising the basic ideas of either majoritarian or power-sharing 
politics. It is easy to identify Switzerland and the UK as two polities that 
correspond to most criteria of one of the models. The UK systematically 
favours the logic of majority rule: competitive elections between two main 
parties based on one major political division (left-right) lead to clear par-
liamentary majorities. The winner-takes-all rule makes parliamentary 
majorities sensitive to even small changes in the electorate’s preferences; 
the losing party becomes Her Majesty’s Official Opposition. Because of its 
parliamentary majority, the executive cabinet is empowered to realise its 
policy programme, as long as there is no successful vote of no confidence, 
which may necessitate an early election. Power is concentrated among the 
parliamentary majority and the cabinet. The House of Lords has few com-
petencies; almost all legislative power belongs to the House of Commons. 
The latter may change constitutional documents in the same way as any 
other laws, with very few judicial constraints. One may speak of a nearly 
‘sovereign’ parliament, with the main exceptions of devolution of power 
to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and of some independence 
given to the Bank of England. A similar coherence of elements, but with 
the opposite goal of power-sharing and negotiating politics, is found in 
the consensus model of Switzerland. Lately, both Switzerland and the UK 
have somewhat moved away from the ideal models in becoming less con-
sensual, the first, and less majoritarian, the latter.
Majoritarian and consensus democracy are more than descriptions of 
two special cases in abstract terms. Lijphart’s typology was particularly 
seminal in a comparative perspective. His updated study of 2012 shows 
how 36 countries can be situated on a continuum from majoritarian to 
consensus democracy. In this two-dimensional Fig. 6.2, Lijphart’s ten cri-
teria are organised into two groups. The horizontal dimension sums up all 
indicators of the political process of parliament and government that lead 
to majoritarian or power-sharing politics (characteristics 1–5 in Table 6.2). 
On the vertical dimension, we characteristics 5–10, which essentially rep-
resent a unitary-federal continuum. Unsurprisingly, almost all federa-
tions—Canada, the US, Austria, Germany, India and Switzerland—are 
located in the upper part.
Federalism therefore shows up as an important structural element of 
consensus democracy but is not as decisive as one could expect. Canada 
and the US are two countries combining federalism with majoritarian pro-
cesses of politics. In the Scandinavian countries, Lijphart found only 
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characteristics of power-sharing unrelated to federalism: multi-party sys-
tems, proportional representation, grand coalition cabinets designed to 
integrate different political forces, corporatism and a balance of power 
between cabinet and parliament. We note that the UK and Switzerland, as 
mentioned above, still end up as ‘ideal’ majoritarian or consensual cases 
because their respective logics of structure and process coincide.
Does power-sharing make a difference? Yes, says Lijphart. In many of 
his comparative studies he found evidence for a different performance of 
politics in majoritarian and consensus democracies:
Indeed, the results could hardly be clearer: consensus democracy—on the 
executives-parties dimension—makes a big and highly favourable difference 
with regard to almost all of the indicators of democratic quality and with 




























































Fig. 6.2 Majoritarian and consensus democracy: a two-dimensional conceptual 
map. (Source: own calculations and figure, using Lijphart’s (2012) data. Shown 
are average values for 1981–2010. Countries: ARG: Argentina; AUS: Australia; 
AT: Austria; BAH: Bahamas; BAR: Barbados; B: Belgium; BOT: Botswana; CAN: 
Canada; CR: Costa Rica; DK: Denmark; FIN: Finland; FR: France; D: Germany; 
GRE: Greece; IS: Iceland; IND: India; IR: Ireland; ISR: Israel; ITA: Italy; JAM: 
Jamaica; J: Japan; KOR: South-Korea; LUX: Luxembourg; MAL: Malta; MAU: 
Mauritius; NL: Netherlands; NOR: Norway; NZ: New Zealand; POR: Portugal; 
E: Spain; SWE: Sweden; CH: Switzerland; TRI: Trinidad and Tobago; UK: United 
Kingdom; URU: Uruguay; and US: United States)
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With regard to the developing world, we could add a further point: 
power-sharing helps democratisation. Drawing on Lijphart, Linder & 
Bächtiger et al. (2005) developed a concept of power-sharing applicable 
also to non-consolidated democracies or even authoritarian regimes. In a 
comparative study of 62 countries from Africa and Asia, they found that 
between 1965 and 1995, power-sharing and the cultural element of low 
familism turned out to be the strongest predictors of democratisation. 
Economic factors—often viewed as the most important variables shaping 
democratisation—had only limited effects.
6.3.2  Democratic Power-Sharing: A Key to Resolving Conflicts 
in Multicultural Societies
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this book illustrate what political power-sharing 
has done for Switzerland: complementing federalism, it became the key 
element in integrating a community of two religions and four languages. 
Later it provided the Swiss with a collective identity strong enough to 
defend their political independence in periods of war abroad, and it helped 
to overcome some class struggles. Power-sharing—considered by political 
scientists as the most appropriate form of democracy for pluralist or seg-
mented societies—has even turned Switzerland into a relatively homoge-
neous society, in spite of its different languages. From this perspective, the 
‘paradigmatic case of political integration’ (Deutsch 1976) of Switzerland 
has been an undeniable success. Can power-sharing and consensus democ-
racy also be used by other countries facing the problem of multicultural 
integration (see also Iff and Töpperwien 2008)?
The question is pertinent. The integration of different cultures through 
political institutions has become an important issue worldwide, at a much 
larger scale, and with more difficult problems than in the case of 
Switzerland. We mentioned India with its many hundred languages and 
idioms; some of Africa’s sub-Saharan states are faced with the challenge of 
forming conglomerates of dozens of ethnic tribes which never before in 
history had been united together under a common political regime. In the 
new order of worldwide liberalisation and open markets, if the money 
does not go to the poor, the poor will go where the money is. Millions of 
people are migrating within the Third World or from the Third World to 
more developed countries (Milanovic 2016).
This has also led to the intertwining and confrontation of different 
cultures which once had been quite separated. European countries are 
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experiencing growing immigration from overseas. In California or New 
Mexico, US states with strong immigration, a considerable part of the 
population are Spanish speakers. They do not identify with the culture of 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and the melting pot idea of assimilation is 
fading. Today, a large majority of the countries considered as sovereign 
states constitute multicultural societies. Yet conflicts between different 
groups of language, religion or ethnicity are salient in all regions of the 
world. Historical minority problems in industrialised democracies have 
not faded away, and in Europe immigration has led to new social tensions.
Gurr (2000) estimated that at the beginning of the millennium, about 
275 minority groups from 100 countries, representing one seventh of the 
world population, were politically endangered. Instead of classical war 
between states, we increasingly find armed conflict between different 
groups in deeply divided societies—such as in Syria, Libya, Sri Lanka or 
Pakistan, to mention just a few. In many cases, the causes of internal con-
flict boil down to conflict over resources, but political escalation, alien-
ation and mass mobilisation are often based on cultural difference or 
intertwined with discrimination (Lake and Rothchild 1998).
In order to prevent minority problems becoming salient or even esca-
lating into violent forms of ethno-politics, more, or better, political inte-
gration is needed. Is power-sharing or consensus democracy appropriate 
for the problems of multicultural coexistence and integration, and 
if so why?
To begin with, we notice that the predominant model of democracy is 
majoritarian. Before spreading all over the world, majoritarian democracy 
was invented and first practised by white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. They 
shared common cultural values and beliefs and spoke a common language. 
Westminster democracy is (or was, after Brexit) a perfectly adequate 
decision- making procedure for the solution of social conflicts in Britain’s 
industrial society. Part of the voters, not being tied to an ideological posi-
tion, are open to the question of whether the country needs more liberties 
for entrepreneurs or more social protection of workers. According to the 
economic situation and the performance of the last government, the 
British may vote in a pragmatic way: first for the Conservatives, twice for 
Labour and eventually again for the Conservatives. This change of indi-
vidual preferences sums up to changing political majorities and to alternat-
ing roles of government and opposition.
In multicultural societies, however, majoritarian democracy may 
encounter serious difficulties. Cultural values, beliefs and languages are 
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not only heterogeneous, but may also lead to different political prefer-
ences that do not change: parents cannot opt out of sending their children 
to schools held in their own language, or discard their religious beliefs, 
without giving up part of their cultural identity. Individuals or groups can-
not ‘free’ themselves from their cultural heritage, or only at great cost to 
themselves. In such situations, minorities cannot hope to gain much from 
majoritarian democracy. If the dominant cultural majority is large enough, 
it will not have to take into account the preferences of the minority (e.g. 
O’Leary 2019, 558).
In the worst case, a government’s chances of re-election under the 
winner- takes-all rule even increase if it offers special benefits to its own 
cultural group while discriminating against the minority. If majoritarian 
democracy does not offer a regular change of power, it suffers from three 
deficiencies:
 1. Despite elections, the political majority becomes ‘eternal’, which 
goes against the basic idea of majoritarian democracy.
 2. Such an ‘eternal’ government has no incentives to take into account 
the needs and preferences of minorities. It can afford not to learn, 
which is the pathologic use of power.
 3. Majority rule may further alienate those cultural segments which 
find themselves always in a minority position.
Tocqueville’s, Madison’s or J. S. Mill’s criticism of democracy as a ‘tyr-
anny of the majority’ is therefore well founded. This has led to corrective 
institutions, such as rule of law, basic rights for individuals, federalism or 
particular autonomy rights for regions and minority groups. A further cor-
rective element is political power-sharing. Lijphart, already in the first ver-
sions of his theory, proposed that consensus democracy is better suited 
than majoritarian institutions for multiculturally segmented societies. The 
theoretical reason is obvious: consensus democracy gives societal minori-
ties a chance to participate in political power and have a voice in the poli-
cies of the government which cannot be overheard. By mutual agreement 
and compromise, societal divides may be eased or even overcome.
Looking at the classical power-sharing democracies of Switzerland, 
Belgium or the Netherlands, Lijphart’s proposition makes sense. The case 
of Northern Ireland, where elements of power-sharing were introduced as 
part of the peace-process between Protestant Unionists and Catholic 
Republicans, is at least promising (e.g. McGlinchey 2019). Finally, India 
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shows that elements of informal power-sharing can be useful also in devel-
oping countries and under conditions fundamentally different from small 
European states (see, however, Adeney and Swenden 2019).
On the African continent, we find contradictory experiences (Remond 
2015): in South Africa, power-sharing enabled the passage from Apartheid 
to democracy, allowing the white minority as well as different black eth-
nicities to participate. The power-sharing pact in Rwanda in 1993, how-
ever, could neither outweigh conflicts on resources nor put an end to the 
historical hostilities between Hutu and Tutsi, once fuelled by the colonial 
powers. An atrocious civil war followed. Moreover, peace agreements in 
divided societies such as in Bosnia, Cambodia, Burundi or East Timor, 
often arranged by the international community, proved to be of moderate 
success despite provisions for political power-sharing (Mukherjee 2004). 
Against this background, one is not surprised to find a controversial aca-
demic debate. Critics of Lijphart state that power-sharing is not helpful for 
peace-making or even that it undermines democratisation (e.g. Sisk 1996; 
Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Norris 2008; Lijphart 2008).
Much of this academic critique departs from an inadequate baseline, as 
it does not compare majoritarian with consensus democracy as a sustain-
able institutional arrangement under equal conditions. Rather, it evaluates 
the short-term success of power-sharing agreements as part of the peace- 
making process. It is obvious that the transformation of peace-treaties into 
stable democratic institutions bears high risks and can fail for many rea-
sons. From a vast literature, one can learn that the consolidation of democ-
racy entails a long process also under more favourable conditions than 
present in war-torn societies. In developing countries, much depends on 
the existence of a consolidated state, chances for economic development 
and the compatibility of the cultural heritage with social modernisation 
(Senghaas 1997; Carothers 1999; Leftwich 1996; Moore 2001; Przeworski 
et al. 2000; Linder and Bächtiger 2005).
Power-sharing peace arrangements after armed conflicts in deeply 
divided societies may be a good beginning, but that is not the same as an 
established constitutional order, and only part of a consensus democracy 
yet to be developed. When it boils down to the relevant question of com-
paring majoritarian with power-sharing institutions, empirical evidence 
favours the latter (Lijphart 2008; Norris 2008):
 1. Proportional representation has a high symbolic value, favouring the 
development of mutual respect between different cultural groups. The 
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self-esteem and political recognition of minority groups are an 
essential precondition for any rational political discourse and accom-
modation among elites. To promote this objective, proportional 
representation can be practised in many places: in the electoral sys-
tem, in parliament, in the executive, in all branches of the adminis-
tration or also in the police and armed forces. Of course, proportional 
representation has some pitfalls. Under the conditions of one single 
minority or a single cleavage, there is a risk that proportional repre-
sentation perpetuates societal conflict instead of cooling it down. 
With more than one  minority and cross-cutting cleavages, however, 
proportionality may favour the development of non-ethnic, non-
regional political parties, elites and cultures. The evolution from a 
divided into a pluralist society lets old cleavages fade into the 
background.
 2. Proportional representation favours negotiation and accommodation 
of conflicts whereby minorities have an effective voice. The veto power 
of minorities does not suspend the formal rule of majority decision. 
Yet, where minorities are permanently participating in decisions, 
formal decisions imply negotiation and accommodation, avoiding 
‘winner takes all’ situations and mindsets. For example, right since 
1848, French-speakers have always had at least one, most often two 
representatives in the seven-seat Swiss government (Giudici and 
Stojanovic ́ 2016, 297). The effective voice of minorities depends on 
two conditions. The first is mutual recognition of the different parts 
of the political elite. This opens the door to cooperation on a ratio-
nal basis. On such a basis, solutions turning zero-sum into positive-
sum games become feasible. Cooperation then is more advantageous 
than non- cooperation because it leaves all parts better off. The sec-
ond condition is alternating, issue-specific coalitions. If today’s 
opponent is tomorrow’s coalition partner, both are partly depen-
dent on each other. This favours a political culture of mutual respect 
and support. Empirically, under power-sharing conditions politi-
cians listen more to each other and give more weight to arguments 
of their opponents than in majoritarian situations (Bächtiger et al. 
2005; Steenbergen 2009). Thus, proportional representation and 
power-sharing are more promising arenas for deliberative democracy.
 3. Political cooperation among political elites may encourage general 
patterns of amicable intercultural relations. Cooperation in parlia-
mentary and executive bodies not only promotes compromises on 
6 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
254
political issues. It may also, through frequent interaction and mutual 
dependency, lead to a better understanding between different cul-
tural segments and the development of common values. This pro-
cess may at first be limited to the political elites, but it can then 
‘trickle down’ to larger segments of society.
 4. Federalism or decentralisation may be more effective for multicultural 
co-existence if combined with other elements of power-sharing. 
Federalism may be considered a structural element of power-shar-
ing. While restricting the power of the central government, it can 
guarantee autonomy for different cultural segments in territorial 
sub-divisions. Like basic individual rights or statutory minority 
rights and vetoes, federalism is an institutional mechanism restrict-
ing majority rule and limiting majority politics. Federalism as a ‘ver-
tical’ dimension of power-sharing has its deficiencies, however, as we 
have discussed in the previous part of this chapter. Yet in combina-
tion with the ‘horizontal’ elements of political power-sharing, feder-
alism and decentralisation may become more effective for minority 
voice and protection (Fleiner et al. 2003).
 5. Consensus democracy rejects the hegemonic claims of a single group and 
avoids the fallacy of a monocultural nation-state. Consensus democ-
racy is viable only under conditions of recognition of equality of all 
societal cultures and their groups before the state. Thus, political 
power- sharing requires a certain acceptance of societal and cultural 
pluralism. This pluralism must be instilled into the basic concept of 
the state: the latter must guarantee equal rights to all its citizens and 
renounce on undue privileges for a specific culture and thus dis-
criminate others. In contrast to the cultural or ‘ethnic nation’, this 
amounts to a political or ‘civic’ conception of the nation 
(Verfassungspatriotismus, for Habermas 1992), where citizenship is 
the only qualification for membership. Such a concept is basically 
indifferent to the religion, language or ethnicity of its different 
groups. Of course, every constitutional order, to a certain degree, is 
characterised by the heritage of a specific culture and its predomi-
nant values. The idea of separation of religion and the state, for 
instance, is realised in different ways and to different degrees in 
industrialised Western democracies (Madeley and Enyedi 2003). 
These differences may be greater still in developing societies where 
ligatures of religion are much stronger. Non-industrialised, tradi-
tional societies exposed to outside pressure of accelerating moderni-
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sation are sometimes even pushed towards relying on religion and 
other cultural traditions. However, values that symbolise a precious 
good for one cultural segment may be threatening for another. Such 
divides can be overcome only by the development of equal rights, 
mutual respect among all cultural groups and the development of 
common—or at least neutral—values. Such a collective identity or 
political culture requires a high degree of indifference or impartiality 
on the part of state authorities towards particular cultures.
 6. The development of a political culture of power-sharing takes time. A 
new constitution can be written in a few weeks, political parties 
founded, elections held, and a parliament and government installed 
in a few years. Successful democratisation, however, takes much lon-
ger because the consolidation of institutions, the functioning of the 
political process, and the appropriate behaviour of actors all neces-
sitate the development of a democratic political culture. In times of 
global pressure towards accelerated modernisation and quick con-
flict intervention by the international community, it should not be 
forgotten that changes in social values, the development of common 
views among different segments and cultural pluralism are processes 
of social integration that take time. Even more patience is needed 
when it comes to power- sharing as a means to overcome societal 
divides and accommodate deep social conflicts. The wounds of dis-
crimination and civil war take generations to heal (Esman 1990, 
14ff.). More than majoritarian settings, power-sharing institutions 
incite a ‘spirit of accommodation’ (Lijphart  1968, 104), respect, 
trust or even ‘deliberative potentials’ (Steenbergen 2009, 287). But 
these incentives cannot be accelerated, are even weak and vulnera-
ble. While trust in consensus democracy takes a long time to develop, 
it may quickly be destroyed by the hegemonic use of power.
 7. Consensus democracy provides better chances, but still no guarantee for 
the peaceful resolution of conflict in multicultural societies. Peaceful 
conflict resolution in deeply divided societies depends on many cir-
cumstances: on the economy and resources, neighbours and foreign 
interests, on culture and history—and on the political institutions. 
The latter are just one of many factors. The only proposition here is 
made with regard to the type of democracy: if the choice is between 
majoritarian and consensus institutions, the latter provide better 
chances for the resolution of multicultural conflict. In theory, there 
are two major arguments against consensus democracy. First, it is 
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said that the political will to share power depends to a great extent 
on political elites, and that power-sharing can turn into an elitist 
model of democracy. Second, consensus democracy can be used by 
hegemonic groups as a veil to hide their real power in giving minori-
ties the opportunity to participate but no substantial influence 
(McRae 1990). In this case, which can be observed for instance in 
the relations between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in 
Israel, Ian Lustick (1980) speaks of a ‘control model’, with charac-
teristics entirely different from the consensus model. Neither argu-
ment devalues the consensus model as such—but they illustrate its 
limits: the consensus model offers better chances or opportunities 
than majoritarian democracy, yet there is no guarantee that a suc-
cessful political integration through mutual adjustment will actu-
ally occur.
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Over the last few decades, worldwide politics was characterised by globali-
sation (e.g. Dreher et al. 2008, 64ff.). In Switzerland, globalisation has by 
and large become a question of Europeanisation (e.g. Gava et al. 2014; 
Hirschi et al. 1999; Jenni 2016). This development has had strong impacts 
on Swiss policies, its politics and even on its polity. In the first part of this 
chapter, we discuss how Swiss democracy has reacted to challenges com-
ing from the outside. At the same time, other countries show a growing 
interest in Swiss institutions, which seem to offer several advantages such 
as political stability, participation and conflict resolution. How can other 
countries learn from the Swiss experience? We discuss this question in the 
second part of this chapter.
7.1  EuropEanisEd but not a MEMbEr 
of thE Eu: Why?
One of the most encountered questions of a Swiss abroad is, Why is 
Switzerland not a member of the EU? Indeed, it seems strange that this 
small country, so intensely interwoven with the European market and geo-
graphically situated at the heart of Europe, is not a member of the 
EU. How come that the Swiss are unwilling to participate in this common 
experience of 27 EU members? And how come that the Swiss, albeit stay-
ing out of Brussels’ institutions, are sharing a good part of the acquis 
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communautaire, the entire body of EU law binding for all member states? 
Without going too much into the details of this development, the answer 
has three parts.
7.1.1  Direct Democracy
As explained in Chap. 4, in Switzerland all important international treaties 
are subject to a mandatory referendum and need, in case of constitutional 
amendments, a majority of the people and the cantons in a popular vote. 
This has strongly determined the way of Switzerland’ European integra-
tion. EU politics began in 1972, when the people approved the free trade 
agreement signed with what was then the European Economic Community 
(EEC). In 1992, the EEC offered to the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) the European Economic Area (EEA). This offer was particularly 
interesting for EFTA members (among them Switzerland since 1960) 
who were sceptical of political cooperation beyond free trade arrange-
ments. While the other EFTA members accepted, Switzerland said ‘no’ to 
the EEA treaty. The reason was direct democracy. Although a large parlia-
mentary majority accepted the EEA, 16 cantons and 50.3% of voters 
rejected the treaty in a historical popular vote of December 1992 (Fig. 7.1). 
Opposition came mainly from rural areas in the German-speaking parts of 
Switzerland, and it was organised by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
The vote of 1992 left a divided country (Seitz 2014, 149; Mueller and 
Heidelberger 2019).
The result was not only a shock for the government. The pro-European 
elites were most surprised that public opinion in many parts of the country 
expressed a preference for ‘Switzerland staying neutral and sovereign’. 
Opposition against EU integration became the main and everlasting issue 
of the SVP and a magnet attracting all Eurosceptics. Subsequently, this 
national-conservative party became the strongest political force in 
Switzerland, its electoral strength almost tripling in 30 years. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the pro-European forces were not able to mobilise as 
strongly—not even close: Their popular initiative to start immediate nego-
tiations with Brussels on EU membership was rejected by over 75% of 
voters and all cantons in 2002.
The Federal Council, aware of the strong opposition against EU inte-
gration, thus sought a compromise. In its will to consolidate and extend 
vitally important economic relations with the EU, it negotiated a minimal 
solution satisfactory enough for Brussels and gaining sufficient domestic 
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support to overcome the referendum challenge. That solution consisted in 
two series of bilateral treaties with the EU, a sort of participation à la carte 
but without the voice and influence of a full member state. The treaties 
were accepted by the people in 2000 and 2005. The strategy of ‘bilater-
als’, a key political concept ever since, opened the EU market for Swiss 
companies, goods and persons in several economic areas. Even so, the 
EU-opposition did not miss a chance to challenge further integration 
steps which, in its eyes, went too far. Thus, through the optional referen-
dum, the SVP challenged, albeit without success, extending the free move-
ment of persons to the EU’s new members in 2005 and 2009; the payment 
of around one billion for ‘cohesion’ purposes in 2006; the introduction of 
biometric passports in 2009; and the tightening of the Swiss gun law in 
line with Schengen/Dublin requirements in 2019 (Linder et  al. 2010, 
658ff. and 667f.; Swissvotes 2019).
Yet in 2014 the people and cantons accepted the SVP’s initiative 
‘against mass immigration’ (Masseneinwanderung/MEI). It demanded 






people cantons (white filling if cantonal majority not needed)
Fig. 7.1 Share of the pro-EU vote in 14 referenda, 1972–2020 [%]. (Note: 
shown is the percentage of people as well as of cantons approving a proposal, 
except for the ‘EU negotiations’ (1997), ‘MEI’ and ‘ECOPOP’ (both 2014) and 
‘limitation’ initiatives (2020), where rejecting shares are shown since in these cases 
Eurosceptics vote yes. In quotation marks = popular initiatives; *=double majority 
of people and cantons needed. Data from Swissvotes (2020))
7 SWITZERLAND IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD 
268
purposes every year. This was clearly an infringement of the bilateral trea-
ties. Brussels was not willing to negotiate exceptions to the principle of the 
free movement of persons and, in the worst case, could have sanctioned 
Switzerland with cancelling the first series of bilateral treaties (guillotine 
clause). Reluctant to take this risk, the Swiss parliament passed a law that, 
instead of implementing quotas, strove for a better integration of unem-
ployed persons. Although decried by the SVP as ‘betraying the will of the 
people’, the party refrained from using the optional referendum to fight 
the implementing law. Instead, it launched another popular initiative—
one to simply cancel the agreement on the free movement of persons. 
However, in September 2020 more than 60% of the people and all but 3.5 
cantons rejected the “limitation initiative” (Swissvotes 2020).
Meanwhile, the Swiss government and the EU have negotiated a new 
agreement covering five existing and all future market access treaties as 
well as defining a new dispute resolution mechanism. Besides the obliga-
tion to accept all future developments of the acquis communautaire, the 
draft of the treaty implies that also the Swiss social partnership, up to now 
autonomously regulated between capital and labour representatives, 
should fall under the control of the European Court. This and other pro-
visions are highly controversial, also among the large majority of Swiss 
who so far have found the path of bilateral treaties to correspond almost 
ideally to their preferences of maximum economic but minimum political 
integration. By early 2021, the political fate of the new agreement with 
the EU remains uncertain.
Figure 7.1 displays the results of all 14 popular votes held in Switzerland 
between 1972 and 2020 that were more or less directly related to the 
EU.  It shows the importance of direct democracy in all questions of 
European integration. While no other country grants people such direct 
participation in foreign policy, in Switzerland it is almost primordial. It 
includes not only the principled question of giving up autonomy rights in 
favour of European integration, but also all major legislative acts related to 
the EU. This applies also to further developments of the ‘bilaterals’. While 
these correspond to the preferences of the majority of the Swiss people, 
they are, as a special treatment, not well seen in Brussels. The far-reaching 
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consequences of direct democracy are clear: if Switzerland were a repre-
sentative democracy, the majority of its parliament would have accepted 
the EEA and probably even EU membership by now. It is the majority of 
the people (and cantons) who think differently and who, so far at least, 
have made the difference.
7.1.2  National Autonomy and Political Neutrality
The voting campaign on the EEA in 1992 was dominated by two clearly 
opposing camps: on the one side, pro-Europeans highlighting the com-
mercial advantages offered by the treaty and defending the idea of an 
‘open Switzerland’. On the other side, opponents winning the popular 
vote with two catchwords: ‘sovereignty’ and ‘neutrality’. While it came as 
a surprise that the conservative idea of a ‘closed Switzerland’ triumphed, it 
can be explained by the wisdom of hindsight. Official history had exces-
sively stressed the role of political neutrality as the decisive policy of 
national survival in World Wars I and II. Pretending that neutrality was 
seemingly compatible with the EEA was not credible for many and gave 
opponents a considerable advantage.
Similarly so regarding ‘sovereignty’. Swiss foreign policy was an advo-
cate of free trade worldwide and closely connected to international eco-
nomic organisations. But at the same time the government had been 
against international cooperation on the ‘political’ level for a long time. In 
this respect it was extremely cautious in the name of national sovereignty 
and neutrality. The opposition’s claim that Switzerland would ‘lose’ its 
sovereignty and neutrality as part of the EEA was certainly a populist exag-
geration. But it seemed credible enough to an important part of the elec-
torate—and the government had not yet developed an explanation for its 
policy change (see also Gabriel 2019; Mueller and Heidelberger 2019).
Finally, the Swiss highly value their political institutions as they are: they 
belong to the very few things which the multilingual Swiss have in com-
mon (see Chap. 2). Political neutrality, autonomy and federalism as a 
means to avoid any form of centralisation still belong to the core values of 
a popular (and especially cantonal) majority—and won’t change so soon. 
Even so, there are differences in the degree to which the linguistic com-
munities, and people living in cities or on the countryside, favour interna-
tional cooperation and European integration (e.g. Widmer and Buri 1992; 
Kriesi et al. 1996; Linder et al. 2008b; Seitz 2014).
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7.1.3  The Political Economy of Globalisation 
and Europeanisation
Switzerland profits from globalisation. Its specialised industrial products 
and services (precision machinery, pharmaceutics, watches, etc.) have bet-
ter export chances on liberalised markets. Political stability attracts inter-
national capital, and Swiss businesses profit from abundant credit at low 
interest rates. Big multinational firms like Philipp Morris, Alphabet, 
Glencore and many others place part of their service activities in 
Switzerland. Big cities such as Zurich, Geneva, Basel and Lausanne, while 
small in international comparison, are flourishing. Political neutrality 
allowed Switzerland to be one of the first to recognise the regime of 
Communist China in 1950, then a poor developing country. This pays out 
70 years later in bilateral treaties, China meanwhile being one of the most 
promising markets for Swiss exports. In 2013, Switzerland and China 
signed a comprehensive bilateral Free Trade Agreement, called a ‘mile-
stone’ by a leading Swiss business association (Economiesuisse 2016). 
This fits into the big picture drawn by the economist Milanović (2019), 
according to whom small nations like Liechtenstein, Ireland or 
Luxembourg and cities are benefitting particularly from globalisation.
From this perspective, Switzerland should be happy with the 
EU. Because it is the EU which pushes the neoliberal agenda of globalisa-
tion by means of the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. 
It could be pushed even further if Switzerland were to decide to become 
a member of the Union. But here lies a problem: globalisation and 
Europeanisation, like all free-trade policies, also bear economic disadvan-
tages. Farmers, small- and medium-sized enterprises and entire branches 
producing at higher costs than those on the world market disappear, and 
their jobs and professions with them. Innovation and disruption, named a 
process of ‘creative destruction’ by economist Joseph Schumpeter (2006 
[1942]), is accelerated. As everywhere, this process creates both winners 
and losers. In Switzerland, the winners concentrate in international export 
firms of industry and services with highly qualified jobs as described above, 
while the losers are found among the producers of domestic goods, crafts 
as well as among low qualified workers and in rural areas.
These conflicts between export and domestic industries, between urban 
and rural regions and between the different social strata are nothing new. 
But politically the traditional balance of political influence among these 
cleavages has changed considerably with globalisation. The bilaterals give 
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liberalising forces strong tailwind (Linder 2011). Thus, the framing of the 
conflict has changed completely: conflicts of globalisation and liberalisa-
tion became conflicts between the winners and losers of Europeanisation. 
It is well known that in EU countries, public opinion attributes the advan-
tages of integration to their own government while Brussels is blamed for 
all mishaps. In Switzerland, one can observe a similar mindset—with two 
consequences: first, the losers of globalisation strongly oppose Brussels 
and any further step towards European integration. Second, the 
Eurosceptic camp also includes many who actually profit from 
Europeanisation but interpret these advantages as resulting from the 
autonomy of the Swiss government and the proficiency of Swiss industry. 
Thus, the political economy logic implies that Eurosceptics hold better 
cards than Europhiles.
7.2  Can thE institutions of sWiss dEMoCraCy 
autonoMously survivE?
Direct democracy, highly valued national autonomy and neutrality as well 
as the political economy of globalisation are plausible reasons why 
Switzerland has not joined the EU so far. As all these factors are durable, 
we would not expect the country to join the EU anytime soon. At the 
same time, it is highly improbable that the Swiss will abandon the bilater-
als at their own choosing—a ‘Swixit’ would hurt the more vulnerable 
country even more than the British in the case of ‘Brexit’. Thus 
Switzerland—without co-decision in Brussels—will be exposed to further 
Europeanisation and globalisation. In light of the last two decades of bilat-
eralism and further internationalisation, the effects on the Swiss polity are 
considerable (Linder 2011):
Internationalisation of legislation: In 1982, domestic law represented 
53% of all federal law, while 47% consisted of international treaties. In 
2007, this proportion was exactly reversed, and the higher growth of 
international law is continuing (Linder 2017). Real internationalisation is 
even greater, as these statistics do not include domestic law which—in the 
euphemistic term of ‘autonomous adaptation’—is harmonised with EU 
provisions voluntarily (Jenni 2016).
Powers shifting away from parliament to the executive and to diplomacy: 
The internationalisation of law means a considerable loss of power for a 
parliament who cannot discuss and alter specific provisions of international 
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law. Despite being consulted in the process of negotiation, parliament is 
restricted to approving or refusing treaties already negotiated and signed 
by the government and its diplomacy. Moreover, important international 
treaties are subject to a referendum (see Chap. 4, Table 4.1).
Federalism: Europeanisation is curtailing cantonal legislation and 
autonomy. While in the past the cantons carefully defended their compe-
tencies against federal authorities, they are without institutional means to 
prevent their own legislation being harmonised with EU law. This in the 
end means a new type of ‘cold’ centralisation. As a reaction to EU deci-
sions becoming ever-more important domestically, a ‘Law on the 
Participation of the Cantons in Swiss Foreign Policy’ was passed in 1999, 
when the Federal Constitution was fully revised the last time. The cantons, 
however, want more (KdK 2013).
Direct democracy: Through the referendum, the people can say ‘no’ to 
an important international treaty. A constitutional amendment, approved 
by a majority of the people and the cantons, can charge authorities to alter 
or to cancel an existing international treaty. These ‘exit’ options, partly 
introduced in 2003, seem to extend the people’s rights but also lead to a 
higher vulnerability of the Swiss government. The voice of the people can 
be in conflict with existing international law or the obligations of existing 
international treaties. We have described above how this led to a dilemma 
in the case of the popular initiative ‘against mass immigration’. The cred-
ibility of the government in negotiating international treaties might suffer 
because it cannot give guarantees that the result will pass a possible refer-
endum challenge. As curtailing popular rights is not feasible, the govern-
ment will be confronted with these dilemmas, risks and a loss of credibility 
in the field of international relations.
Policy changes under pressure from the outside: A number of substantial 
policy changes have happened under considerable pressure from the out-
side. The most prominent example is the renouncing on the banking 
secret. On the one hand, these changes can be seen as innovations for 
which blocking majorities for the status quo ante and the immobility of 
Swiss politics were overcome. On the other hand, it means that Swiss pro-
cesses of power-sharing are partially bypassed. Less accommodation leaves 
more political conflict unresolved.
Shrinking national autonomy: The common denominator of all these 
developments is that Switzerland, to a large degree, is losing a part of its 
national autonomy. Yet one can say that this is the fate of all the countries 
taking the path of globalisation, be it inside or outside the EU. But the 
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government is pretending that the ‘bilaterals’ are the ideal way to prevent 
Switzerland from losing autonomy, and that the country is keeping its 
autonomy because it is not an EU member. Both assertions are dangerous 
illusions, for several reasons: they cement the existing relationship, which 
does not allow Switzerland to participate in the shaping of EU decisions, 
although direct participation is one of the fundamental tenets of Swiss 
democracy. This is all the more worrisome the more the Swiss economy 
depends on European law. While the government sells the bilateral way as 
a strategy to protect the autonomy, it actually undermines it. Finally, in 
this way even the winners of Europeanisation believe that non- membership 
pays off, which bars the way towards real alternative arrangements.
7.3  thE futurE
The vote on the EEA in 1992 was a vote on Switzerland’s political future 
and national identity, and that very question has been dividing the country 
ever since. What is more, the divide between pro- and anti-EU citizens 
threatens to swallow up the middle ground of pragmatic, selective voters 
and puts in jeopardy one of Switzerland’s hidden secrets: cross-cutting 
cleavages. For if Europhiles are found in the French-speaking, urban and 
prosperous areas and Eurosceptics in the German-speaking, rural and 
rather destitute lands (Widmer and Buri 1992; Mueller 2019), shifting 
majorities and minorities are impossible on this question.
As always, the choice is one between ‘innovation and stagnation’ 
(Deutsch 1976). The country’s political future is less certain and political 
compromise less easy than for a long time in the past. Even consensus itself 
might be on the line. Pressure from the outside has led to a two-speed 
political process: accelerated and asymmetrical in international affairs, 
incremental and balanced in domestic politics. Liberalising forces use glo-
balisation as their tool; the traditional balance between the interests of the 
domestic and the internationalised economy has changed. Globalisation 
weakens many of the traditional veto points; federal autonomy of the can-
tons, similar to national autonomy, has lost significance in the economy, in 
policies and beyond. No wonder that Swiss politics, too, has become much 
more polarised (e.g. Bochsler et  al. 2015; Traber 2015; Vatter 2016; 
Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015; Kriesi 2015).
‘Switzerland is on its way of becoming a divided society rather than the 
paradigm of cohesion claimed by Deutsch in the 1970s’, is the verdict of 
the British scholar Clive Church (2004, 223), a most reliable outside 
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observer of Swiss politics for decades. And, before a clear majority com-
mitment for European integration would ever be possible, he adds, 
‘Europe may do damage to Swiss political integration’. For the moment, 
this outlook remains realistic rather than pessimistic. But other scenarios 
are possible, too. As long as the EU remains an elitist and bureaucratic 
project with little (direct-)democratic legitimation, Swiss voters will not 
accept to join. Direct democracy, while being one of the main obstacles for 
membership (though one that can be overcome), is at the same time the 
most robust political institution that holds the Swiss together:
• At the level of elites, it forces actors to share power and maintain 
cooperation, negotiation and compromise despite all other transfor-
mations of the Swiss polity.
• At the level of citizens, it creates commonality of voting opportunity 
and experience despite growing social and territorial divides and dif-
ficulties induced by globalisation.
In this sense, Deutsch’s paradigm of integration through political institu-
tions is still true.
7.4  What thE CasE of sWitzErland Can bring 
to othErs
7.4.1  Switzerland: An ‘export model’?
Because of its combination of direct participation with political stability 
and economic success, of federalism with political innovation, and of 
power-sharing with conflict resolution, Switzerland is often called a 
‘model’. In a time when democracy is under pressure worldwide, the Swiss 
are generally proud of theirs and would never trade it in. But can the Swiss 
system, considered as the ‘ideal model’ by themselves, really serve as a 
model for others?
History tells us that this is not unconceivable. In 1926, Kemal Atatürk, 
the Father of the modern Republic of Turkey, adopted the Swiss civil law 
for his country. After the fall of the USSR, many Islamic countries in the 
south of the Soviet Union, now independent, adopted the Turkish code of 
civil law. Today, over 350 million people live under direct or indirect influ-
ence of Swiss civil law.
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In the meantime, Switzerland’s polity offers many features whose 
export seems to be useful at many places: the Swiss institutions of power- 
sharing, for instance, which allowed for overcoming the cultural cleavages 
of language and religion, could play an important role in solving conflict 
in deeply divided societies such as Iraq or Syria. In countries struggling 
with secessionist movements like the Catalans in Spain, the Swiss case of 
the separation of Jura from Bern could help find a peaceful solution. 
Federalism and the use of decentralisation as a means of creative problem- 
solving could also be a valid option for over-centralised polities, that is 
states whose top-down policies are ineffective and fail. Finally, the call for 
more direct participation has become louder in many European countries. 
Could direct-democracy not become, just like chocolate, cheese and 
watches, one of the main export-articles of Switzerland?
Our answer on the appropriateness of such export strategies for Swiss 
democracy is ‘no’, and this for two reasons. The first is simple: Switzerland 
does not belong to the big powers capable of exporting their model of 
democracy as were the US and General MacArthur in 1946, who drafted 
the new Constitution of Japan and imposed it to that loser of World War II.
The second reason is more complex. Let us begin with the question of 
cultural differences. Political institutions have a different political and cul-
tural context even amongst countries of similar socioeconomic level. The 
UK, for instance, which has to contend with secessionist forces in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, would not welcome a Swiss mediator pro-
posing federalist institutions. For the British, the word ‘federalism’ has 
connotations of centralisation and would be in contradiction to any own 
project of devolution of power. Or, if direct democracy would be intro-
duced in the EU, one could not expect the peoples of the EU countries to 
behave like the peoples of the Swiss cantons simply because the common 
interests are much stronger among the latter (Armingeon 2009).
While ‘difference of culture’ as an obstacle to the direct export of insti-
tutions is obvious in these cases, it is often not respected with regard to 
developing countries. The agenda of big powers of the First World and 
their agencies is full of democratisation, good governance or even human 
right programmes lacking respect and empathy for the societal context of 
countries in transition. Their numerous failures can be explained by several 
factors: many of them are ethnocentric and blind for the sociocultural 
particularities of the addressed countries. Few of them take into consider-
ation that before democratisation is feasible, the state as well as the econ-
omy must first have reached a certain degree of consolidation, and that in 
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traditional societies Western institutions of democracy cannot immediately 
take ground (Carothers 1999; Linder et al. 2008a). Finally, democratisa-
tion is often abused as a geopolitical strategy. The lesson is that all these 
forms of ‘exporting democracy’ are not recommendable and do not help. 
Therefore, we strongly doubt that the very idea of exporting political 
institutions is feasible. What we propose instead is a dialogue.
7.4.2  The ‘dialogue model’
Switzerland has an old tradition of offering ‘good services’ to the interna-
tional community. These services include maintaining diplomatic relations 
when two countries cut them off (e.g. between Cuba and the US until 
2015, or between Georgia and Russia, since 2008/9), peacekeeping such 
as controlling the de facto border between North and South Korea, peace 
negotiations as between Russia and Chechenia, or rendering independent 
reports to the UN (as in the case of the armed conflict between Russia and 
Georgia in 2008). In many of these cases, the long-standing neutrality of 
the country has played an important role: Switzerland was considered to 
be an impartial mediator or actor, having no stake in the game.
This practice of ‘good services’ could be extended further to the trans-
fer of institutional knowledge, especially to young democracies. The ‘good 
services’ follow the idea of the ‘dialogue model’, which means that actors 
participate based on their own will and want to discuss questions of (fur-
ther) democratisation on equal terms and on the basis of arguments. This 
implies respect and empathy—each is going into the other’s argument, 
willing to learn by mutual understanding and to review his own views.
While it is not perceivable that Swiss democracy can be introduced else-
where as a ‘model’, its partners in dialogue could profit from the Swiss 
experience with the workings of particular elements. No matter whether 
in academic discussion, in expertise, or official cooperation, such dialogues 
have similarities and follow a certain logic. To begin with, ‘democracy’ is 
not a negotiation chip but an issue on which partners come together as 
equals with the objective to solve problems by mutual learning. It is useful 
that both partners expose the same issue in their own social and economic 
context. This includes their narrative of wars, conflicts, failures and suc-
cesses, and the functioning of their institutions in their own social or eco-
nomic environment. This is the common ground on which both sides are 
able to identify their interest on problem-solving, be it on the levels of 
institutions (polity), decision-making (politics) or actual issues (policies).
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This allows a learning process on either side: both will realise that ele-
ments of reform cannot be exported or imported as such because they 
have their particular meanings and functions in different societal contexts. 
One side will learn, for instance, that the Swiss are not peaceful by nature 
but because of their institutions. The other side will become aware that 
direct participation is practised in many local societies from Asia to Africa. 
With such insights, partners can draw on the Swiss experience to then 
develop their own solutions for reform.
In such mutual learning processes, which we could personally experi-
ence in many countries in Eastern Europe, the Near East, Asia and Africa, 
Swiss democracy was not used as an export model but proved to be a most 
precious point of departure for a credible, respectful and open dialogue. 
What became increasingly obvious in the course of such dialogues is that 
democracy and its institutions can neither be imposed from the outside 
nor implemented top-down. We thus end this book on the belief that 
democracy and its institutions have the best chances when developed 
through the political will of a people, adjusted to its socioeconomic condi-
tions, and in line with a country’s own cultural heritage.
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